Assembly of the Union - constitutional text

In this post, I bring a summary of my previous posts dedicated to the parliament of the European federation in the form of a suggestion of a constitutional text. There are some things that I not discussed aerlier because I realized them only writing this text. First, I added imprisonment to conditions under which a deputy loses his mandate. A reason is obvious, I suppose. Second, I realized that I had given the right to have its representative in the European federal parliament to associated states (see this post), so I had to regulate their position in this constitutional text. And third, I completed in the article about lawmaking that all laws anticipated by the constitution (by words "details are stipulated by the law" or similar) must be subjected to a plebiscite as the constitution itself (because they are in fact a part of the constitution, although a separated one by their form).

Title 4 – Institutions of the Union
Chapter 1 – Assembly of the Union

Article 31 – Assembly and its chambers

1. Legislative power if not exercised directly by the people as well as other competencies stipulated by this constitution belong to the Assembly of the Union.
2. The Assembly of the Union consists of two chambers, the House of the People and the House of States. Both chambers are equal to each other.
2. The Assembly of the Union has its seat in the Federal Region of Brussels. In the case of exceptional circumstances, each chamber can sit in other place of the Union.
3. The House of the People and the House of States have separate sessions.
4. A resolution of the Assembly of the Union requires assent of both chambers.
5. Each chamber can take a resolution if at least two thirds of their respective members are present.
6. Each chamber can take its own resolution or decision. Assent of majority of its members is required.
7. Both chambers are in permanent sessions. The total period for which a session of one chamber may be adjourned shall not exceed 150 days in one year.
8. The Assembly of the Union may not be dissolved.
9. The first session of each chamber of the Assembly of the Union is called by a Chancellor of the Union no later than the thirtieth day after the election or appointment of deputies of the respective chamber. If not done so, the respective chamber meets on the thirtieth first day after the election or appointment of deputies of the respective chamber.
10. Sessions of the chambers and their committees are public. The public can be excluded solely for serious reasons stipulated by the law.
11. Each chamber elects within itself its President and two Vice-Presidents and dismisses them.
12. Each chamber establishes committees and assigns deputies to them.
13. The law of rules of procedure regulates work of each chamber.
14. Each chamber has the right to start investigation in the public interest and to summon all persons discharging public functions.

Article 32 – Rights and duties of members of the Assembly of the Union

1. Nobody is allowed to be a member of the Assembly of the Union and to hold any constitutional or other salaried office of the European Union, of any member state or its autonomous entity or of any other territory of the Union. Nobody is allowed to be member of both chambers.
2. A member of the Assembly of the Union votes only according to his conscience and to interests of the people that he represents and according to the constitution of the Union. He may not vote following instructions of any other person or by proxy. Every member of the Assembly of the Union has one vote in voting.
3. A member of either of two chambers may not be prosecuted or subjected to inquiry with regard to statements or voting made in the exercise of his mandate.
4. A member of the Assembly of the Union may be prosecuted, restricted in his free movement or arrested only with consent of the chamber of which he is a member unless caught while committing a criminal act. The detention of a member of the Assembly of the Union or the prosecution against him is suspended during a session or for its entire duration if the respective chamber requires it.
5. Members of the Assembly of the Union receive a salary and a compensation for the costs of their travel to the seat of the Assembly of the Union paid from means of the Union. To receive any other remunerations is inadmissible.
6. The mandate of a member of the Assembly of the Union becomes effective by his election.
7. Every member of the Assembly of the Union takes the oath at the first session of his chamber which he attends. The oath of the member of the Assembly of the Union reads: “I, … (name of a person), solemnly pledge now to work for welfare of the people of the European Union, to represent it in compliance with my conscience and to fulfill the spirit of the constitution of the Union.”
8. The mandate of a member of the Assembly of the Union expires by

(a) expiration of the term of mandate,
(b) refusing to take the oath or taking the oath with reservations,
(c) resignation,
(d) death,
(e) exercise of an incompatible function,
(f) recall,
(g) imprisonment.
9. Every member of the Assembly of the Union has the right to put questions to members of the Council of Chancellors regarding their authority; they have the duty to respond verbally or by writing no later than in thirty days.
10. Representatives of the associated states have all rights and duties as other members of the Assembly of the Union with exception of the right to vote and to access to confidential information.
11. The law stipulates details of rights and duties of members of the Assembly of the Union.

