Showing posts with label Institutions - Judiciary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Institutions - Judiciary. Show all posts

14 October 2013

Federal judiciary - constitutional text

Chapter 3 – Judiciary
Article 44 – Federal judicial system
Judicial power of the European Union is vested in the Supreme Court of the Union, federal courts of first degree and federal courts of second degree.

Article 45 – Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of the Union is a supreme judicial body of the Union. It has a seat in the Federal Region of Brussels.

Article 46 – Composition of the Supreme Court
1. The Supreme Court of the Union is composed of the President of the Supreme Court and 18 judges.
2. Every citizen of the Union who completed the age of 40 years and is not older than 70 years with at least 10 years of practice in law of the Union can be elected a judge of the Supreme Court.
3. The House of People of the Assembly of the Union elects six judges of the Supreme Court, the House of States elects six judges, the Council of Chancellors appoints six judges.
4. The term of service of a judge of the Supreme Court is 13 years.
5. Details are stipulated by the law.

Article 47 – Election of the President of the Supreme Court
1. The President of the Supreme Court is elected by citizens of the Union in general, direct and secret elections held in all territory of the Union at the same time and according to the same rules.
2. Every citizen of the Union who reached the age of eighteen years has the right to elect the President of the Supreme Court.
3. Candidates for the President of the Supreme Court have to meet the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 46.
4. Every candidate has to prove itself with approval with his candidature of at least 50 000 citizens from at least three member states or other territories of the Union legitimate to vote to the House of People of the Assembly of the Union.
5. The candidate who obtains the majority of votes of citizens and at the same time the majority of votes of states is elected the President of the Supreme Court. Result of voting in the member state, the federal territory of the Union or the Federal Region of Brussels counts as the vote of state.
6. If no candidate is elected the procedure advances in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of article 37.
7. Details of the election are stipulated by the law.

Article 48 – Rights and duties of judges of the Supreme Court
1. Nobody is allowed to be a judge of the Supreme Court and to hold any constitutional or other salaried office of the European Union, of any member state or its autonomous entity or of any other territory of the Union.
2. A judge of the Supreme Court is obliged to refrain from all action that could degrade his dignity and trust in impartiality and independence of the Supreme Court.
3. A judge of the Supreme Court may not be prosecuted, restricted in his free movement or arrested unless caught while committing a criminal act.
4. Judges of the Supreme Court receive a salary paid from means of the Union. To receive other remunerations is inadmissible.
5. The mandate of a judge of the Supreme Court becomes effective by his appointment. The mandate of the President of the Supreme Court becomes effective by his election.
6. Every judge of the Supreme Court takes the oath at his first attendance in the plenum. The oath of a judge of the Supreme Court reads: “I, … (name of a person), solemnly pledge now to defend inviolability of rights of citizens of the Union emerging from nature of the man and from laws of the Union in compliance with my conscience and to fulfill the spirit of the constitution of the Union.”
7. The mandate of a judge of the Supreme Court expires by
(a) expiration of the term of mandate,
(b) refusing to take the oath or taking the oath with reservations,
(c) resignation,
(d) death,
(e) exercise of an incompatible function,
(f) sentence for a deliberate offence.
8. The law stipulates details of rights and duties of judges of the Supreme Court.

Article 49 – Powers of the Supreme Court in first instance
The Supreme Court is a court in first instance for
a) controversies between the Union and the member states,
b) controversies between the Union and the associated states,
c) controversies between the member states,
d) controversies between components of the state power of the Union specified in this constitution,
e) considering conformity of laws of the Union, of decisions of the Council of Chancellors and of constitutions and laws of the member states and other territories of the Union with the constitution of the Union.

Article 50 – Other powers of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court further
a) is an appellate instance for federal courts of second degree,
b) hears constitutional complaints again violation of the rights given by the constitution of the Union,
c) hears disputes concerning jurisdiction between courts of the Union and courts of the member states and other territories of the Union.

Article 51 – Decision-making
1. The Supreme Courts decides in the plenum about the issues enumerated in article 49. At least 14 votes of judges are necessary to pronounce a judgment.
2. The Supreme Court decides in collegia with three judges about the issues enumerated in article 50. At least two votes of judges are necessary to pronounce a judgment. The President of the Supreme Court is not a part of any collegium.
3. Hearing cases is either non-public or public. The President of the Supreme Court decides about public hearing in the plenum, a president of a collegium decides about public hearing in a collegium unless the President of the Supreme Court decides otherwise.
4. Every judge is entitled to make proposals and obliged to vote for one of submitted proposals in the body in which he decides.
5. Judgments of the Supreme Court are pronounced publicly.
6. Every judge has the right to attach his dissenting opinion with justification to a judgment.
7. Details about proceedings in the Supreme Courts are stipulated by the law.

