Federal Central Bank - Constitutional text

Federal Central Bank

Article 61 – Central bank

The Federal Central Bank is the central bank of the European Union.

Article 62 – Composition of the bank

1. The President and six members of the Executive Board lead the Federal Central Bank.

2. Every citizen of the Union who completed the age of 37 years and is a person of acknowledged professional experience in monetary or financial matters can be the President or the member of the Executive Board.

3. The term of service of the President and the members of the Executive Board is eight years. Nobody can be the President or the member of the Executive Board more then once.

5. The law stipulates details.

Article 63 – Election and appointment of members of the Federal Central Bank

1. The President of the Federal Central Bank is elected by the citizens of the Union according to the provisions of the article 47 of this constitution.

2. The members of the Executive Board are appointed by the President of the bank. At most two members of the Executive Board can be citizens of the same member state as the President of the bank.

3. The law stipulates details.

Article 64 – Rights and duties of the members of the Federal Central Bank

1. The President and the members of the Executive Board decide independently and shall not take instructions from other representatives of the Union or any member state.

2. The President and the members of the Executive Board are not allowed to hold any constitutional or other salaried office of the European Union, of any member state or its autonomous entity, to engage in other paid occupation, to receive any remunerations and to give unpaid consultancy.

3. The members of the Federal Central Bank may not be prosecuted, restricted in his free movement or arrested unless caught while committing a criminal act.

4. The members of the Federal Central Bank receive a salary paid from means of the Union.

5. The mandate of the President becomes effective by his election. The mandate of the members of the Executive Board becomes effective by their appointment.

6. The President and the members of the Executive Board take the oath in the beginning of their mandate. The oath reads: “I, … (name of a person), solemnly pledge now to protect stable value of the currency of the Union in order that it serves to the welfare of all citizens of the Union.”

7. The mandate of the President and the members of the Executive Board expires by

(a) expiration of the term of mandate,

(b) resignation,

(c) recall,

(d) death,

(e) exercise of an incompatible function,

(f) sentence for a deliberate offence.

7. Details are stipulated by the law.

Article 65 – Objectives

1. The Federal Central Bank

a) is an exclusive issuer of the currency of the Union,

b) puts the currency of the Union into circulation,

c) guarantees stable value of the currency of the Union,

d) manages reserves of foreign currencies, securities and precious metals,

d) provides bank services to the Union,

e) supervises orderly functioning of financial institutions and determines their obligations,

f) secures smooth and secure monetary circulation in the territory of the Union.

2. The Federal Central Bank is a public institution in complete ownership of the Union and comes under democratic supervision.

3. The law stipulates details.

Article 66 – President of the Bank

1. The President of the Federal Central Bank

(a) administers the Bank and represents it externally,

(b) decides on amount of the currency of the Union in circulation,

(c) determines transactions and other activities of the Bank related to stability of the currency of the Union,

(d) approves the budget of the Bank,

(e) defines the types, amounts and uses of the funds of the Bank,

(f) decides on reserves of the Bank.

2. Decisions of the President of the Bank are published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 67 – Executive Board

1. The Executive Board

(a) implements the policy defined by the President of the Bank,

(b) supervises financial institutions,

(c) secures smoothness and security of clearings and money circulation,

(d) carries out other functions coming under the power of the Bank that are not reserved for the President of the Bank.

2. The Executive Board is called and chaired by the President of the Bank.

3. Decisions of the Executive Board are passed by majority of votes. The President of the Bank has one vote.

4. A form of publishing decisions of the Executive Board is stipulated by the law.

Article 68 – Information and statistics

1. The Federal Central Bank is entitled to require necessary information and documents from natural persons and corporate bodies acting in the financial sphere as well as from public institutions for the purpose of performing tasks assigned to itself by the constitution and the laws.

2. Requisite components of the required information and time limits are determined by the Federal Central Bank.

3. The Federal Central Bank compiles and periodically publishes statistics related to the currency of the Union and the financial system of the Union.

4. Details are stipulated by the law.

Article 69 – Reports

1. The Federal Central Bank submits a report on condition of the currency of the Union and the financial system of the Union as well as its strategy to secure stability of the currency of the Union to the Assembly of the Union at least twice a year.

2. The Assembly of the Union can request an extraordinary report on activities of the Federal Central Bank at any time.

Article 70 – Giving information

The Federal Central Bank, the Assembly of the Union and the Council of Chancellors inform each other on their measures concerning the currency and the financial matters.

Central bank - composition

In previous two posts about the central bank of the European federation I discussed its functions and powers, its personnel questions and decision-making mechanism are to be discussed now.

In the beginning of my consideration about the central bank I started with a quotation and I can do the same in this part. For this once, the quotation is: “Democracy stops outside this enterprise's gates.” This quotation comes from the same time as the one that I used previously but it is not important by whom and under what circumstances it was pronounced,  significant is what it articulates. It personifies a generally widespread opinion that economic activity is something different than administration of public affairs. Also others than I noticed that people are allowed to have a feeling that they are the citizens only at the time of elections but as soon as they cross thresholds of their workplaces they turn into disciplined executors of others will with limited possibility of own decision-making. If we take into consideration how much time one passes in the job (if he/she is lucky to have one) it proceeds from it that democracy actually is restricted to only small scope of human life (and provided that what is called democracy really is democracy).

A talk about the central bank should there however be here. From the point of democratic administration of affairs the central bank stands in a borderland. On the one hand it is (in most European states) a public institution staffing and decision-making process of which is a matter regulated by laws, on the other hand the central bank's policy itself is believed to be a part of capitalist economy and has an “exception to democracy” in this respect. The laws that regulate activity of central banks put the accent to their independence what is without doubt right. But the opposite pole is wholly missing – responsibility. The central bank has its duties and objectives prescribed by the law that it should accomplish but nobody usually is entitled to evaluate whether the central bank accomplishes the objectives in a proper way. There is no defence and no appeal against the central bank's activity. Because the central bank is considered to be a “player” in the capitalist economy it is self-evident in common opinion that it acts as any other economic “player” according to its own deliberation and is responsible to nobody. In other words, because it is expected that that it acts according to rationality and demands of the market which should be unregulated according to the present economic doctrine it is not demanded that the bank renders accounts in a democratic way which means above all to the citizens. Simply, in a system of dominance of economy over (democratic) politics the central banks are responsible rather to the markets than to the citizens.

It would be inconsistent with what I wrote about other parts of the European federal constitution if I wanted to copy provisions about central banks' officials from the laws of the European states now. It is not possible to react to the trend of decline of democracy and of shift of the power outside of politics by mere emphasis on maintaining the (manifestly not working) present model of democratic politics but by strengthening its democratic attributes. In the case of the central bank introduction of the principle of its responsibility to the citizens and so direct election (and recall) of its officials meet this demand. Some objections can be made against it, some of them would certainly be only pretexts, I will mention only one here – so called exhaustion from elections. So far I assigned election of the federal parliament deputies, of the Council of Chancellors, of the President of the Supreme Court and of the President of the Supreme Audit Office to the people, so this is the fifth proposed federal election. I do not intend to suggest another election but the list is rather long despite that and the “exhaustion of elections” can be feared to some extent. Some people really can feel bothered by greater number of elections but let us not forget that polls are not always heavy also where elections are from time to time. Some people does not go to the polls because they are not interested in politics, the paramount is however a feeling that something can be influenced through voting. I admit that the objection of exhaustion of elections is not entirely unfounded but if we want as democratic European federation as possible we hardly are enough with one election (parliamentary).