Article 33 – Lawmaking

1. Every member or a group of members of the Assembly of the Union has the right to submit a draft bill.
2. Every bill is discussed first in the chamber to which it was submitted.
3. Every bill is discussed in three readings in each of the chambers. In the first reading, all members of the respective chamber become acquainted with a bill and they decide whether they will consider it further; in the second reading, draft amendments that may refer only to the discussed matter can be added to the bill; in the third reading, the chamber finally decides whether the bill is passed or rejected. Every reading is accompanied by a general debate that can be left out on request of majority of present members of the respective chamber. No less than twenty days may elapse between individual readings. Details are stipulated in the laws of procedure of each respective chamber.
4. The law about declaration of war and the law terminating state of war are discussed in each chamber only in one reading.
5. Assent of majority of members of the respective chamber is required in each of the chambers to adopt a law or a resolution of the Assembly of the Union.
6. If one chamber expresses its assent to a bill, it is without unnecessary delay advanced to the other chamber. Assent of both chambers is required to pass a bill.
7. A draft law adopted by the Assembly of the Union with exception of the law about declaration of war and the law terminating state of war is without unnecessary delay advanced to the Council of Chancellors. It either expresses its assent to the draft law or sends it with explanations back to the Assembly of the Union. Each chamber votes again about the returned draft law in one reading, amendments are not allowed. A majority of four seventh of members of each chamber is required to adopt the law.
8. An adopted law is inscribed in the Official Journal of the European Union. It takes effect when it is inscribed in the Official Journal unless the law itself stipulates otherwise.
9. Laws completing the constitution of the Union anticipated by the constitution itself require adoption in a federal plebiscite to become effective.
10. An adopted law must not be contrary to the constitution of the Union and must not have retroactive effect.
11. Regulation of more unrelated affairs may not be involved in one law.
12. The law about declaration of war must contain a reason of a declaration of war, definite determination of an enemy and an objective of military actions.

Article 34 – House of the People

1. The House of the People consists of deputies who represent the people of the European Union. The number of deputies must not exceed 567.
2. The people of every member state, of every federal territory as well as of the Federal Region of Brussels is represented according to a number of their inhabitants with respect to the principle of degressive proportionality. The people of any member state and of the Federal Region of Brussels may not be represented by less than three deputies, the people of every federal territory is represented by one deputy. Details are stipulated by the law.
3. Deputies of the House of the People are elected in general, direct and secret elections. Every member state or federal territory as well as the Federal Region of Brussels is a separate electoral district. Elections take place in all territory of the Union at the same time and according to the same rules. The law stipulates details.
4. The term of mandate of a deputy of the House of the People is four years.
5. Every citizen of the European Union who reached the age of eighteen years has the right to elect deputies of the House of the People.
6. Every citizen of the European Union who completed the age of twenty one can be elected a deputy of the House of the People.
7. Nobody can be elected a deputy of the House of the People more than twice.

Article 35 – House of States

1. The House of States consists of deputies who represent the member states of the Union. Each state is represented by three deputies.
2. The Federal Region of Brussels is represented by three deputies, each federal territory is represented by one deputy.
3. Deputies of the House of States are delegated by the member states and federal territories as well as by the Federal Region of Brussels according to their rules observing principles of public administration responsive to the people. All deputies are delegated at the same time. The law stipulates details.
4. The term of mandate of a deputy of the House of States is four years.
5. No deputy of the House of States may be less than twenty one years of age and must be a citizen of the state or other territory of the Union that delegates him.
6. Nobody can be elected a deputy of the House of States more than twice.

Characteristics of both parliamentary chambers

In the last post devoted to the federal parliament, I will deal with special characteristics of its individual chambers (houses). I will discuss both chambers altogether in one post because provisions about both of them will be similar.

I begin with a (constitutional) article devoted to the House of the People. Its first paragraph suggested by me characterizes its role first: it says that the House of the People consists of deputies who represent the people of the European Union. Other statement will be in the first paragraph of the first article about the House of  States (that it consists of deputies who represent the member states). The second part of the same article is then a sentence determining the maximum size of the House of the People. I determined the number at 567 deputies which I had written about in the first article devoted to the federal parliament.