Article 52 – President of the Supreme Court
1. The President of the Supreme Court
a) represents the Supreme Court externally;
b) presides over sessions and voting of the plenum; opens discussions and voting; his vote has the weight of two votes; charges a concrete judge to write a decision after voting;
c) assigns judges to collegia and appoints presidents of collegia; a judge cannot be transferred to another collegium in the course of hearing a case;
d) draws up a work plan for the Supreme Court and its individual parts for a certain period not shorter than two weeks; he can at his discretion commit a case belonging to a collegium to a decision of the plenum;
e) performs administration of the Supreme Court, engages employees for that purpose and determines their job content; assistants of judges have to meet the condition of education in the sphere of law of the Union; the law stipulates details.
2. In his absence, the President of the Supreme Court charge another judge of the Supreme Court with exercising his powers except of the right to vote.
3. Unless otherwise stipulated all provisions referring to other judges of the Supreme Court apply to the President of the Supreme Court.

Article 53 – Federal courts of first degree
1. The federal courts of first degree are courts of first instance authorized for all issues emerging from law of the Union and activities of state administration authorities of the Union.
2. The law stipulates seats of federal courts of first degree, territorial districts of their jurisdiction and details about their work.
3. Every federal court of first degree has departments:
a) commercial for matters following from commercial and financial law,
b) civil and criminal law for matters following from civil procedure law, copyright and criminal law,
c) labour and social for matters following from labour and social law,
d) administrative for matters following from administrative law.
At least one judge is assigned to each department. Judges decide as single judges.
4. Judges of federal courts of first degree are elected by the House of People of the Assembly of the Union. Every citizen of the Union who reached the age of 35 years with at least eight years of practice in law of the Union can be elected judge.
5. The provisions of article 48 apply to judges of federal courts of first degree.

Article 54 – Federal courts of second degree
1. The federal courts of second degree are appellate courts for matters heard at federal courts of first degree.
2. The law stipulates seats of federal courts of second degree, territorial districts of their jurisdiction and details about their work.
3. Every federal court of second degree has a department
a) commercial for matters following from commercial and financial law,
b) civil and criminal law for matters following from civil procedure law, copyright and criminal law,
c) labour and social for matters following from labour and social law,
d) administrative for matters following from administrative law.
At least three judges are assigned to each department. At least two votes of judges are necessary to pronounce a judgment.
4. Judges of federal courts of second degree are elected by the House of States of the Assembly of the Union. Every citizen of the Union who reached the age of 35 years with at least eight years of practice in law of the Union can be elected judge.
5. The provisions of article 48 apply to judges of federal courts of second degree.

30 September 2013

Lower federal courts

Whereas relevant constitutions usually write in details about a peak of the judicial system, existence of courts of lower degrees is often only briefly mentioned and all rules administering their function are pushed aside into ordinary laws. I do not want to expand on function of lower federal courts into the same details as about the Supreme Court in the proposal of the European federal constitution, yet the constitutional text should in my opinion determine at least the most elemental frame rules for the lower federal courts.

The principal judicial activity should take place at courts of the lowest degree, in other words at courts of first instance. Just at the first reference to them I face a question how the courts of first instance should be called (although it is not the most important thing). This degree of the judicial system is called district courts in the United States, which is a fitting name. I am however not inclined to rash copying, so I simply chose an appellation “federal courts of first degree”. Analogically, I gave the title of “federal courts of second degree” to the second level of the judicial system with appellate function (called courts of appeals in the United States).

As for a number of courts of the first and second degree, I cannot say anything concrete. Territorial extent of districts of respective courts and so also a number of inhabitants coming under jurisdiction of the respective court may be different and a total number of courts will depend on it. It is no other way but to leave it to an independent law.

I want also to leave rules about function of federal court of first and second degree to a different law but I regard as necessary that the constitution mentions their basic internal structure.  Because the federal courts of first degree should, according to my suggestion, deal with all affairs resulting from federal law it is necessary to reserve specialized judges or departments for certain spheres of affairs at each court. According to the competencies of the federation as suggested by me earlier, four departments at each federal court of first and second degree seem the most appropriate to me: a) commercial, b) civil and criminal, c) labour and social, d) administrative. Existence of some departments is understandable, a few words are necessary at some of them. There is not necessary to explain the commercial department for cases proceeding from commercial law as well as administrative department for matters of administrative law resulting from function of federal authorities. The labour and social department can awaken some questions, it is however based on that I left the labour law on federal level in the section about powers of the European federation and I determined co-operation of the federation and the member states in matters of health service and old age security in the social sphere ibidem. The most strange may seem why I assigned the civil and criminal department to every federal court. Who goes through powers of the federation that I described earlier finds out that matters coming under the civil and criminal law are not listed among competencies of the federation (that is they remain in competence of the member states). Yet there are some circumstances that force to use these spheres of law also on the federal level. As for criminal law, it is necessary to take criminal acts against authorities of the federation, property of the federation, currency of the federation and the like into account; after all, it is appropriate to remark that there is a federal criminal court in the Swiss federation. As far as civil law is concerned, some branches of it belonging under the power of the federation according to my suggestion are elements of it, namely it is a part of public law – civil procedure law (regulating actions at federal courts) and a part of private law – copyright law (other parts of intellectual property law would join commercial law and commercial departments of federal courts would apply them). There is unimportant to enumerate here other branches of law which can be applied in connection with powers of the European federation because they come under the Supreme Court of the federation in the first instance in my suggestion.