Now I finally get to who should be elected in the central bank of the European federation and what should be a decision-making structure of the bank. In fact, I am faced with the same problem as at election of the executive power representatives or judges of the Supreme Court here and therefore the conclusion will be very similar. The primary decision-making power in the central banks is usually held by a council with several members (in most central banks) or is divided among more councils each of them with its sphere of competencies (for example in the National Bank of Poland, Hungarian National Bank, European Central Bank). From the point of view of electing representatives of the central bank the second variant is more favourable which I am to explain immediately.

A choice among several clearly defined personalities is more comprehensible for citizens-voters than among lists of more “anonymous” candidates and therefore only one representative should be elected in my opinion which is not meant naturally that only one man should make all decisions in the central bank. This directly elected representative (president of the bank) would have the right to decide about the most significant affairs on the basis of his direct mandate from the citizens, above all about amount of circulating money and instruments related to it (for example interest rates level), in other words about currency stability. Implementation of these measures then should be entrusted to an executive board that would so carry out day-to-day management of the central bank including the powers that the elected president would not carry out, for example commercial financial institutions supervision or securing fluent flow of payments and clearing.

Members of the executive board could – as is a custom – be appointed by other constitutional institutions but it is better in my opinion if they are appointed by the president of the central bank himself which even more emphasizes importance of his election. For the purpose of decision-making in the central bank, it is not necessary that the executive board members are holders of different opinions than the bank's president; on the contrary, it is transparent for citizens that who they elected implements policy of the central bank without necessity of compromises. Maybe somebody remembers what I wrote about position of the directly elected president of the Supreme Court. I made him not the only member of the decision-making board of the court but only one of more although a privileged one because it is not possible that decision-making belongs only to one person in the highest court instance. But I believe that it is possible in the case of the central bank, at least as far as the most important decisions related to currency stability are concerned. It must not be presupposed that the president of the bank will be overburdened with all work that in other respects the whole board performs; the executive board should act as a consultative body in questions entrusted to the president's decision-making in my suggestion. This arrangement can be compared with situation in some (extra-European) states – one person (typically a president) holds the executive power there but there are ministerial cabinets besides which execute decisions of the president and have also consultative function.

I propose not to complicate the question of election of the central bank's president. I introduced a method of electing one person to a European federation's institution already earlier – that was a case of the Supreme Court's president and the president of the Supreme Audit Office. I take over this method also for the purpose of the central bank president's election. To remind, these are the conditions and circumstances: candidates must be at least 40 years old and meet certain professionals preconditions, necessity of 50000 citizens accepting candidature and election through double majority (majority of citizens and majority of states).

A question to be discussed is a length of the mandate of the president of the central bank and whether it should be renewable. Because this question can be answered more or less in whatever way I will follow the conditions valid for the members of the executive board of the European Central Bank which is a mandate of eight years without possibility of reelection. I believe that one longer mandate with potential removal (by the citizens) is better than a shorter renewable mandate. Because the members of the executive board are appointed by the bank's president in my proposal the length of their mandate must be equal, that is also eight years and they should not hold it more than once too because their mandate is derived from the one of the (current) president.

In addition that the central bank's president and the executive board members should have relevant education and are expected to be experts on monetary questions also provisions about incompatibility of functions (among others prohibition of any gainful occupation and non-paid financial consultancy) are necessary in the constitution as well as provision about the beginning and the end of the mandate of the central bank's officials. I intend to take over these provisions from the previous parts of my proposal because it is unnecessary to invent anything new.

Powers of the central bank 2

I wrote in the previous post that one of the fundamental functions of the European federation's central bank should be to have monopoly on issuing  the currency of the European federation which means that the commercial banks should be prevented from creating new money through so called multiplication in the European federation. This measure logically proceeds from what I wrote in the section of basic rights – the economic power must be subordinated to the democratic political power and should be regulated to benefit of all citizens of the European federation. But it is not sufficient to entrust the central bank as a public institution with monopoly on issuing money; it is also necessary to bind the central bank by some rules in order that its activity can be democratically supervised.

The main question associated with issuing money is a question of their amount in circulation or in other words of inflation. The present central banks mostly have price stability as their principal objective. That should mean zero inflation but central banks pursue more or less 2% inflation policy which however in strict sense of the words is not price stability but growth of prices though very low and only little differing from price stability.

A question of zero inflation is dependent on what function we expect from money. The fundamental definition of money is that money is a good purpose of which is to determine value of all other goods. But if it is necessary constantly to spend more money, though not radically, for the same amount of goods it meets its purpose not well. At a given moment of time or in short periods, depreciation of money is not obvious but it is obvious in longer periods of time that greater amount of money has to be spent for the same changeless goods in the moderner time than earlier. One piece of information can show how inflation degrades role of money as an indicator of value in long-term range: in Germany in period 1950-2000, GDP rose approximately seven times but amount of money supply rose 32 times. Then a question should be asked what amount of money in circulation represents if it so diverges from amount of produced goods and services. This disconnection pronounces in favour of zero inflation as well as another purpose of money: it holds value. It is unnecessary to justify why inflation is harmful in this case.

In search why small rate of inflation is advantageous one encounters an argument sooner or later that issuing new money cannot be limited too much because economy needs continual inflow of money and central banks consider inflation slightly under 2% to be an indication of sufficient amount of money in economy. Economist who are at the helm (so in central banks too) are convinced that easy availability of money for firms is a paramount and almost only condition for well working economy. Unfortunately they do not realize that economy will not work only due to abundant money. In the present time, many central banks pursue policy of so called quantitative easing which is in fact pouring money in economy with the hope that firms will so have enough money to grow; but this presumption proves not true. European Central Bank provides commercial banks with cheap money yet they grant loans to firms only unwillingly and use the money rather in so called financial casino where profits are higher than in real economy. In the year 2007 allegedly only 1,7% of worldwide money was used for real economy transactions, the residual 98,8% were used for various forms of financial speculations. Simply, the commercial banks are convinced that their investments in firms in real economy (through loans) are not able to secure sufficient profit to them – action of commercial banks is logical from their point of view. Let us assume that firms really get - in the form of loans - money that central banks so generously pour through quantitative easing in economy. Firms would use it probably to their “expansion” or in other words to expansion of their production. But then the cardinal question is: who would consume such increased production if incomes of middle and lower classes fall in the long term, already decades? Perhaps great firms and the most wealthy individuals incomes of which precipitously grow on the contrary? Such question is probably not asked by economists. The real problem of present (European) economy is not at all lack of credits but undue and constantly increasing unevenness of what has been produced in economy. If economy is set to primarily secure increase of profits for the greatest firms (and the wealthiest individuals) even however big flood of cheap and available credits will not create healthy economy fulfilling needs of people. Economy should first of all be taken as sum of activities to secure needs of people, instead of it, it is taken by economists and politicians rather as a machine for securing prosperity of firms (and their owners) and when stock values growth in the stock markets it is regarded as a evidence of growing economy (“recovery”) even if living condition of most population worsened (the equation “prosperity of firms = prosperity of people” is not valid more in the world of today). In addition of that, the mainstream economists and most politicians still propagate necessity of constant growth although it cannot be a basis of wealthy economy and although the growth cannot last forever (inability to change this self-destructive course is one of the greatest defects of present capitalism and its financial system). Generally, it can be said that classical theorems about relation between quantity of money and wealth of economy (from the point of view of its ability to fulfill needs of people) fail today. Because policy of providing commercial banks with multitude of money does not satisfy the role of securing needs of people through economy I do not see also now a reason why the central bank of the European federation should not pursue the objective of zero inflation policy.