The “lower” house should represent the people of the federation as a whole but in practice, this people is divided among the member states (or other territories) of the federation – therefore also the deputies representing the people of the federation have to be divided according to the member states (eventually other territories) of the federation. A rule must logically be valid at the same time – that the greater part of the people of the federation resides in the respective member state the greater number of deputies represents this part of the people. This principle is determined in the second paragraph. Apportion of adequate number of representatives among each state is another question. There will be great differences in their size among the member states in practice which will undoubtedly necessitate that very great or very small states will be disadvantaged. To prevent that very small states are too undervalued in their representation, it is necessary to grant them a certain minimal number of deputies as it is common in the present European parliament and other current parliaments. My suggestion is that in the House of the People, every state is represented at least by three deputies which is intended also for the Federal Region of Brussels. I expect moreover that the European federation will have something like federal territories outside the member states and I grant them the right to at least one deputy. (I will return to the topic of federal territories in a separate post because I realized that I forgot some important things concerning them in previous articles of the proposed constitution.) What mathematical method should be used to apportion the deputies among the member states (and other parts) of the European federation I am not able to say now, so I leave details to a separate law (but I believe that the now used principle of so called degressive proportionality should be preserved also in the future and that a general mathematical principle should be used, not a trade-like “ad hoc” political deal as in the EU today).

The third paragraph of my suggestion speaks about the way of election of deputies of the House of the People. I have again to leave details to a separate law, the constitution should determine only the most important principles. I take for obvious what all constitutions write, namely that the election should be based on universal, direct, secret suffrage. If the constitution allocates a certain number of deputies to each state (or other territory of the federation), a necessity results from it that every member state is also a separate electoral district. It is advantageous for the reason too that in such districts, citizens will have a possibility to know candidates which would not be possible in the case of a list of candidates made for one electoral district comprising the whole territory of the federation (present proposals to put something similar through for the election in the European parliament are unreasonable and cannot bring what federalists expect of). Actually, it is an almost obvious thing, there are (more than one) electoral districts for legislative body's election in almost all states of the world. One more rule must be present in the third paragraph of this constitutional article in my opinion; it is not common in constitutions of federations but concrete experiences with the present intergovernmental European Union require it. There are no unified common rules of suffrage in the European Parliament election at the present time. Every state determines its own rules, it has to respect only three basic general rules. It reflects that the present European alliance of states, though it is called a union, is in fact no union (to promote this word in the title of the European community by the federalists was not a reasonable idea, because thus a genuine meaning of this word loses in value). The present European Union is in short a community (or a club) of independent states and realization of election to its  parliament-like representative body mirrors the fact. But if a European federation should be one state and if I have written that the House of the People represents the people of the Union, it is not possible that different rules in relation to the common federal state are in force. Somebody can take it for obvious but I prefer – having experience with the present manner of election to the European parliament – to add a sentence to the third paragraph saying that election to the House of the People is held in all member states (and other territories of the federation) in the same time and by the same rules.

The fourth paragraph of my suggestion determines a period during which a deputy of the House of the People executes his mandate. A standard period in parliaments of most European states is four years and I do not see any reason to determine another term of a deputy's service for the House of the People.

The following two suggested paragraphs determine a minimal age of candidates and their voters. The first of them, the fifth paragraph, says that every citizen of the Union who has reached his eighteenth year of age has the right to vote to the House of the People. The following sixth paragraph then determines the minimal age for a possibility to be elected (= passive suffrage). I determined this age to 21 years because it is a frequent age limit for this type of election in many European states; I believe furthermore that the age for public offices should be higher then the age of active suffrage.

The last, seventh paragraph  comprises a provision which is normally not present in constitutions of states. It says that nobody is allowed to be elected a deputy of the House of the People more than twice. Because it occurs in practice that political parties place some persons in their lists of candidates again and again and it happens considering known behaviour of voters that some persons serve as deputies of a legislative body for a long continuous period but thus they become professional politicians who lose contact with reality and those which they should represent. This provision therefore should prevent it.

Now is the turn of the House of States. The structure of the suggested article devoted to it will be very similar to the previous one. Its first paragraph has again two parts, it determines the role of this chamber and its size. The role of the House of States should be to represent the member states as I have written above. I wrote also about the size of the House of States (in the post http://federal-constitution-of-europe.blogspot.cz/2012/06/form-of-parliamentary-body.html). I suggested three deputies for each state there and also gave reasons that I had chose this number in order that the “upper” chamber has not disproportionate size in comparison with the “lower” one. For if to adopt every law requires agreement of both chambers, disproportionately less votes would be sufficient in one chamber than in the other one, if the House of States is too small in comparison to the House of the People (but I admit that in reality, there are great differences between two chambers of some bicameral parliaments).

A provision about the number of deputies representing other territorial units than the member states is located in the second paragraph. The Federal Region of Brussels should in my opinion have equal position as the states, namely three deputies, federal territories then one deputy because – if they exist – they will be territories of small number of inhabitants. Again: I will write about these in a future, already mentioned article.