A thing of a number of judges assigned to individual departments and a number of judges adjudicating one thing naturally follows. It is usual that single judge decrees at courts of first instance which follows that every department of a federal court should have at least one judge. A federal court of the first degree so has to have at least four judges. It is however usual that judges decree in collegia (panels etc.) at appellate courts. If a number of three judges is wholly sufficient in one collegium, then every federal court of second degree would have at least twelve judges. A way of decision-making is in my suggestion this: through single judges at the courts of first degree, through collegia with three judges and with majority of two votes at the courts of second degree.

I did not mention a significant question yet who should appoint judges of federal courts of first and second degree. I entrusted appointment (election) to the Assembly of the Union (federal parliament) as in the case of the Supreme Court. Because the Assembly of the Union has two chambers in my suggestion, each of these chambers will vote judges of other level of the judicial system. Distribution of election between them is relatively simple – it can be assumed that a number of judges in the first degree will be greater due greater number of courts of this level in the judicial system than a number of appellate judges; therefore election of greater number of judges should be entrusted to greater of both chambers of the European federal parliament, namely the House of People and election of appellate judges thus remains at the House of States. Minimal requirements for judges is related to election of them. Unlike judges of the Supreme Court, lower age and shorter practice in federal law should suffice to judges of lower federal courts – namely a minimal age of 35 years and eight years of practice in Union's law.

Writing about the Supreme Court of the Union I did not mention delimitation of judge's mandate and his rights and duties. I believe that the same rules should be valid for all federal judges of the European Union regardless court level, so I write about them only now.

On principle, I took over the respective provisions concerning deputies of the Assembly of Union and members of the Council of Chancellors as I had them described earlier also for judges of federal courts making some smaller amendments or supplements required by substance of the thing. One provision was added by me in provisions about rights and duties which says that a judge is obliged to refrain from action that could debase his dignity or arouse doubts about impartiality of decision of the court of what he is a member. I modified also an oath of judges to a hearing: “I, … (name of a person), solemnly pledge now to protect inviolability of rights of the people of the European Union arising from nature of the man and from laws of the Union in compliance with my conscience and to fulfill the spirit of the constitution of the Union.” I hope that it is evident that nature of the man is meant natural law. Then, I gave condemnation for a deliberate criminal offence, not only imprisonment as in the case of deputies of the federal parliament or members of the Council of Chancellors as one of conditions for termination of a judge's mandate.

21 August 2013

Powers and organization of the Supreme Court

I suggested already what functions the Supreme Court of the federation should have in an earlier post about overall form of the judicial system of the European federation, now I will synopticly summarize it, will deal also with organization of court's work and add powers of the president of the Supreme Court to it as I wrote above in the previous post.

Powers of the Supreme Court were basically given by me earlier, so I will namely put them into two groups; other will follow. The powers closely related to the constitution will be in the first group, namely resolving conflicts between the federation and the member states, conflicts among highest bodies of the federation's state power, also conflicts between the federation and the associated states (mentioned earlier), conflicts among the member states and finally adjudicating conformity of laws of the Union and of decrees of the Council of Chancellors as well as of constitutions, laws and other directives of the member states with the constitution of the Union.

The second group will include competencies following from position of the Supreme Court as a supreme member of the federal judicial system, namely hearing appeals from federal courts of second degree, constitutional complaints of citizens about violation of rights given by the constitution and also – which I have not mentioned earlier – conflicts about competency of court between the Union and the member states.

The mentioned division of the Supreme Court's competencies in two groups has its function not only in differentiation between constitutional and non-constitutional matters but also in a way of their hearing. The first group of matters – because of their significance – must be heard in the plenum of all 19 judges, collegia of three judges then suffice for matters of the second group. A question of majorities necessary to adopt a decision follows. It is simple at hearing cases in collegia – if there are three judges and unanimity is not required, votes of two judges are an only possible majority. I consider the same majority of two thirds of votes to be appropriate for a plenum vote (if the plenum hears more significant cases, why it should have a smaller majority?), that is concretely 14 votes (why not 13 I explain below). I do not suppose that it is necessary to determine a quorum, mentioned majorities should be valid in whatever number of present judges which means in practice the less judges are present the more unanimous their opinion must be.