Apart from the mentioned function to exclusively issue the currency of the federation and to preserve zero inflation, the central bank of the European federation has to have other more functions that more or less correspond to that ones of the present central banks. I mention supervision over the financial market in the first place, in other words supervision over banks, insurance companies, stock markets, credit companies and other financial institutions. Rules regulating formation and functioning of these institutions has to be determined by the law, the central bank however should oversee discharging the law in order that only the institutions (firms) can operate in the financial market that meets the conditions prescribed by the law.

Another function is associated with the previous one, administration of money circulation and of system of payment which above all includes handling physical currency and organizing bank-to-bank payments. The role of the central bank should be that money flow is smooth as well as secure and economical.

The supervisory and controlling function of the central bank of the European federation should on at least one ground be broader by one item. If the central bank should obtain money issue monopoly in all its forms the commercial banks will be forced to get additional money for their business by purchasing them at the central bank instead of their (almost) effortless creation in their computers. It can be expected that commercial banks might try to get around this necessity by creation of various derived bank products and so creation of new money by them would continue as today. The central bank of the European federation must therefore have the possibility to safeguard its money issue monopoly by supervision over bank products created by commercial banks including supervision over treating the fundamental financial instruments like investment accounts that could be used to get around issue monopoly of the central bank first of all. This power of the central bank is however important also on another ground. An ideology of the market bound by nothing rules in the present time, every “player” in it has the right to achieve the profit in almost whatever way, especially without regard to societal consequences. The banks and other financial institutions take advantage of it in a large extent and create various exotic bank products that usually comprehends almost nobody and although these products are called modernization of the financial system they serve often only to immoral enrichment, for example to the sale of inferior credits and the like. Therefore it is desirable that the central bank has the competence to determine rules according to which individual categories of financial products should be traded in. It is true that such matter should be regulated by the law but beside that also the central bank should have the same competence in cases not envisaged by the law to be able to promptly react to development in the financial sphere. Of course, it is obvious that all supporters of the “free market” or in other words as least as possible or preferably no regulations would energetically denounce this provision but it is in accord with the already here discussed provision about basic rights saying that the economic power should be subordinated to the democratic political power. And if it is obvious that some economic activity is harmful to the society it has to be regulated or even fully made impossible without regard that it allows to ineffably get rich to some small minority and it therefore wishes its preservation.

The last function of the central bank of the European federation mentioned by me here is to be the bank of the Union, in other words to conduct accounts of the constitutional and other institutions of the European Union. The reason is that it should be more advantageous for the Union and it is also a question of transparency of managing public financial resources because to place finances necessary for functioning of the Union's institutions in account of commercial banks would arouse suspicions about interconnection of the said banks and politicians who decided about that placement. The principle is also important that a public, not private institution handles public resources.

In the end, I make remark about a way of issuing new money and its putting into circulation by no more than few words. A demand could arise that the currency of the European federation is backed by some material good as it was so by precious metals earlier. The present currencies are backed by nothing except by trust of their users that they can buy something for it. The same was actually true in the past too, the trust was given by contents of the precious metal. Today, the precious metal in the role of trust giver was replaced with the policy of the central bank. Dependence on the precious metal was however disadvantageous in the past because new money could not be put into circulation in the case of precious metals lack though economy needed more money. So I believe that the currency of the European federation should not be backed by some material good, that everything should stay unchanged in this respect and that no respective provision is necessary in the federal constitution.

The central bank puts new money into circulation through the commercial banks. It actually sells (lends) the money to them in various ways (“free market transactions”). The central bank is dependent on the commercial banks in this respect because the commercial banks are not willing to acquire money from it under any conditions. If the commercial banks are not willing to take money from the central bank under the current conditions the central bank must cut interest rates for which it grants new money to the commercial banks in order that they are more willing to borrow new money and so to put it into circulation. Many central banks (including ECB) conduct this policy of cheap money now but the commercial banks do not release money obtained this way into circulation. So even although the commercial banks have the right to extensively multiply money obtained from the central bank the central bank can in certain circumstances have a problem to up amount of money in circulation. I believe therefore that the central bank of the European federation should have a possibility to put new money into circulation also in other way than through commercial banks though it should not necessary use it often. The most logic answer to such necessity is to provide the Union (or the member states) with a required amount of money because it will put it into circulation absolutely certainly and will not retain it or play them in financial casino (speculations) unlike the commercial banks.

These were the most important powers of the central bank of the European federation that should be enumerated in the European constitution's text, it is sufficient that other less important competencies will be treated in a separate specialized law.

The Central bank of the Union - objectives

I begin this post with a quote of a saying “Money is always only on the first place”. Its author was somebody from a circle of Václav Klaus, the first post-communist minister of finance of Czechoslovakia then, shortly after the year 1989 when Czechoslovakia began under his management creating flourishing capitalist society with an intention “to catch up with Europe”. That saying that became popular soon was a cynical expression of an attitude that Václav Klaus held: we (at least somebody) must get rich by any possible means, must not have regards for anything and not let be restricted, in particular not with morality or even laws. It can therefore appear that validity of that saying is limited with place and time to wild transition of central-eastern and eastern Europe to capitalism but it has more general validity. Paradoxically those who only learned what capitalism is exactly articulated its most significant feature – worshiping money. But I want not to moralize about influence of money on the human society in this place, I used the saying because it excellently puts its finger on the most significant feature of human doing in Europe today. But it is surprising all the more so that what everything bows to in reality gets only small attention in documents the function of which is to determine principal rules governing functioning of states.

Supervision over money or currency is entrusted to a central bank in every European state because reality demands it. But if we should judge only by constitutions of the European states we would reach the conclusion that central banks are anything but equal with parliaments, governments and courts by their importance – in the society where central banks (at least some of them) can take measures of more significant implication than parliaments, governments and courts together really strange thing. From 28 constitutions of the present EU states, there is not a mention about existence of a central bank in the respective state in 15 of them – it is absolutely unbelievable thing in capitalism but it would not be less surprising even if there was not capitalism in Europe. In remaining 13 constitutions usually one or few sentences are that mention existence of a central bank, give a definition of its function and refer the rest to a separate law; in some constitutions existence of a central bank is mentioned only by the way and its functions are not defined. If matters referring to, for example, the parliament were prescribed in the same way it would be written only: “For the purpose of exercising the legislative power, there is a parliament. Its functions and powers are stipulated by the law.” The contrary is however true; a contrast between detailed regulations about a form, composition, election, powers and work procedures of parliaments in the European constitutions and almost complete absence of similar regulations referring to central banks could be justified only in the case that central banks would be little important institutions equivalent to meteorologic institutes. It is however possible that the mentioned absence of regulations in the constitutions is maybe unintentional expression of that regulating money comes not under the main duties of the state. One would say – no wonder in neoliberal capitalism; but duties of a central bank are with at least a few sentences described in the constitutions of east-European states that were created in the era of neoliberal capitalism in which the markets have dominance over democratic politics whereas the constitutions of the western states created before neoliberal era conceal existence of central banks.

In every case, the present practice of the European constitutions is wholly untenable in the constitution of the European federation. It is out of the question that functioning of an institution performing such important function for the society, namely regulating money, is not regulated with more detailed provisions in the constitution than is usual now. These provisions have to regulate chiefly two most important things – the aim and duties of the central bank and a method of decision-making including its staffing. Now, I will deal with the first one.

From the very beginning when I started describing my idea of the constitution of the European federation here I subordinated everything to a fundamental categorical imperative that all public politics exercised by the institutions of the federation must be democratic, that they must proceed from the will of the European federation's people and must serve to interests of the federation's people. Also the central bank of the European federation must naturally be subjected to this categorical imperative because such important thing as the currency of the state must equally as other public matters be under democratic control of the citizens who are fundamentally affected by the currency. Thinking about democratic character of the European federation's central bank and in particular about democratic control of the currency of this state (utopian for now) I came to the conclusion that the bank cannot be a mere copy of central banks of the present European states (or of the European Central Bank). However, I reached also the conclusion that to subject the currency of the European federation to the democratic control is not possible without a radical change of at least some aspects of the financial system as such. “Money governs the world.” But who governs money?