The third paragraph speaks about a method of election of deputies of the House of States. But now, it is not necessary to determine unified rules. The House of States should represent the member states (and other territories) of the federation and every state (etc.) is a separate unit that determines its own rules in internal matters. Therefore is my opinion that also a method how every individual state elects its deputies to the House of States should be reserved to its free deliberation. So elections of deputies of the House of States in fact will in some extent be similar to election of deputies to the present European parliament that also has not universally unified rules. I believe that even more freedom to decide about the method of election of their deputies to the House of States should be given to the member states of the future European federation in comparison to the present “euro-elections” and only two general rules should be in force: the deputies shall be elected by a method respecting the principle of public administration responsible to the people and all deputies of all states should be delegated at the same time. I leave details to a separate law again.

Then length of service of deputies of the House of States is a question. It should be equal or longer (or shorter) than the mandate of deputies of the “lower” chamber? In some bicameral parliaments, deputies of the upper chamber are elected for longer period of time than deputies of the lower chamber, in other parliaments however, their length of service is equal. I decided for the second possibility for the House of States because I had chosen a principle earlier that both chambers should have equal position – and in that case, there is no reason for longer term of service of deputies of the House of States.

The fifth paragraph of my proposal determines again the age limitation for deputies. I will not determine a lower limit for active suffrage because I wrote that to decide about election of its deputies will be a business of each member state (etc.). What remains is to determine the lowest possible age of a deputy of the House of States. I determine it again in 21 years as in the case of the House of the People. But it is necessary to add one more limitation: a deputy delegated by the respective state (or other territory) must be its citizen, otherwise the House of States as a body of representatives of the member states would have no sense.

The same provision as in the case of the article about the House of the People is in the suggested last paragraph: nobody is allowed to be elected to the House of States more than twice.

It is all what I wanted to write about the federal legislative body of the European federation. My next post will bring a proposal of the constitutional text related to this matter.

Legislative process

In this post I will discuss for the last time matters that are common for the whole federal parliament, both its chambers, namely the legislative process.

Nobody doubts that laws are a very important matter, after all I have written in the suggestion of the constitution's section about fundamental rights that duties can be imposed only by the law. Therefore high attention must be paid to rules of their making and therefore main principles of lawmaking have to be defined by the constitution, as it is common in states' constitutions (though principles of lawmaking are sometimes written in a separate law). My following proposal for the most part corresponds to common constitutional texts regulating this matter but it partially differs also, in particular for the reason of my different view of relation between the executive and the legislative power in the state.

This my different point of view is expressed just in the first suggested paragraph. This paragraph determines who has the right to lay bills and it enumerates only individual members of the Assembly of the Union or groups of its members. The executive power (the Council of Chancellors in my terminology) is utterly absent here, not by an oversight but wholly deliberately. It is a common practice in European (and extra-European) states that the executive power (the government) lays bills and nobody is puzzled about it. Let us however ask why should it be so. Separation of the state power in the legislative and the executive power is based on a theory originating already in the age of Enlightenment and saying that the power in the state can easily turn into tyranny if concentrated in one pair of hands. Therefore was introduced that someone else makes laws and someone else acts according to them. The legislative power creates rules but cannot enforce them in practice and the executive power then pursues practical measures but only in the frame of rules that the legislative power gave to it – both state powers control each other this way. Or it theoretically should be at least so. But if governments lay bills in practice, they in fact create rules to themselves according to which they will act – and it definitely breaks purpose of separation of these state powers. Some people can make an objection that it is not duty of the legislative power (the parliament) to automatically pass government's bills but we know how the things are: governments are formed in order that they have so called parliamentary majority, that is in order that – among other thing – government's bills easily pass in parliament votings. If governments have such parliamentary majority (and they have it almost always), government's bills really pass almost always and control of the executive power by the legislative power is thus only formal (the government gives rules to itself). The principle of separation of the executive and the legislative power and their mutual control is weakened in present European states (also for other ground than this but I will deal with it more precisely in the section about the executive power) and the executive power gets too predominant position. It is necessary to restore balance between these two state powers in conformity with the theory of separation of state powers and a wholly new constitution of the European federation gives an opportunity for it. My proposal assumes no exceptions.