There is another question whether proceedings should be public or non-public. I suppose that it is not necessary that they are public but I leave a decision to the judges themselves, concretely at the President of the Supreme Court when a case is heard in the plenum and at the chairman of a collegium if a case is heard in a collegium. To pronounce a verdict is however something else, it has to be pronounced publicly.

The last two provisions which I decided to insert in this section relate to a procedure of judges. According to the first of them, every judge has the right to suggest own proposal at hearing a case and then the obligation to vote for one of all suggested proposals – it makes to abstain from voting impossible. The second provision gives the right to attach their dissenting opinion to the judgment to the judges who disagree with a result of a voting; this should be valid for hearing cases either in the plenum and in collegia.

Now I move to provisions about the President of the Supreme Court. I wrote in the previous post that the President should be an only judge of the Supreme Court elected directly by citizens and his (her) exceptional position in the Supreme Court should be in accordance with it. Organizational powers are naturally above all the point; I tried to determine them in a way that the president has an influence on direction and decision-making of the court though he cannot get round voting of other judges.

That the president will represent the Supreme Court externally is self-evident so I immediately go over to other competencies and they concern hearing in the plenum. The president of the court should have the right to call a session of the plenum, to chair it, to open discussion and to vote as the first and to charge a concrete judge with writing a decision after voting. Because he should not be a member of any collegium he can vote only in the plenum. Here I asked myself a question whether to moderate discussion and to vote in the plenum is a sufficient possibility to influence the court's direction of opinion. Although I will mention more other administrative powers of the president of the court I reached the conclusion that it itself cannot be a sufficient expression of the president of the court's exceptionality against other judges and that I can dare to assign two votes to him at voting – it is not too exaggerated, the president alone this way cannot outvote other judges, it however symbolicly reflects that he unlike other judges was established in his office directly by the people. Then a majority of minimally 14 votes instead of 13 for pronouncing a judgment in the plenum follows from it as I have mentioned above.

Other competencies of the President of the Supreme Court relate to filling the collegia; he should have the right to place the judges to individual collegia and to determine their chairmen in my suggestion. I determined however one restriction so as the president of the court cannot arbitrarily manipulate with things being heard through transferring judges; this should be prevented with a provision that a judge cannot be transferred to another collegium in the time in which he considers a case but only after pronouncing a judgment. I also leave in the president's hands to determine a work plan of the plenum and the collegia, with a condition that it will not be for a period shorter than two weeks. I added one more to powers of the President of the Supreme Court over the collegia, namely a power at discretion to commit a case belonging to a collegium to plenum's hearing. The president's last administrative competence in my suggestion then is to manage ordinary operation of the Supreme Court, to engage employees and determine their job content; a condition was added by me here that employees assigned as judges' assistants must be educated in law of the Union (with detail stipulated by the law).

A question of temporary replacement of the President of the Supreme Court remains. There is no permanent Vice-President of the court in my proposal. By that reason, I added a provision that the president of the court can entrust anyone else judge with execution of his powers in the time of his absence but with one exception, namely the right to vote. As I have already written two votes of the President of the Supreme Court are expression of that he has unlike other judges direct support of citizens, no other judge should therefore have these two votes at his disposal. But there is a question whether the president of the court would schedule a plenum voting for a time of his absence.

I have no other special power for the president, so a statement remains that – except as above stated – all provisions concerning other judges (including matters about which I have not written yet) should relate to the court's president too.

Rules regulating election of the President of the Supreme Court naturally cannot be absent among other provisions concerning him (her). I believe that it is not necessary to invent anything new and that provisions regulating election of the Council of Chancellors (see here) should be used here, that is to say the majority system of two rounds with a requirement of double majority. The only two differences are in requirements for candidates and in number of citizens requisite to enroll a candidate. A candidate for the President of the Supreme Court has to meet criteria for other judges of this court, it is to say age of 40-70 years and activity in law of the Union of at least 10 years. As number of supporting citizens is concerned I decreased it against the corresponding number at election of the Council of Chancellors because experts of law discipline have smaller chance to obtain broader people's support than representatives of executive public functions. So my numbers are in this case 50 000 supporting citizens (a half of the number required to support  candidates for the Council of Chancellors) from at least three member states (or other members of the federation).

30 June 2013

Function of judges of the federal Supreme Court

In the previous post I presented my idea that a supreme court of the European federation should have the function of a constitutional court and at the same time a court of last resort on the top of the federal judicial system. Now I will deal with the concrete form of the court, namely with three questions – how many members (judges) the court should have, for how long time the judges should hold their function and in what way they should be installed in their functions.