The primary aim of the European Central Bank is to maintain price stability (article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union); the same applies also to the central banks of the state where euro is not the currency. But in my opinion the main duty of the central bank of the European federation should be something else, namely to issue the currency of the federation. The objective to maintain price stability loses not its importance by it but in the method of issuing the currency of the European federation that I am to write about discharging that objective becomes a component of issuing the currency and those aspects cannot be separated from each other.

In earlier times, a monarch issued money (it was a sovereign's privilege) although he temporarily conceded it to some aristocrats or (especially in a time of a crisis) to some cunning businessmen (who promised to fulfill the empty treasury). In the modern time, monarchs were replaced by parliaments and governments and the right to issue money passed to a specialized state organ – a central bank. But the central banks of today do not the same as the monarchs earlier although it can look so at first sight. Any central bank in Europe (including the European Central Bank) has the exclusive right to issue banknotes and coins of the respective state currency (the ECB with its unique attributes). But it is by no means the privilege to issue the money in its whole because money has not only the form of banknotes and coins today – banknotes and coins from the times of monarchs were supplemented with electronic money in the 20th century and it is not completely issued by central banks; on the contrary, it predominantly originates in private commercial banks. In other words – the present state has not the privilege to issue its currency.

The main function of commercial banks is to grant credits, in other words to lend out money. They lend however not the money of savers because value of balances of savers' accounts is not affected by credit activity of the banks. In fact banks set a value of a credit in their computers and it grant to an applicant then; what is important, the applicant then can pay with the credit obtained this way as with “real” money, namely as with banknotes and coins. Because balances of savers' accounts remain unchanged new money that was not issued by the central bank come into circulation this way. The commercial banks are – mildly – limited in this action but credit money (or debt money) issued in circulation by one bank other banks can multiplicate and so the amount of money issued by the commercial banks is considerable in the end – the central bank is one, commercial banks are thousands. The outcome is that about 90% of all money are issued by private commercial banks and only about 10% of circulating money are issued by the central bank (I found this ratio equally for the Swiss franc and US dollar, I suppose however that this ratio is similar for other currencies). We got back with this to the times when monarchs conceded their currency privilege to private persons but we even surpassed them because no monarch relinquished his right to issue money to such large degree.

The present system has two implications for me: it is immoral and nondemocratic. If I make an imitation of a banknote in my house printer and try to pay with it I will be (severely) punished; if a bank makes money from nothing in its computers and grants it as a credit it will not be punished for it, to the contrary, it will be praised that it sets wheels of capitalist economy in motion. But there is no difference between me and the bank – I extend the amount of the money supply to achieve my private benefit, the bank extends the amount of the money supply to achieve its private benefit (the commercial banks are capitalist enterprises existing for achieving private profit). So why I should not have the right to issue new money into circulation for my enrichment whereas the owner of the bank should have the right? In addition, it is absurd in this situation that banknotes have a lot of security measures in order that they could not be imitated, on the other hand there is no security measure against imitating tangible money by pressing a key in the keyboard. And a practice caps it all that the present states borrow (instead of levying firm taxes) just the money created from nothing by the private banks in the financial markets and then they guarantee the loan with working of their citizens – almost effortless profit for the bankers secured. Who would not want to be a banker?

The second consequence follows from the character of money – money serves to all citizens, it is something like air or water in a way, therefore it should be considered a public property. But a public property should be under the democratic control in a democratic society and handling it should not be transferred to a private subject. Whereas issuing money by the central bank can be regulated through laws and the central bank is or should be this (or other that I will write about later) way responsible to the citizens, the commercial banks are responsible to nobody apart from the pocket of its owner. Massive creation of new money by commercial banks leads to devaluation of the currency or inflation to which then the central bank must react with its measures to curb it. It is paradoxical that it is wrong according to economists that issuing money is under the control of the government because it would have temptation to print money without limits to cover its expenditures and so cause inflation but the same economists do not mind that the private banks have almost that power today. It has to be admitted that the central banks have certain tools to react to inflation caused by issuing money through the commercial banks but it is only reaction to action of private subjects.

These two conclusions cause that I believe that issuing whatever form of money in circulation in the European federation can be entrusted only to the central bank under democratic laws and democratic control. I must however add to this that I am not completely sure how to properly formulate the mentioned requirement in the constitution's text. The best is in my view the reading “The Central Bank of the Union is a exclusive issuer of coins, banknotes and any other units of the currency of the Union.” But the text of the Polish constitution causes some dilemma to me; it says (article 227) that the Polish national bank “shall have the exclusive right to issue money“ (original wording is: “Centralnym bankiem państwa jest Narodowy Bank Polski. Przysługuje mu wyłączne prawo emisji pieniądza oraz ustalania i realizowania polityki pieniężnej.”) It should follow from this wording that expanding the money supply through credit activity of the commercial banks should be unconstitutional in Poland, in practice however there is the common capitalist bank industry with all common appurtenance in Poland. It can be probably concluded from it that money created through credit by the private banks in the territory of Poland is not considered money by Polish public authorities (the Polish central bank states in its web pages only issuing banknotes and coins as its competence) and it therefore comes not under the competence of the central bank which is absurd because one can pay with credit-created money just as with money issued by the central bank. It is unconstitutional after all in my view if wording of the Polish constitution should be taken seriously and it is at least an absurd situation but where is a plaintiff absent there is a judge absent as a proverb says. Hence my doubt whether my wording mentioned above will be interpreted correctly as a prohibition to issue money through credit in the commercial banks.

I read several popularizing books about economy and it is strange that the authors criticised existence of the central banks and advocated free enterprise in the economic field. It is obvious that the mentioned books are biased, they were written from the view of one economic theory (that all enterprise should be unregulated in capitalism) yet their criticising the central banks touches a certain possible problem. In the present system, if there is not a crisis, probably the main source of inflation is multiplying money through credit activity of the commercial banks. But it follows not that the central banks have no possibilities of inducing inflation. They do it for example through purchase of government bonds and other open market operations; all such tools have as their object to pour money in economy (first of all in the commercial banks) which increases inflation. If there should be a system of exclusive issuing the currency of the federation by its central bank in the future European federation and if the commercial banks should be forbidden from creating new money through credit activity the central bank becomes the only institution capable of inducing inflation (I simplify, I know, inflation is a bit more complicated matter). In that case it is necessary to insert such provision in the European federation's constitution that prevents its central bank from inducing inflation. Should I not write “unchecked inflation” instead just “inflation”? Laws determine to maintain price stability as a primary objective to the central banks which is another way how to say that they should fight inflation. But the said laws do not specify what exactly the central banks should achieve and in what way; it is left to their deliberation. A dilettante would say that price stability is zero inflation, but economists express their opinion that moderate inflation is beneficial. There are various substantiations for this. One of them says that the central banks do not know exactly the inflation rate but they assume that it is lower than the measured one and therefore they keep it slightly above zero (around 2%). Another substantiation says that moderate inflation is a security measure in order that the central bank has a manoeuvring space for the case of a potential crisis, yet another that it stimulates economy because consumers do not delay their consumption because they expect that prices will be higher due to inflation in the future. These all and other substantiations may be true but also need not to; however if inflation is defined as devaluation of the currency I am for zero inflation as a primary objective of the federal bank of the European federation (by the words that is should preserve stable value of the currency of the Union – inflation is by contrast constant devaluation). The matter of inflation and its role in action of the central bank of the European federation is complex so I leave some other remarks of this thing to the next post.