It is common in bicameral parliaments that bills are laid to one predetermined chamber, typically the “lower” one. But this favours one selected chamber to the other one and is not therefore applicable for my proposal of the constitution of the European Union according to my view because I have written in a previous post that both chambers of the European federal parliament should have equal position. In order that it is maintained no chamber can be preferred in the legislative process, so my suggestion of the second paragraphs says that a bill is discussed first in the chamber in which it was laid.

The third paragraph is the longest among all paragraphs of this article and it generally regulates the process of adopting a bill in the frame of one parliamentary chamber. It expressly demands adoption in three steps - readings and shortly describes individual steps. In the first reading all deputies of the respective chamber should be informed about a bill and should decide whether they will discuss it further. In the second reading the deputies should have the possibility to propose amendments to the bill. I added also a remark that proposed amendments must refer to the discussed matter; this provision should prevent from creation of so called riders, proposed amendments by those their proposer tries to surreptitiously enforce a thing that would not pass as an independent proposal. The third reading then should serve for final adoption or rejection of the presented bill without the possibility of proposed amendments. Each reading should be followed by a debate which can be omitted at the request of absolute majority of the present (not all in this case) deputies of the respective chamber. The minimal period that should pass between the individual readings is a question. I am not sure what period is the most suitable, whether rather shorter or longer. I want however not to view the period between the individual readings as a mere technical break but as suitable retardation of the process of adoption a law making rash adoption of a bad law more difficult and giving a possibility to citizens to follow the legislative process and to react to it. That is the reason why I chose 20 days as the minimal period of time that has to pass between the individual readings; and my formulation prevents not that the chambers extend this period by their rules of procedure. The last sentence of this paragraph speaks just about the rule of procedure of each chamber and refers to it in particulars that cannot be included in the short text of the constitution itself. In the end, I must add mention of two explicitly enumerated exceptions for those is not meant what I have written above: the law about declaration of war and the law terminating state of war – one reading has to be sufficient in discussion about these laws for a possible concrete situation would hardly allow long-winded adoption of them. I reserved a separate paragraph for it; then, I will deal with it more in detail in a post discussing the executive power.

The next paragraph speaks about a majority necessary for adoption of a bill in the respective chamber. My suggestion is absolute majority, i.e. majority at least 50% of all deputies of the respective chamber (without regard to the number of deputies really present). I wrote about it in one of my previous posts already.

If one chamber approves a bill, this one must logically be sent to the second chamber where the same process of approval will take place. The fifth paragraph stipulates immediate sending an approved bill from one chamber to the other and determines that adoption of a law requires approval by both chambers.

In the suggestion of the sixth paragraph I return to the executive power. I concede some part to it in the legislative process after all, namely a possibility to return laws adopted by the parliament to it for reassessment. Although I disagree that the executive power itself makes laws (as it occurs today) I believe that the right of it to return a law to the parliament is an important component of mutual control of state powers. I concede this right of so called suspensive veto to the holder of the executive power of the European federation, the Council of Chancellors. It has 20 days for assenting to it or returning it with observations to the Assembly of the Union. In the second case each chamber has – without possibility of amendments – to vote on the law again and now the majority of 4/7 (=57%) of all deputies of the respective chamber is required because the parliament has to “outvote” the veto. The limit of 4/7 is a number that goes not much away from 50% and can be expressed in a so simple fraction as possible too. The paragraph determines two exceptions, again the mentioned laws about proclamation of war and terminating state of war – on the one hand for the reason of time, on the other hand for the reason of control of the executive power by the legislative power.

The eighth paragraph of my proposal determines how the adopted law comes into effect. It says that adopted law shall immediately be inscribed in the Official Journal of the Union and it comes into effect at that moment, unless the law itself determines something else.

The following two suggested paragraphs say what attributes adopted laws must not have. The ninth one determines contradiction to the constitution as the first such thing and forbids further a law to have retroactive effect. The tenth paragraph then forbids more mutually unrelated matters to be regulated in the frame of one law which should have positive influence on lucidity of federal laws (and it goes again against the so called riders as it is mentioned above).

The last paragraph of this suggested article resembles the previous two ones, it determines required components of the law about declaration of war because it is not desirable that it is promulgated carelessly and gives carte blanche to the executive power. According to me therefore a bill of such law must contain a reason of declaration of war, definite determination of the enemy and objective of military actions in order that it is not possible to arbitrarily misuse the armed forces of the federation.

That is all for this time, the next post will deal with special characteristics of each chamber.

Rights and duties of the deputies

This post will again deal with both chambers of the federal parliament, it determines rights and duties of deputies of the parliament which will the same in both chambers. This post brings no peculiarities, it determines in principle rules usual in many or most states' constitutions.