I start with the size of the court. What number of judges would be the most suitable for the supreme court of the European federation? The court that I took as an example, the Supreme Court of the United States of America, has nine judges. Such number seems to me however low for purposes of the European federation, especially because a role of European constitutional courts is somewhat broader than the constitutional role of the Supreme Court of the USA. The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland presents a wholly different number – it has 38 judges (in the present time). This number can seem surprisingly high in view of the size of Switzerland but it is due to the fact that there is not a fully developed federal judicial system of more degrees in Switzerland (the FSC was the only federal court for the long time). The Court of Justice of the European Union which can partially be compared to a constitutional court has 27 judges at present which is the number corresponding to the number of the member states of the community. The constitutional court of Russia has 19 judges which I regard as being in a reasonable range. The number of judges of the supreme court of the European federation must not be to high in order that the most important things can be heard in a plenary session (the number of 27 or even higher would be too high for that) but it must not be also too low in order that a sufficient number of collegia with lower number of judges to hear appeals from federal courts of lower degrees and to deal with constitutional complaints can be made. Finally, I came to the number 19, primarily on the basis of the number of collegia of the lower number of judges. If one of functions of the supreme court of the European federation should be to judge constitutional complaints that every citizen can file as it is common in practice of many European constitutional courts it can be expected that a number of such complaints will not be inconsiderable, so the number of collegia must correspond to it. For that reason I suggest to create six collegia and because the lowest reasonable number of judges of one collegium is three it makes together the resulting number 18. The president of the court should have a special position and should not participate in any collegium, he (she) should (in addition to other duties) only participate in plenary sessions and chair them. Nineteen judges may seem many for plenary decision making but similar numbers are known also from elsewhere (for example, the plenum of the constitutional court of Ukraine numbers 18 judges, the plenum of the supreme court of Finland as well); if we weigh up that nineteen persons can decide whether laws are constitutional that hundreds of millions people will be governed by, it is not a high number at all.

The second question is how long the judges of the supreme court of the European federation should hold their functions. There are two possibilities – lifetime tenure or for a determinate period of time. Appointment for lifetime naturally is also appointment for a limited period, only the period is not delimited in advance and usually is longer than terms determinate in advance. Nonetheless, judges in many states where appointed for lifetime have an obligation to retire after they have achieved a certain age and if a fact is added that a minimal limit of age of a candidate is determined is some states, appointment for lifetime in fact is appointment for a period that must not exceed some concrete number of years. It is better in that case right away to determine a determinate period equal for all judges which I prefer. And how long the period should be? It should represent balance between change and stability. Too long term of mandate of judges could result in enforcing outdated view at organization of society that accords not with changed societal reality, too short term of mandate on the other way could lead to frequent alterations of the Supreme Court's opinions and so to certain legal uncertainty in some measure. I take a period slightly exceeding 10 years for the best for the term of mandate of a judge of the supreme court of the European federation. I chose the term of 13 years, for that ground that the given number overlaps not with election cycle to the Assembly of the Union (4 years) and to the Council of Chancellors (5 years). A question is connected also with this number whether members of the supreme court should have the right to re-installation after their mandate has expired. I believe that it is not suitable, just due to length of the mandate: a mandate for twice 13 years or close to it in fact would be a lifetime mandate.

The last question remains, namely a way of installation of the judges of the supreme court of the European federation in their functions. I was hesitating here long before I decided for the solution. Because the supreme court (in the concept that I write here about) is one of three most important state bodies and if both the House of People of the Assembly of the Union and the Council of Chancellors are directly elected by citizens in my suggestion, I put a question to me whether the third of the most important state bodies should also be directly elected. Popular election of judges is not an unknown thing, it is under way for example in Switzerland in Europe (judges of lower courts), in the United States of America outside Europe (in state level, again mostly judges of lower courts but also of highest courts somewhere). So there are concrete experiences and there is also a long-lasting debate about advantages and disadvantages of popular vote of judges. It is stated as an advantage of popular vote that judges elected this way have greater responsibility to the people and have more respect to public sentiment or that direct election gives a legitimacy to the judges to be self-confident counterweight to other components of the state power; it is stated as an disadvantage that people are not able to consider quality of candidates and tend to choose according to partisan or secondary criteria or that directly elected judges can be influenced in their decision making by pressures of those who supported them in the election campaign (with money). Both kinds of arguments are weighty and do not facilitate a simple, prompt decision. There is an objection against popular vote of judges that it is purposeless because judges anyway must judge a thing by correct interpretation of law and there is no place for subjective beliefs in it. But it is not true; so why courts of highest levels judge in collegia (senates) and decide by voting if law can be applied only in sole way? I will introduce two examples of subjective (and most likely unconstitutional) decisions of the constitutional court of the Czech Republic which made me to ponder popular election of judges of the supreme court of the European federation.

