The last post devoted to the executive power of the European federation will deal with realization of the executive power by the Council of Chancellors.
The first article of my proposal first deals with a question who will be in the chair of the Council of Chancellors. All Chancellors should have wholly equal position according to my suggestion but a function of a chairman is necessary for practical reason. A question of presidency is unnecessary at the moment of election, nobody of the respective group of candidates should act as a candidate for a president. Because no hierarchy among individual candidates there should be, it is necessary to choice a chairman after the election. It corresponds however not to equality of all chancellors that one of them is appointed a chairman for the whole term of service of the Council of Chancellors whereas the others would be in position of “ordinary” chancellors. The best solution is therefore alternation of presidency similarly as in the case of the Swiss Federal Council. It is elected by the Swiss federal parliament and it also elects a President of the Council from among its members every year. But it is impossible at the Council of Chancellors for its origin is not derived from the parliament. The only acceptable manner that enters my mind is by drawing lots. The term of service of the Council of Chancellors is divided in three equal periods and each chancellor will be a chairman of the Council (so he (she) will be a First Chancellor in official terminology) in this way determined period of time by which equality of all three chancellors will be preserved. Taking its importance into account, drawing lots should be realized in a public and solemn manner, in the best case along with the obligatory oath. Such suitable public and solemn manner is a joint session of both chambers of the Assembly of the Union. There is only one question there, namely who will be in the chair in such joint session. In most bicameral parliaments is the lower chamber preferred and its president usually chairs the session. In my proposal, both chambers of the European federal parliament are equal but the same is in the case of the Swiss federal parliament whose chambers are constitutionally equal as well and in spite of it their joint session are chaired by the president of the “lower” chamber (the National Council). So I choose the same solution for the European constitution.
Next my suggested article deals already with work of the Council of Chancellors. First, however, it defines purpose of existence of the Council. The purposes are two: to perform decisions of the legislative and judiciary power and, independently on them, to execute measures for the good of citizens of the federation. In the case of the second, it is necessary to emphasize that it must go on in the frame of laws of the federation, otherwise power of the Council of Chancellors would be limitless.
Further, sessions of the Council of Chancellors themselves are described. As in the case of the Assembly of the Union, I determined the Federal Region of Brussels as a place where sessions of the Council should take place; and with a supplement that it can be also another place in the federation in the case of exceptional circumstances.
The next two letters of the text determine that sessions of the Council are non-public, unless the Council determines otherwise and that the First Chancellor calls and chairs sessions of the Council, in urgent cases other Chancellor of the Union.
I wrote about the next item already in the previous post – a decision of the Council of Chancellors is adopted by absolute majority, that is by two of three votes.
As well as in usual governments where a certain minister is charged with performing the decision of the government, also in the Council of Chancellors, a certain chancellor must be charged with the performing a Council's decision. I added a provision that such chancellor has the right to issue necessary decrees performing the decision though it may seem obvious.
Not only laws adopted by the parliament, also decisions of the Council of Chancellors have to meet certain formal requirements to come into force. The main condition is inscription in the Official Journal, although I added a possibility that it is not necessary to wait for inscription in the case of urgent necessity. Details however have to be regulated by a separate law in order that it is not abused.
A compensation for that sessions of the Council of Chancellors can be non-public has to be necessity to make out a written record (minutes) of every session which is after all usual in work of governments.
I devoted the following two suggested articles to two spheres of competencies of the executive power whose relation to Chancellors of the Union should be generally determined in the constitution. The first of them concerns foreign relations, in concrete terms who should represent the European federation externally. A head of state usually represents the state externally in most European states, it is mostly a president or a monarch but my proposal of the constitution of the European federation includes no such function of a president or similar representative person (the function of a president is a republican “remake” of a monarch and I consider it superfluous). In the case of absence of such function, it is possible to consider a collective head of state like (for example) in Switzerland; there is however a practice in Switzerland that the President of (Con)federation, a chairman of the federal government and of the collective head of state at the same time, acts as a head of state abroad. Therefore I included a provision to my constitutional proposal that the First Chancellor is the highest representative of the Union who represents it externally. I reserved however also a possibility that the Council of Chancellors put representation of the Union externally to the hands of other chancellor.
I detached, from acts of representation of the federation externally, matters of diplomatic mission in a separate provision. It is again mainly a task of the First Chancellor and he in my proposal independently can receive credentials of foreign diplomatic representatives. Also formal appointment and recall of ambassadors should be put in his hands but not on the basis of solely his decision, rather on the authority of the Council.
The following provision corresponds to present practice in most present states and should be present also in the constitution of the European federation. The matter is negotiation of international treaties and their ratification. Usually, it has to do with a head of state or with a government and because both of these functions are incorporated in the Council of Chancellors, negotiation and ratification of international treaties must therefore be its responsibility. But the Council cannot be allowed to secretly negotiate whatever, so it has to have an obligation to inform the parliament about progress of negotiation. The last step, by the way, must be according to me acknowledgment by people's vote but the turn of this matter comes later in the respective part of the constitution.
And the second article regulating performing executive power of the federation deals with relation of the Council of Chancellors to military affairs. First: who will be a commander in chief of armed forces of the European federation? The Council as a whole or the First Chancellor are the choices. In Switzerland that has a collective head of state identical with a government, a general (e. g. a soldier) is appointed by the parliament in the post of the commander in chief but under supreme authority of the government. I on the contrary believe that supreme authority over the armed forces of the European federation should hold one person and not (professional) soldier. So I put the authority of a commander in chief in the hands of the First chancellor along with competencies of appointing and recalling high officers of the armed forces and, before all, with the power to decide about use of the armed forces in both peace and war.
The next three provisions put limits on decision of the armed forces of the European federation by the chancellors. The first limit is that the armed forces of the federation can be dispatched outside the territory of the federation and the associated states only with approval of the Assembly of the Union.
But there has to be an exception for cases of urgent need. It however must have strict limitations as a protection against misuse. So the first limitation stipulated by me is an immediately imminent military attack or heavy natural disaster. The second limitation is a period of 50 hours – it is, I hope, a sufficiently long period so that the Assembly of the Union can manage to approve or reject further activities of federal armed forces outside the Union.
And other provision determines one more limitation, very important in my view – military activities against an enemy can be done only after a formal declaration of war (enacted by the parliament). It is my reaction to present abuse of military powers of European states (and before all of the USA). Their constitutions mostly make military actions dependent on a declaration of war, but present governments simply use such Orwellian terms like “preemptive strike”, “protection of civilians”, “searching for terrorists” that allow to pretend that no war is waged and so assent of the parliament is not asked though the same military actions are done as if a regular war was waged. Laws about waging war are evaded now, war is labeled in various other ways in order that own legal rules must not be followed. In the beginning of the 20th century, European states had ministries of war, today their cynical name is “ministry of defence” but wars are waged nothing less than at that time (the only difference is that today, European wars are waged predominantly outside of Europe). I do not want that any future European federation acts like European states today so I added to my proposal of this constitutional article a severe provision saying that any military actions against an enemy can be done only after formal declaration of war (and it by a special law). This provision should at least reduce if not remove excessive military campaigns (above that in good of only few chosen ones like great mining companies) which we can see today.
And that is all relating to the executive power of the European federation that has crossed my mind. The legal wording will follow and then I will come to the judiciary.
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