The first paragraph of my suggestion states  precisely incompatibility of the functions, that is to say it enumerates the functions which the deputy of the European federal parliament cannot hold. Separation of individual kinds of state power in the frame of one state system has to be safeguarded in the first place and so the first paragraph forbids a deputy of the federal parliament to be a representative of the executive or judicial power of the federation. But beside that, it forbids him to hold any other with pay remunerated position in the federation because the deputies should devote themselves only to the work for which they were elected. Except for separation of individual kinds of power, also separation of constitutional functions of the federation and the member states must be maintained, nobody should be both a holder of state power of any member state and the federation or the federation and an autonomous region of any member state in the same time. For if the federal constitution determines separation of the state power of the member states and of the federation, also their exercise should be personally separated. A provision is then joined to this paragraph and says that nobody is allowed to be member of both chambers which is common and obvious provision of constitutions of all states whose parliament has two chambers.

The second paragraph establishes a principle of independence of the deputy. According to it, the deputy of the federal parliament may not vote in compliance with instructions of someone else. He must vote in person as well, not by proxy. For a specific deputy was elected (or appointed) and only he has his responsibility for the voting process, not someone else. Apart from this instruction of personal voting my suggestion stipulates three guidelines which the deputy shall follow in voting. These are own conscience, conformity with the constitution of the Union and interest of the people which he represents. Only the first is relatively common in constitutions, namely emphasis on voting according to conscience of the deputy though simple prohibition of giving instructions to the deputy mostly occurs. Much less widespread is a demand that voting of the deputy is in conformity with the constitution – it is probably regarded self-evident and it has been relied on possible correction in the form of constitutional judiciary. But I hold it important because the constitution (according to my suggestion) determines in the section of the basic rights but also in other its parts ground delimitation how the society of the European Union should be organized and what values should follow. And the deputies of the parliament should embody these values in individual concrete laws. The last of guidelines for voting, interests of the represented people, is the most unusual and is not commonly present in constitutions. But it is utterly logical provision – for there are only few other ways how to ensure that elected deputies keep what they promised when they were candidates. The deputies were above all elected just for that purpose that they represent the people and its interests. If the deputies voted without regard to the people that voted them, we could directly manage entirely without elected deputies. Finally, the last sentence of this paragraph says that every member of the Assembly of the Union has one vote which expresses equality of all deputies.

The following two paragraphs protect – as is usual in constitutions – elected deputies from unjustified persecution that would be a pretext for exercise the function of a deputy impossible. The first paragraph says that no deputy may be persecuted for speeches or voting made by exercise of his mandate. The opposite naturally would make to represent certain opinion of the people inconvenient to certain powerful group impossible, on the other hand this provision makes not possible to enforce that a deputy really represents the people that elected him – those are two conflicting demands, but the first one is more important; besides, the people can secure its interests otherwise than through the deputies as I will write about it later.

The second paragraph then speaks about prosecution of a deputy for other acts than attitudes in the precinct of the parliament. It says that a deputy can be taken into custody only if he is committing a criminal offence or immediately after, otherwise he can be prosecuted only with consent of the chamber of which he is a member; the respective chamber also can postpone prosecution of the representative to the time of expiring of his mandate. All of these are provisions by whose constitutions commonly protect deputies of parliaments from unjustified prosecution.

The next my provision refers to pays of deputies of the parliament that they should obtain from the means of the Union. It is necessary from several reasons. It has been known already from the antiquity that if political activity shall be paid from own resources, only who can afford it will participate in it which goes against the principle of equity of access to elective functions as it is written in the suggestion of the second chapter of this constitution. The second reason is just the words “from the means of the Union”, because it is necessary that no deputy accepts any means (except for his regular pay) from somebody and is therefore not dependent on him. And in order that it is prevented my suggestion contains one more sentence saying that accepting other rewards is unacceptable.

Two paragraphs delimit the time of the deputy's mandate. The first is very brief, contains only one sentence saying that the mandate of the deputy is effective upon his election. The second paragraph enumerates circumstances of the end of the deputy's mandate; but I inserted before it a paragraph concerning the oath of a newly elected deputy. According to it, the new deputy must in the first sitting of his chamber in which he will take part swear an oath whose reading I directly wrote in my proposal and which is: “I, … (name of the person), hereby pledge to work for welfare of the people of the European Union, to represent it in accordance with my best conscience and to fulfill the spirit of the constitution of the Union.” I tried that all what I described above as guidelines for decision-making of the deputy is expressed in it.