In 2008, the right-wing government of the Czech Republic consisting of political parties loaded in favour of influential business groups and connected with them through corruption introduced (through the parliament) limitations (“ceilings”) on levies in the system of public pension and medical insurance for highest income groups (including great firms). These changes caused a loss in amount of (in conversion) 1,46 milliard euro in the public health system only in the first year of the respective law's force and the health system went further down in next years (the government called it a result of the global economic crisis). In order that the health system collapsed not the government introduced (through the parliament) charges for a visit to a doctor, for a hospital stay and extra charges to medicines to compensate the loss mentioned above (the official governmental justification was that people excessively use health care and waste medicines). It was in fact a transfer of (part of) tax duty from the richest to the middle classes and the poor (a typical neoliberal agenda known Europe-wide). The opposition termed it breaking the constitutional article which says that“ citizens shall have the right, on the basis of public insurance, to free medical care and to medical aids under conditions provided for by law”. Medical charges then came to the constitutional court which decided by close majority of votes that they are in conformity with the constitution. A core of its decision was that amount of the charges was not set so high that anybody would be kept from access to the public health care. The judgment even insinuated that free health care relates to the totalitarian communist regime (in which it really started – one of paradoxes of that age) as if it should be restricted in a democratic regime and acceptability of medical charges justified by reference to Hammurabi's code of law of ancient Babylon (!) that prescribed to pay for medical care as if no social progress could occur since than. The constitutional court itself thus by its own judgment (strangely justified in addition) authorized violation of the constitutional article which access to free medical care conditions only by paying public health insurance. In addition, the assertion of the court that amount of medical charges is no obstacle to access to health care proved to be untruth because the charges appreciably afflicted in particular old people who need health care in a higher degree and even mainstream mass media (which constantly uncritically favour whatever right-wing government and which after pronouncing the judgment predominantly exulted that the left-wing opposition succeeded not at the constitutional court) from time to time bring news about pensioners who reduce purchase of foodstuff to be able to afford medicine charges (that increase after their introduction which the constitutional court “could not” anticipate) or even visit not a doctor in the case of health inconveniences because they presume not to be able to afford to buy medicines that the doctor would prescribe to them. The constitutional court of the Czech republic gave another similar ruling recently. A right-wing government (other than in 2008 but corrupted even more) in 2012, in defiance of opinion of most citizens, pressed donation of public landed property in value of approximately 2,9 milliards euro to the catholic church with official substantiation that it is a remedy of injuries of the communist totalitarian regime (the public believes that it is only a pretext and that this property at least in part should be thieved by influential business groups connected to the government parties). The respective law (adopted by manipulating voting procedures in both chambers of the parliament and by bribing some deputies) came to the constitutional court which confirmed it as adopted in conformity with the constitution and not opposing it. One of the judges of the constitutional court attacked the decision of the court in his dissenting opinion writing that the constitutional court disregarded unlawfulness and immorality of the manner in which the respective law was pressed in the parliament, further the fact that the government conceals what concrete property should be given, that a principle of equality was violated because the catholic church should be more than abundantly compensated while others damaged in the age of the totalitarian regime received only small or even no restitution and that donation of immense property to the catholic church will appreciably raise its influence in the society which endangers religious neutrality of the state. The public feels this decision of the constitutional court unfair, there are voices that the constitutional court does not the job for which it was established.

Two mentioned examples of low-quality judgments of the court that should protect constitutional rights of the citizens but does it not can be attributed to low level of the society in the Czech Republic (as in other post-communist countries) but I believe that there can be a danger also in western Europe that courts guarding constitutionality may not put the proper accent to the rights of the citizens. From this point of view the argument supporting popular election of judges seems to me fully legitimate that says that judges elected this way will more observe interests of the people. In spite of it, I am not sure that it is possible to hold elections of 19 judges of the Supreme Court in a Europe-wide frame so that it has the effect that I have mentioned. After all, judges stand not in the main focus of mass media and it is more difficult to get information about all candidates for citizens in a wider European extent if no pan-European mass media exist. It would be also an organizational problem – how many candidates would have to run if 19 of them should be elected? Therefore I believe that especially in the very beginning of the European federation, it would be a problem to satisfactorily choose 19 judges by popular election so I decided for traditional appointment though I rejected the popular vote not entirely. In the end, there is one problem yet connected with appointment – namely whether appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court should be committed to the executive power with ratification of the legislative power as it is common in many states. The problem is that I wrote earlier that both chambers of the European federal parliament should be fully equal and it would follow from it that both chambers would have to deal with candidates proposed by the Council of Chancellors – and it would be complicated and lengthy. It would be also possible to use a joint session (as in Switzerland) but thus the principle of their equipollent status would be gone because of their different size. Finally I decided to divide appointment among three components of the state power – one third of judges appointed by the Council of Chancellors, one third by the House of the People and last third by the House of States. Altogether it is 18 judges and the last, just the president of the court would be chosen in mentioned popular election. Significance of the court's president (his/her competencies) should be in accordance to the fact that he, unlike other judges, was elected directly by the citizens, nevertheless I will get on to it in another post.