Federal plebiscite - constitutional text

I still owe a constitutional text to the previous article dealing with the subject of the federal plebiscite, so it is here.

Federal plebiscite

Article 55 – Direct exercise of the state power

1. The citizens of the European Union exercise the direct state power by means of the federal plebiscite. The decision is made in the form of the law or the international treaty.

2. The laws and international treaties adopted in the federal plebiscite are inscribed in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 56 – Obligatory plebiscite

The federal plebiscite is obligatory about

a) modification of the constitution of the European Union,

b) laws expanding the constitution of the European Union,

c) accession of the European Union to an international organization or a military alliance,

d) adoption of an international treaty or withdrawal of it,

e) adoption of a new member of the Union,

f) a law about the status of the federal territory.

Article 57 – Restriction of the subject of voting

Restriction or abolition of democratic public order and restriction or abolition of the rights in the Chapter two of the Constitution of the Union, in particular prohibition of death penalty, torture, slavery or other cruel treatment may not be the subject of the federal plebiscite.

Article 58 – Organization of voting

1. The federal plebiscite is declared if at least 0,78% of the citizens of the Union authorized to vote to the House of People of the Assembly of the Union from at least eight member states request it.

2. The Council of Chancellors declares the date of the federal plebiscite being no more than 200 days after the day when the required number of the citizens request it.

3. The request of the citizens of the Union is not necessary to hold the federal plebiscite about the matters enumerated in the article 56.

4. The Council of Chancellors may submit any proposed law passed by the Assembly of the Union and submitted to itself for the federal plebiscite.

5. The law stipulates details about organization of the federal plebiscite.

Article 59 – Repeated voting

The matter rejected in the federal plebiscite may not be submitted again to the people earlier than after three years.

Subsection 1 – Federal plebiscite about a proposed law

Article 60 – Subject of voting and adoption of a law

1. Any legal arrangement of a matter that comes under competence of the Union can be the subject of the federal plebiscite about a proposed law. In one voting, more different proposals of the same thing can be submitted.

2. Modification of the constitution of the Union or a law expanding the constitution is adopted if at least two thirds of involved voters and at the same time two thirds of the member states vote in favour of it. Result of voting in the member state counts as the vote of the state.

3. A law except of a law expanding the constitution is adopted if the majority of involved voters and at the same time the majority of the member states vote in favour of it. Result of voting in the member state counts as the vote of the state.

Article 61 – Limits in adoption of a law

1. The Assembly of the Union may not repeal or modify a law adopted in the federal plebiscite.

2. A bill containing a matter rejected in the federal plebiscite must not be introduced in the Assembly of the Union for a period of three years.

3. The law adopted in the federal plebiscite must comply with conditions of paragraphs 10, 11, 12 of the article 33.

Subsection 2 – Federal plebiscite about an international treaty

Article 62 – Adoption of an international treaty

1. After an international treaty is submitted to the people a term of 200 day runs during which at least 50000 citizens of the Union authorized to vote to the House of the People of the Assembly of the Union can submit proposals of the change of the submitted international treaty. If such proposals are submitted there is voting about more proposals of the international treaty at the same time.

2. The international treaty is adopted if a majority of involved voters and at the same time a majority of the member states vote in favour of it. Result of voting in the member state counts as the vote of the state.

3. An international treaty that endangers democratic public order in the European Union or is inconsistent with rights, freedoms and principles provided in the chapter two of this constitution cannot be adopted.

4. Accession of the European Union to an international organization or a military alliance must have the form of an international treaty that contains all obligations and right of the Union within the respective organization or alliance.

Supreme Audit Office of the Union

The power of the modern state is separated into the legislative, executive and judicial power in theory. It is true on principle, the state of today however has also other institutions available that cannot unambiguously be classified within the mentioned three powers. This is also true about an institution whose function is to inspect (to audit) economic administration of the state and its parts; it is sometimes labeled as the fourth audit power. It is beyond doubt that the future European federation too cannot do without this component of the state power. There are usually not many provisions about a audit body in constitutions of the European states, neither the European federation's constitution needs to be an exception; but I consider to be necessary that at least two thing are included in the constitution's text – a way of staffing and its powers.

A question how the people who inspect state institutions get in their positions can be answered after the answer to the question about essence of this office. Existence of a supervisory institution itself is a logical expression of the principle that nobody will control himself or at least not objectively. There is an element of compulsion in necessity to let to be audited and the superior audit office so stands against everyone in a way. This its position demands that it is as independent on the inspected institutions as possible. In the European states officials of the supreme audit institutions are usually appointed in their positions by the parliament, sometimes by the government or the president. It in itself needs not to be an obstacle to independence of audit office but this tie may arouse some doubts sometimes after all whether it will proceed towards all state institutions equally resolutely. It is also suitable to realize that relations among individual state institutions despite theoretically good separation of powers are in reality influenced by existence of a factor which constitutions not much deal with, namely political parties. In my opinion the audit office of the European federation should be more than an information agency, it should be the real fourth state power, independent on the three other ones. A conclusion follows from it for me that its establishment should be independent on three other powers, not derived from them, although the main essence of its independence should ground in its powers. By the way, it is striking that everyone regards as self-evident that democracy works in the way that the people only elects deputies of the parliament and the other constituents of the state are established already without participation of the people. If the people should have at least some control how those who are supposed to manage its matters administer funds, direct election is more suitable than if political groups themselves assure who will inspect them.

If there is a demand for direct election of officials of the European federal audit office, its internal structure must be discussed simultaneously because it will be dependent on it who actually should be elected. All auditing stuff naturally in view of its number (hundreds of them) cannot be elected, the election therefore can only apply to a board with competencies to decide. Here a question emerges whether the European federal audit office should have a collective or one-person management. I believe that it is the most advantageous for citizens if only a president of the office endowed with powers corresponding to that fact is directly elected and he (she) himself appoints other members of the management. The president should be elected according to the same rules as the members of the Council of Chancellors and the President of the Supreme Court. As for the term of mandate of the president, I adhere to the practice of the Court of Auditors of the present European Union. It is useful (and in accord with real practice) to establish audit departments branch-oriented according to objects of the audit inside the office and heads of these departments are who I mean as the superior management and who should be appointed by the president of the office. Appointment of other stuff of the departments can be in the hands of their heads but with final approval of the president. As for decision-making, I believe that the president of the office on the basis of his direct mandate from the citizens should be entrusted with all significant competencies (besides administration of the office itself and its representation externally those are to establish the audit plan and to approve audit reports) and the heads of the departments should be a consultative body for his decision-making.

In order that the audit office of the European federation deserves its label of fourth state power its competencies have to correspond to it, especially if it is (in decisive regard) directly elected. What is therefore necessary is wide range of inspected institutions, independence at auditing activity and first of all, enforceability of remedy of imperfections if they were detected.

Among institutions whose fund managing should be inspected must be above all the Assembly of the Union, the Council of Chancellors and the Supreme Court which are the supreme constitutional bodies, besides them also all offices exercising a role of ministries or specialized administrative offices (as for example a statistical office) as well as all public institutions which are entirely or for the most part paid by the Union (as for example science institutions). Also the member states and their autonomous parts as well as private subjects must be inspected if they obtained financial resources from the Union. The army in all its units must not be absent from the list of inspected institutions and not at all economic enterprises. Funds management of the Central Bank of the Union and the Federal Investment Bank (about these later) must also come under audit, at the Central Bank also issue of money and securities. Conclusion of the list of inspected items is then formed by implementation of the state budget of the Union, the state final account and awarding public contracts (on the part of the Union).