So now is turn of the paragraph describing the end of the deputy's mandate. Some mentioned circumstances are obvious such as expiration of the term of mandate or death. Also an obstacle in the form of exercising an incompatible function as the first paragraph (of the proposal) mentioned above speaks about is logical. I added also words about refusing to take the oath or taking it with reservations so that the oath is not mere formality without significance; it is common practice by the way. Finally, I add one more way of ending the deputy's mandate that on the contrary is not a common practice (at least in Europe), namely recall election. For the people has to have the right to remove its representatives, I wrote about it in the post about political rights.

The last but one, the ninth paragraph of my proposal determines the right of the deputies to the so called interpellation, parliamentary question of representatives of the executive power of the federation. It is one (though not mighty one) possibility of control of the executive power by the legislative power. According to my suggestion every member of the Assembly of the Union shall have this right towards the representatives of the executive power (members of the Council of Chancellors – I will speak about this terminology later in a respective post) shall have obligation by words or in writing answer within 30 days (longer period of time would be in my opinion too excessive).

Because it is impossible to include entirely all duties and rights of the member of parliament, the last paragraph of this article says that details are stipulated by a separate law.

Parliament's chambers

In the previous post, I wrote about some separate matters that refer to the legislative body of the European federation. I will now more systematically continue in matters that concern the federal parliament as the whole or are common to both chambers of it.

I wrote in the previous post, that the federal parliament should consist of two chambers (The House of the People and The House of States). But I expressed about their mutual relation in no way. This relation can in general be whatever – for example one chamber can have superiority and the other only be supplement to it (as in Germany) or either chamber can have approximately or completely equal position (as it is in Switzerland). If however two chambers of the federal parliament should counterbalance different size of the member states, wholly equal position of both chambers is desirable, neither should be superior to the other one. This equality should be expressly determined just in the paragraph determining division of the federal parliament in two chambers. Other rule also logically follows it and should be written in the next paragraph: to adopt a law or a resolution of the whole parliament requires consent of both its chambers.

A paragraph following previous two provisions should say that both chambers sit separately though it can appear unnecessary because obvious.

I reserved the next paragraph for a provision about the seat of the European federal parliament. It may (also) appear as an unnecessary provision for I wrote already in the general provisions that the capital of the federation is the Federal region of Brussels but it has its justification, even two. We all know that the parliament of the present EU (because of selfishness of France) every half a year moves hundreds kilometers so such move will be prevented by an explicit provision that the seat of the federal parliament is the Federal region of Brussels. The second justification is a provision that I attach just in the following sentence – if circumstances urgently demand it, whatever chamber of the federal parliament can meet in other place of the federation. It is a measure that allows to the parliament to meet in the case of a critical situation, if someone or something prevented the parliament from meeting in its usual seat. Besides, some constitutions know this provision too.

The following two paragraphs of my proposal deal with necessary majorities. The first of them determines a number of present deputies necessary for the respective chamber to be quorate (to be able to adopt a decision). In states' constitutions, presence of absolute majority (at least one half) of all representatives is stipulated. I personally consider it as a quite low number and though I admit that individual deputies can be charged by the parliament with a task which make their presence impossible or they can be indisposed in health but I do not understand why just one half of a respective chamber's members should “roam” elsewhere outside the seat of the legislative body. The deputies of the body were elected to do the work for the European Union and its people, not to avoid it. The constitution of Portugal even determines that members of the parliament have a duty to be present at plenary sittings and committees to which they belong. Also the deputies of the European federal parliament should have the same duty and a minimal number of present representatives necessary for a valid sitting will indirectly secure it. I therefore determine this quorum higher, at two thirds of all members of the respective chamber.

Also minimal number of votes necessary  for adopting a decision (a law) in the respective chamber is closely connected with the previous question. A condition of absolute majority of present representatives is stipulated almost always in parliaments in Europe. But I believe that absolute majority of all deputies (of the respective chamber) should be a condition in the European federal constitution which will cause pressure against low presence of deputies in sittings because the lesser number of deputies will consider a thing the greater agreement will have to be among them so that they pass a law or other decision. That is therefore a measure against absence of deputies in sittings but also a measure that ensures that every proposal obtains sufficiently great, not only close majority. I add a sentence to this provision that each chamber can adopt its own resolutions. Consent of both chambers should be necessary for passing laws and other decisions of the whole Assembly of the Union but besides, every chamber should have a possibility to adopt its own declarations and resolutions.