31 May 2013

Federal judiciary - general overview

It is left to me now to discuss the remaining component of the principal state powers of the European federation, the judicial power. Before I start describing (in the next post) concrete questions, it is necessary to think about a general form of the judicial power of the European federation. Two questions that are mutually connected have to be answered – how many courts and what types of courts should to execute the judicial power of the federation and what connection should be between the federal judiciary and courts of the member states. There are two choices in principle: either the European federation will have one supreme court whose content will be to resolve questions of jurisdiction between the federation and the member states and among supreme bodies of the federation (or possibly in addition to it several specialized courts, as for patent matters for example) and remaining disputable matters following from federal law will judge the member states courts (as in the present EU) or federal law will be interpreted and judged solely by a fully developed system of federal courts without participation of courts of the member states. Let us see first how the situation in (mainly) European federations looks.

I start with the greatest European federation, Germany. There are both courts of the member states and federal ones. There are six mutually equipollent courts on the top of the federal judicial system, the federal constitutional court and five courts for criminal, civil and patent, administrative, financial, social and labour matters. Save for the constitutional court these courts are the last appellate instance for courts of lower degrees. These lower courts are however not only federal courts but also courts of the states and so entire system of German courts is in fact interconnected in one complex. For example whatever criminal case initiated at state courts can in appellate procedure end at the Federal Court of Justice. It is for that reason that almost all important law passes the federation under concurrent legislation and state courts therefore in fact (predominantly) arbitrate according federal law. The state courts decide also state matters according to state law but its sphere is relatively narrow.

Situation in neighbouring Austria is very similar; the role of the federation there is fortified by the fact that entirely judicial system is only federal. On its top, there is the constitutional court and three specialized courts for criminal and civil, administrative matters and of asylum; there are no courts of the member states. These states (or provinces) have the right to pass own laws but in very narrow sphere like in Germany and federal courts so judge also questions coming out from modest law of states – it is actually wholly opposite to how applying law of the European Union works.

Situation in Belgium, another European federation, is basically similar to that one in Austria. All judicial system is only federal (though it is not called so) which is caused by the fact that it underwent not organizational change since when Belgium was a unitary state. There is naturally the Constitutional Court for the whole state, otherwise in the federal level the Court of Cassation as a supreme instance for extra-constitutional matters.

There is a separate state (cantonal) and federal judicial system in Swiss federation. The federal judiciary comprises of three courts, the Federal Supreme Court, the Federal Criminal Court and the Federal Administrative Court. Not all federal law is however judged only at these courts, some questions are judged according to federal law also by the state (cantonal) courts and vice versa the federal courts are an appellate instance for some matters coming under the state level (as matters of municipal autonomy). Generally however separation of state and federal judicial system in Switzerland is noticeably greater than in Germany.

A relation between federal and state judicial system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is similar to the Swiss one. The federal judiciary comprises of three courts, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Authority of the constitutional court is clear and accord with that of constitutional courts of other federations; the last mentioned court is a local uniqueness responding to the war in former Yugoslavia. Competence of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina comes out from federal law and its content is to judge cases of organized crime and economic criminality if they go beyond the scope of the states (called entities here) or if they endanger integrity and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or may cause economic damages exceeding boundaries of the states (entities); this court judges not appeals from state (entities) courts. It can be said that separation of judicial system of the federation and of the member states is the greatest in Bosnia and Herzegovina among all European federations.

Because the United States of America are strong inspiration for political unification of Europe I will present also the judicial system of the United States. The federal judicial system and courts of the member states are separate in the United States, they basically act according to different law (federal or of the respective state) in either this level in which this system is similar to that of Switzerland or Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the contrary dissimilar to Austrian, Belgian and in fact German one. But the federal judicial system in the United States is, unlike the federal judiciary in whatever European federation, extensive and has several degrees. The Supreme Court stands on the top of the judicial system and acts partly as a constitutional court, partly as a court of last resort with appellate jurisdiction over federal courts of lower degrees. The second degree is comprised partly of twelve appellate courts on geographic basis, partly of appellate courts for some special matters and, in the end, of an appellate court for the armed forces. The lowest degree of the federal courts is most large, district courts that are at least one in every member state fall here first of all, then four specialized courts for tax, economic questions and of foreign intelligence agents; moreover a bankruptcy court is affiliated to each district court and also courts of the armed forces complete the system of the lowest degree courts.