To deal with an outcome of the audit is a very important part of the inspect process and I want to diverge from the usual practice here. Supreme audit state bodies are usually formed as a kind of detective agencies assignment of which is to submit reports to other authorities of the state power. An audit report is naturally submitted to a inspected body and to a superior body too which should organize rectification in the case that imperfections were detected; in addition to that the audit office submits a report about its activity at times (once in the year). A danger threatens however that the work of the audit office will be devalued by that a state body within which power is to accomplish rectification of detected imperfections or to punish guilty persons does not accomplish rectification and does not punish the guilty persons, especially when a “political interest” will be in it. It is amazing that the politicians do not dare to disregard reports of their audit office in some European states but this certainly is not true in all Europe; and in general, organization of the state cannot be built on unconditional trust in kindness of people. My opinion is that people must be compelled to proper behaviour sometimes and it proceeds from it that I want to give a possibility to the audit office of the European federation to at least partially enforce rectification of its negative findings. But not directly, I want to observe separation of powers and tasks to some extent. It is for example not autotelic that the court decides about guilt and punishment but cannot bring a charge, it is not autotelic as well that the parliament adopts laws but not executes them. It is not appropriate as well that the audit office finds out wrong funds management or even a peculation and itself secures a remedy. But what I consider as necessary is that it has the right generally to order rectification of detected defects to competence authorities (the concrete form of rectification will be a thing of the competent authority) and to control whether rectification was accomplished and whether it meets the purpose. Besides that, it is my intention to give a power to the audit office of the European federation to bring accusations to the federal courts against persons responsible for negligent funds management, for peculation and similar imperfections and offences if they were detected at inspection and also competent authorities for not accomplishing remedy measures. Only if the audit office has coercive powers it is with certainty taken seriously by everybody and it will so justifiably join the three main parts of the state power.

There is a question in the end whether the audit body itself should be uninspected. That is naturally not possible, the audit office therefore must be subjected to the inspection too and the Assembly of the Union is the best choice for it.

Supreme Audit Office of the Union

Article 54 – Audit power of the Union

1. The power to exercise audit of public funds management belongs to the Supreme Audit Office of the Union.

2. The Supreme Audit Office of the Union has its seat in the Federal Region of Brussels.

3. The Office is subjected to supervision by the Assembly of the Union.

Article 55 - Composition

1. The Supreme Audit Office of the Union is composed of the President and the High Auditors of the Union. Each High Auditor is the head of an Audit Department; the law stipulates their number and subject jurisdiction.

2. Every citizen of the Union who completed the age of 40 years can be the President of the Supreme Audit Office of the Union or the High Auditor of the Union.

3. The term of mandate of the President and the High Auditor is six years. Nobody can be the President or the High Auditor more than twice.

4. Details are stipulated by the law.

Article 56 – Election and appointment of members of the Supreme Audit Office

1. The President of the Supreme Audit Office of the Union is elected by the citizens of the Union according to provisions of the article 47 of this constitution.

2. The High Auditors of the Union are appointed by the President of the Office. At most two High Auditors can be the citizens of the same member state as the President of the Office.

3. Other staff of the Office are appointed by the President or by High Auditors with approval of the President.

4. The law stipulates details.

Article 57 – Rights and duties of the members of the Supreme Audit Office of the Union

1. The President, the High Auditor or other member of the Office carrying out the direct control activity is not allowed to hold any constitutional or other salaried office of the European Union, of any member state or its autonomous entity, to engage in other paid occupation, to receive any remunerations and to give unpaid consultancy.

2. The member of the Office carrying out the direct control activity may not be prosecuted, restricted in his free movement or arrested unless caught while committing a criminal act.

3. The members of the Office receive a salary paid from means of the Union.

4. The mandate of the High Auditor becomes effective by his appointment. The mandate of the President of the Office becomes effective by his election.

5. The mandate of the President of the Office and the High Auditor expires by

(a) expiration of the term of mandate,

(b) resignation,

(c) death,

(d) exercise of an incompatible function,

(e) sentence for a deliberate offence.

6. The law stipulates details.

Article 58 – The President of the Office

1. The President of the Supreme Audit Office of the Union

(a) administers the Office and represents it externally,

(b) develops the plan of auditing activities and its changes,

(c) authorizes audit reports,

(d) develops the report on the work of the Office,

(e) brings actions following from the audit reports.

2. The President of the Office making his decisions consults the board of the High Auditors.

Article 59 – Control activity of the Office

1. The Supreme Audit Office of the Union shall audit

(a) the implementation of the State Budget of the Union,

(b) the state final account of the Union,

(c) administration of public funds by every institution stated in this constitution as well as all units of the armed forces of the Union,

(d) funds management of public institutions which are entirely or for the most part paid by the Union,

(e) funds management of the Central Bank of the Union and the Federal Investment Bank and issue of money and securities by the Central Bank,

(f) financial administration of enterprises in exclusive or majority ownership of the Union,

(g) administration of funds by private subjects if they obtained financial resources from the Union,

(h) awarding public contracts by the Union.

2. The audit applies to conformity of fund management with laws and other regulations of the Union and further to thrift, efficiency and expediency.
3. The institutions subjected to the audit have to provide all necessary data irrespective of the type

and degree of their secrecy.

4. The Supreme Audit Office of the Union carries out auditing activities in compliance with its own plan. It does not accept commands from any public institution of the Union or private subjects.

5. Details of course of the audit are stipulated by the law.

Article 60 – Conclusions of the audit

1. The audit report is submitted to the institution subjected to the audit and to a superior institution if possible.

2. To protest to a court against the audit report is admissible.

3. If violation of the law or imperfections are detected the audit report indicates responsible persons. The institution subjected to the audit and the superior institution are invited to take measures which will result in rectification. The institutions accomplishing rectification are obliged to inform the Supreme Audit Office of the Union which measures to rectification were accomplished.

4. The Supreme Audit Office of the Union brings actions for peculation, neglect in administration of public property and other detected imperfections as well as for not accomplishing or unsatisfactory accomplishing rectifications.

5. The law stipulates details.

Federal plebiscite

Besides three main till now described branches of state power of a European federation, there are other that should in my opinion be present in the constitution of the European federation but I want to interrupt writing about them and to deal with something else now.

Most bodies that constitutions mention exercise (or at least should exercise) the people's will indirectly. It is possible to debate how much they really exercise the people's will and to what extent they only formally refer to it; it is however important that most state systems in Europe takes only very limitedly direct exercise of the people's will into account. From a point of view one could even say that the people in Europe grew mature not yet from the 19th century when modern society came into existence and that it is necessary that “experts” think and decide for the people. And it has to be remarked that what is called democracy has not substantially evolved since then to now, at most by spreading universal suffrage. Nothing is naturally black and white, the society of today is very complex and managing public affairs really needs experts. On the other hand, only in fairy tales political authorities work only for welfare of the people, in reality also the power is associated with state (or more broadly public) offices and it not rarely serves to interests of the powerful. It is not only a theory, political practice of European states (transferred also on the common European level) speaks expressively. In order that this is restricted as much as possible it is necessary that the people has a possibility to decide on itself without professional politicians acting as mediators. Also the people naturally can decide wrongly but in that case it takes consequences of its bad decision itself whereas a caste of professional politicians is protected from consequences of its bad decisions both by its high salaries and contacts above standard with the powerful and rich. So it is a question of fairness; in addition to that I wrote earlier that a European federation, from its very beginning, must be based on the will of the people expressed by itself, not – unlike in existing unification of Europe – on the will of politicians for which the people is only passive viewer of their decisions.