There is a question now which of the mentioned systems is most suitable for the European federation. First of all, it is necessary to answer whether interpretation of federal law should be committed to the member states courts – extent of the federal judicial system then will be dependent on it. There are two choices: 1) judicial proceeding in questions of federal law will be initiated at the member states courts (which will so function as intrastate courts following interstate law for one thing and as federal courts following federal law for another thing) and only possible appellate proceedings will take place at the courts of the federation; the most important constitutional questions will be heard exclusively at federal courts; 2) judicial proceedings in questions coming under federal law will in all degrees take place in the system of federal courts separate from judiciary of the member states. The first model is on principle a model of Germany and Austria and of the present European Union (which is logical because it – despite its name – is basically an international organization), the second model is in essence that of Switzerland, of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the United States of America. No inexorable logic of functioning of the federation as such requires one concrete solution, so the choice depends on subjective perception of relation between the federation and the member states or rather of position of the member states. It is about a conception whether the member states will take a share in exercising powers of the federation or whether they will exercise only their internal matters. My opinion is that activity of either level should be separate as much as possible; for each level has own sphere of functions and activities and should decide on them independently. Just distribution of public affairs between two levels is essence of the federation and if we wanted to leave execution of common affairs to the member states, we would have no need of a federation, an international organization like the present European Union would suffice. The federal level is established to exercise common affairs, it is its purpose – so let it do it. It is necessary to emphasize that common affairs (which are content of activity of the federal level) require uniform arrangement equal for all involved ones. To adopt uniform rules common for all in the federal level and then to exercise them differently according to nature of the respective member states in the state level makes no sense. If it is necessary to exercise a public affair according to conventions of a given state, that affair should fall in the state level, not in the federal one (some states can have a belief that they must absolutely all execute themselves according to own conventions and that therefore cannot accept any federation, but it is another question). Two reasons why to want to (partially) exercise powers of the federation by member states organs occur to me: 1) a state can have a strong tradition of efficient public administration and believe that it can better exercise decisions of the federation than the administration of the federation would do it; 2) fear of growth of bureaucracy by creating new (e.g. federal) authorities besides the existing state ones. But in the first case, desirable solution is to strive for high-quality federal administration, in the second case, it is necessary to realize that quantity of functions of state organs will decrease by creating the federal level, so doubling of organs for execution of the same matters will not occur. A rule should be in force in my opinion: in what level a decision was passed, in that level it should be executed. This should be generally valid, it means in the sphere of judiciary that exclusively a system of federal courts separate from state courts should interpret federal law.

A form of the judicial system of the European federation is thus predetermined in a large extent. A court holding a function of the constitutional court must naturally be on the top but it is about how the rest of the system will look. If we start with axiom of separate federal judiciary, the European federation cannot make do with for example three courts as in the Swiss case. Whereas Switzerland is relatively small (eight millions inhabitants) the European federation will probably comprise a significant part of Europe with great population some day (though it may start as a relatively small state comprising of only few member states). It will require a more extensive judicial system, like in the USA. Also the European federation in my opinion should have a system of three degrees, with courts of original jurisdiction, appellate courts in the second degree and a supreme court on the top of the system.

Questions are left to answer whether original and appellate judicial proceeding should take place only at ordinary courts of the first and second degree or whether some spheres of affairs should be judged at specialized courts in either this degree and in addition whether a separate constitutional court there should be on the top of the system or whether the constitutional authority should pertain to the supreme appellate court. If we look at specialized courts of the mentioned federations, we can see that they are not identical and so it looks that it depends on specific needs in the given federation. I am not able to say something about specific need of the future European federation and besides, I think that it is only organizational thing whether some matters of federal law will be judged by a general system or they will be separated to courts specialized in certain subjects. Therefore I believe that it will be more understandable for the public and more simple if all questions of federal law will be heard at general courts, each of them having several departments for separate spheres of matters.

As far as separation of a constitutional court is concerned I prefer that constitutional questions are heard by the supreme court as in the United States. Because it seems to me suitable that one court is on the top of the federal judicial system and functions as its keystone. All judicial system of the European federation would so have a form of a pyramid – courts of first degree with original jurisdiction at the bottom, appellate courts of the second degree over them and all on the top would be the supreme court. All this pyramid should be entirely separate from the member state courts and all matters coming under federal law should be judged only at the federal courts.

This is my general idea for now, next time I will deal with a form (composition) of the supreme court.