So I will write here about the way of decision-making which usually is called a referendum. I will call it in other way in my proposal, a plebiscite because I like this word more than the previous one. Moreover, it is also etymologically more suitable because translated from Latin it means “decision of the people” whereas there is nothing similar in a word referendum though someone can object that in ancient Rome the word “plebs” denoted not the entire people but only its part, the unprivileged people – but it is appropriate in a way of speaking because the privileged ones do not need plebiscites to press their interests. Because I will discuss a plebiscite within the European federation I will call it a federal plebiscite.

Now I will pursue basic parameters that a federal plebiscite in my opinion should have in the European federation. The first thing is obligatory character and a form that comes up from the plebiscite. A plebiscite (referendum) can be either consultative or mandatory. The first one has no place in my concept. The meaning of a plebiscite is that the people can get around the will of professional politicians by means of it and decide about itself. In that case a plebiscite that only would give a recommendation to political elites lacks any purpose (all the more so that it would waste resources). If I proceed from the assumption that the people should be a ruler and politicians should be only its servants, it cannot be allowed that the people beg its servants by a not binding inquiry of public opinion. It l however also logically follows from it which form the plebiscite has to have. In referendums of the present time it is usual that a question is submitted to the people and it responds with “yes” or “no”. But again, if I proceed from a condition that the people is a sovereign and politicians are its servants, it is not an acceptable way. The people decide whether yes or no but politicians have again a final decisions in their hands and they can handle the result – though within certain limits – in a way that the people's decision devalues and adapts to their interests (or interests of their sponsors). It is therefore necessary that the federal plebiscite in the European federation has such outcome which could not be changed by politicians in any way. The only way how to satisfy this condition is to propose a draft bill but made by citizens, not a parliament or a government. Citizens would so answer “yes” or “no” not to a question “Do you agree that it is done…?” but whether they agree with a proposed bill which then directly comes or comes not into force. It could be also possible to propose more bills regarding one matter and the citizens would elect the proposal which is the most acceptable for them. It certainly offers greater possibilities for the people to decide than a mere yes-no to a question about which concrete implementation into a law (or into actions of the executive power) it decides no more after. I consider also to be necessary that every international treaty is approved by the plebiscite, again not as an answer to a question “do you agree that the European Union makes a treaty with… dealing with…?” but in the form of approval or disapproval of the final wording of a negotiated treaty. International treaties, subsequently integrated into the system of law of the state, are usually very momentous, they not a little influence lives of people and sometimes unfortunately, they serve the powerful to press their interests in a way that tries to circumvent the people and democratic procedures belonging to it (as a typical example, one can remark events around an international treaty ACTA and continuing tries to sneakily smuggle some its principles despite a rejection in other treaties or a treaty about trade partnership between USA and EU being secretly negotiated in these days which is to radically reduce democratic supervision over supranational corporations). I have to highlight in conclusion that it is insufficient to me that citizens can only give their opinion to laws passed by the parliament as the thing is arranged in Switzerland. The citizens of the European federation must have a right to propose and to pass any law in a plebiscite without necessity to be approved by the federal parliament. It is worldwide unique (as I know, only in the USA in the level of (some) member states this happens) but the present crisis age requires new forms of democracy if the present ones fail.

The citizens of the European federation should have the right to express their will in a plebiscite whenever they consider appropriate but in some cases, to hold a plebiscite must be obligatory. First, it is ratification of the federal constitution and any its changes which I wrote in my earlier posts about, second, ratification of every law that expands the constitution with further provisions (such law is pointed out by words like “the law stipulates details”). Further it is ratification of an international treaty that was mentioned in the previous paragraph and also accession of the European federation to an international organization or a military pact – a reason is that by accession to such organization a state conform to interests of other states in a certain extent or – in the present world – rather of certain elites linked with states only loosely (trade organizations of today are a typical example). Another example of an obligatory plebiscite that I also wrote earlier about is admission of a new member of the federation and I add one case more, namely voting about status of a federal territory: I wrote earlier that federal territories unlike “full” member states should have a possibility to adapt their relation to the federation in a specific way but because their status should not be generally unified yet exceptional it is necessary to approve every such exception by all citizens; this voting is of the same kind as a plebiscite about admission of a new member because both give assent to a change of internal conditions in the federation.

Opponents of plebiscites (referendums) from ranks of politicians admit only sporadic use of them about questions which themselves propose to the people. Argumentation in principle is that the people is not enough mature or knowing to decide about itself and also that the people could initiate voting about some very important matter having significant influence on the entire society and after that adopt a very bad decision. It is offensive in a way, as if the people was small children that need leadership of adults, on the other hand, it is true that irrational emotions really could outweigh prudence. For example, there is a danger that in a crisis the people willingly votes for extraordinary powers for some “saviour” who will “make order”. It is obvious that a plebiscite (referendum) is really not possible about some matters because it would disturb the ground of democracy itself and the human rights. It is therefore necessary in the text of the European federation to outlaw a plebiscite about restriction of democratic order (for example in a form of extraordinary powers) and of the rights listed in the constitution, in particular in the case of prohibition of death penalty, torture, slavery and similarly. Also the people must restrict itself in some things, Cicero's “We are slaves of the law to be able to be free” has its value here in hundred percent.

Now, it is turn of practical questions of accomplishment of a federal plebiscite. The first thing is an initiative leading to it. It is clear from what I have written that it is not acceptable that citizens only ask for holding a plebiscite and politicians decide whether they comply or not. A plebiscite must be held every time when the people decides to decide a public matter through it, the question is only what number of citizens should be necessary to initiate a plebiscite. Practice in the only European state that can serve as an example, in Switzerland, is a guideline for me. In that state it is necessary to collect 50000 signatures of citizens so that a facultative referendum about laws (already passed by the parliament) is held. It is circa 0,63% of all inhabitants of Switzerland and my opinion is that there is no obstacle to use this share also in the European federation. Not all inhabitants however are also citizens entitled to vote, a number of citizens certainly is lower and in the constitution, a required number of initiators of a plebiscite has to be related just to citizens with the right to vote, not inhabitants generally. I will proceed from a condition that voters are 80% of state's inhabitants (so is the actual number in the Czech Republic) although it may vary by some percents up or down in various states. In the concrete case of above mentioned Switzerland, the number of 50000 signatures corresponds to a share of 0,78% of voters if I use that 80% voters of entire population. As the formulation of a concrete number in the text of the European constitution is concerned the problem is that it cannot be known at present how the European federation will look, namely how many inhabitants and voter it will have. In addition, it can be expected that it will be a growing state similarly like the USA in the 19th century. Therefore it cannot be possible to give an absolute number (though it would look better) and what is only left is to give a share, namely the mentioned 0,78% of voters. And the federal structure of the European Union has not be forgotten so there is again a condition of citizens' signatures from more member states – I chose more than six states as in other similar cases mentioned earlier because the thing here is of greater significance: so I decided for eight member states.

Realization of a federal plebiscite will be in hands of the executive power, that is of the Council of Chancellors. So, to announce a concrete date of voting will be its power. The date should not be too early in order that the citizens are able sufficiently to talk over a topic of voting but also not too late. The first is not so grave because already collection of signatures will procure attention to a topic of a potential plebiscite, voting must however not be deferred too much after necessary signatures are collected so as thus artificial lowering of citizens' interest in a topic of voting is not caused. If it is necessary to take account of necessity to technically prepare voting I consider the term of 200 days as a deadline.

I have another three general remarks to organization of the federal plebiscite. If some topics should be subjected to a mandatory plebiscite, it is useless to collect citizens' subscriptions to initiate it, only the initiative of the Council of Chancellors suffices in that case. I believe further that it is suitable that there is a possibility to propose any law passed in the federal parliament to the people to a binding statement on initiative of the Council of Chancellors. It would a kind of a parallel to a Swiss facultative referendum which essence is also emendation of parliament's measures but in this case, it would be rather means of controlling the legislative power by the executive power and the people. The last of three mentioned remarks refers to repeating the plebiscite. It is naturally not possible to eliminate from the public space forever a matter rejected in a federal plebiscite; it is however necessary as well to give sufficient space to the people to newly reconsider the thing if a demand to solve it via a plebiscite still endures. The term of three years after which voting will repeat is most suitable in my view.

Other provisions specifying conditions of holding the federal plebiscite are divided by me in two subsections in compliance with a topic of voting. In the first subsection there are provisions referring to the plebiscite about changes of the federal constitution, laws completing the federal constitution and ordinary laws. The first two matters are more significant than the third one and voting about them must be more strict. There are two ways that can be chosen – either higher number of signatures to initiate a plebiscite about these questions will be required or there will be a requirement on greater majority to approve. The Swiss example goes by first way, at voting on changes of the federal constitution it requires double subscriptions of the citizens than for voting on other matters but only a simple majority (over 50%) of involved voters is sufficient to approve an issue in both cases. The contrary seems to me more logical, namely the same number of requests for initiating a plebiscite whatever its issue should be but greater majority for approving changes and completion of the federal constitution. A concrete number of such higher majority is a question. I have written about a simple majority everywhere till now, only in the case of outvoting a veto of the Council of Chancellors in the Assembly of the Union I suggested a majority of 4/7 which is 57%. It is however little for deciding about a change of the federal constitution in my view, such important thing should require a majority of 2/3 of voters which is around 66%. I add in essence mechanically that also here (and in particular here) is necessary to lay down a dual majority for voting according to the Swiss example which is a majority of all voters and at the same time a majority of states which means a result of voting within individual states. At voting about ordinary bills, a simple majority of 50% (but again double) suffices for their approval in the plebiscite.

Some things more that I add are provisions referring to the relation of the federal plebiscite to the parliament or to making laws generally. Somebody can regard as an expression of basic decency that if the people approves a bill in the plebiscite, the federal parliament will not try to repeal or at least change it. But to rely only on decency in politics is not reasonable because there is also a question of power in politics so I consider to be appropriate to explicitly determine a limitation in the constitution saying that the Assembly of Union must not repeal or change a bill passed in the federal plebiscite and at the same time, I add one provision more: that in the Assembly of Union a bill including a matter rejected in the federal plebiscite must not be introduced for three years – the reason is obvious, again to prevent circumventing the will of the people and the period of three years is identical with the period for which it is not possible to vote about the same issue in the federal plebiscite. Another thing that I consider to be important to add determines some requisites of a law that is supposed to arise from the federal plebiscite. I described such requisites in the section about the Assembly of Union, in the paragraph prescribing a procedure of adopting laws. Those are requisites that have either considerable importance or their violation would cause serious malfunctions in legal order of the European federation and they must be valid every time, also if a law passed through a plebiscite is dealt with – a way of adopting a law cannot be of any importance. Namely, those are the provisions that forbid to adopt a law contradicting the federal constitution, to adopt a law with retrospective force, to include more unrelated matters in one law (or prohibition of so called riders though there is less danger that they will be approved in the plebiscite than in the parliament); then a law about proclamation of the war must contain a ground of proclamation, unambiguous identification of an enemy and an objective of military actions.

The second subsection of my proposal comprises provisions dealing with voting about international treaties. It is practical that politicians negotiate conditions of a treaty but it suffices not in my view that the treaty is then submitted to the people's voting only as is. The present time shows that politicians in secret calmly sell the people to the “markets” and in addition they publicly celebrate themselves for it. So I integrated a provision into my proposal that the people has a possibility to suggest changes in a treaty submitted to it to decide in a period of 200 days before the day of voting itself. It is a safety measure to avoid that some provision detrimental to the people is hidden in an otherwise beneficial treaty (an analogy to riders in bills passed by the parliament) and to avoid that politicians can blackmail the people with a statement that a beneficial or even needful treaty must not be rejected only due to one “problematic” provision. The appropriate number of citizens authorized to propose a change in the text of the submitted treaty is in my view 50000, however without a requirement of their distribution among more member states because I do not consider it to be necessary here. That is a matter of voting itself which is another provision of my proposal. The simple majority (again however double) should suffice to approve an international treaty because the international treaty equals an ordinary law by its importance, not a law changing the constitution.

I came to the conclusion that one more safety measure has to be added though it can be in a certain way taken as an expression of mistrust to abilities of the people to recognize what is harmful for itself. What I have in mind I explain straight in an example. In Europe, legal and social protection of people working in state of employment (through regulations of individual states) is still in force, such as limitation of working time, paid holiday, regulations of occupational safety, a minimal wage (though this no everywhere), health and old age security and so on. But if the European community concludes a free trade treaty with, let us assume, an Asian state where there is no similar protection of employees, actually a double collision occurs with the human rights as I articulated them earlier and which after all largely are in force today. If on the basis of this treaty, goods (or in certain cases services) produced by people in situation almost slavish (which is the reality of today) are imported in Europe such goods will necessary be cheaper than the same goods produced in Europe by people enjoying many social rights – it will result either to elimination of European jobs or to pressure to restriction of social right of European workers under the demand of so called competitiveness (and it is not uselessly pessimistic spooking, it is the reality of today again). In addition, such treaty in no way compels the other contracting party to improve social rights of its working people and Europe as a matter of fact makes out a blank cheque to continuation of insensate conditions at goods production in the country that the treaty concluded with – and it is in contradiction with the provision that the European federation should actively endeavour that human rights (including social right naturally) which acknowledges itself to diffuse in other parts of the world as I wrote in my proposal of the European federal constitution. If the future federal Europe should have conscience it cannot solemnly proclaim rights that will respect only home but at the same time, it will not only tolerate but on the contrary support their violation elsewhere and also indirectly allow that they are endangered at home. It is therefore obvious that an international treaty that seemingly has nothing to do with human rights and do not endanger them can in fact both endanger them and give sanction to their violation (abroad or home) and is therefore inconsistent with the constitution as I suggest it. By the way I add – which does directly not concern the suggestion of the European constitution – that the only moral and fair solution is to trade only with them who will respect human rights being in force in Europe but I am conscious that it is utopia in the present neo-liberal capitalism because trade agreements are formally concluded among states but in favour of supranational firms and more or less according to their requirements (because private profit is more important than human rights for them). In any case, it is necessary to think over again what federal Europe we actually want.

The last provision from the subsection dealing with plebiscites about international treaties speaks about accession of the European federation to international organizations including military (or “defense”) associations. These organizations have founding or other agreements regulating their action, they are however not enough detailed so as the joining state can say what in completeness it could expect from the organization and above all, where limits of its obligations towards it will be. Just the limits are concerned here. I added this provision again on the basis of a deterrent example of the present reality. When the Czech Republic in 1999 joined the NATO it was realized in the form of a law passed by the parliament. In the law, apart from poetic formulations, there was only the sentence that the Czech Republic joins the North Atlantic Treaty which text comprising 14 articles was cited; the law mentions no concrete obligations or rights. The Czech Republic (as well as some other east-European states) joined the NATO for (irrational but understandable) fear of Russia. But the army of the Czech Republic works in fact now as auxiliary colonial corps fighting outside Europe for interests of more mighty members of the NATO which has absolutely nothing to do with preparation of defense against Russia (or whomever else). In order that similar development is avoided at the European federation in the future and that it is not forced, by joining some organization (either trade or military or any other), to conform to principles that were not known in advance I deem necessary that accession of the European federation to any international organization, military or not military, has the form of an international treaty with concrete specification what are obligations of the federation to the organization and what rights following membership in the organization emerge from it.