The following paragraph of my suggestion determines rules of sitting of both chambers of the Assembly of the Union. It has a few sentences and the first of them says that either chamber sit permanently, that is to say for the whole election term of four years. They will naturally not sit for the four years continuously, the next sentence therefore determines a maximal period for which the chamber's setting can be adjourned. Various periods are determined as to this in constitutions, if they are determined at all. I believe (which I have already written) that representatives was elected firstly to work for those who elected them, therefore I determined 150 days in the year as a maximal period for which the sitting of one chamber can be adjourned – it is a sufficiently long period for me.

The next paragraph of my proposal is brief, it says that the Assembly of the Union cannot be dissolved. For I consider permanence of sitting of the federal parliament as a significant component of stability of whole democratic political system. Various people will certainly be surprised that I refuse present practice common in whole Europe and they will want to know how I would like to resolve usual governmental crises. But I see the relation between the legislative and the executive power differently from the view common in Europe and I do not believe that a crisis of the executive power's institutions should be resolved by intervention in the legislative power (why to dissolve the parliament when a problem is in the government? - it is silly).

The ninth paragraph determines the time when both chambers should meet for the first time and a manner of it. It is possible that either the parliament meets on a given day after elections on its own accord or somebody convokes it in a given term. Both possibilities come into consideration, I prefer the second one because it is a bit more formal. According to my suggestion, the Council of Chancellors of the Union convokes the first sitting of either chamber of the parliament in the 30th day after the respective election at the latest. Whom I call “Council of Chancellors of the Union” I will explain later discussing the executive power of the federation. It has to be also determined what should occur if a representative of the executive power (that Council of Chancellors) convokes not the first session of the respective chamber within thirty days – then my suggestion says that the chamber meet on its own the 31st day. And I add also that in the chair of the first session is the oldest member of the respective chamber.

The following paragraph ensures that sitting of the chambers will be open to public and that public can be expelled only in weighty cases determined by the law. It is a common provision of constitutions and its purpose is obvious.

Also following two paragraphs of my proposal correspond with common constitutional provisions. The first of them says that every chamber elects a president and two vice-presidents, the second one then that each chamber establishes committees and decide on distributing deputies in them.

All rules about the parliament's and its chambers' working cannot be present directly in the text of the constitution, therefore I refer to a special law about rules of procedure of the respective chamber in the next paragraph.

The next provision of this article gives to each chamber of the European federal parliament the right to conduct an investigation in the public interest and to summon persons discharging public functions.

In the next post, I will write about rights and duties of the European federal parliament's members.

The form of the parliamentary body

In this post, I proceed to state institutions of the European federation. For if the European federation shall be a common state, it has to have common state institutions as every other state. I will suggest no mere reform of any institution of the present intergovernmental European Union in any my future suggestion of this part of the European federation's constitution because a functional federal state must have other and otherwise working institutions than an international organization even if it were hundred times “sui generis”. First I will deal with the form of the legislative body of the European federation.
There are many questions that the federal constitution must respond in reference to its legislative body, I will deal with three of them for the present: how great it should be, how many chambers it shall have and what its name shall be.
The most important of these is the second one. In principle, it is a choice between a unicameral and bicameral parliament. The current European parliament is unicameral but it cannot be taken as a pattern because it is not a typical parliament, it is still more a consultative assembly, in spite of its (somewhat misleading) denomination. It is more profitable to look at the form of parliaments of real federations. The facts are that most parliaments of world's federations are bicameral, only a few federations have a unicameral parliament – they are Venezuela, Comoros, The Federated States of Micronesia and The United Arab Emirates (if it is possible to speak about a true parliament in this case). So practice shows that federal arrangement prefers the bicameral parliament. For two principles are expressed by two chambers: 1) people are citizens both of their member states and of the federation, 2) the difference between size of the member states and their equal position in the federation. The same reasons suggest that also the parliament of the European federation has two chambers, the first in which the states are represented according to the number of their inhabitants, the second in which every state has the same number of representatives. Naturalness of this view at the matter is confirmed also by various proposals for adding the second chamber to the present EU Parliament.
The second question is size of both of these chambers. I have total number of representatives of every chamber, namely of the “lower” one (where states are represented according to the number of their inhabitants) in mind. It is mathematically challenging task to balance representation of every state with appropriate number of representatives and also to maintain such total number of representatives so that the chamber is able to work. Excessive number of representatives is a problem of the present European parliament – it has 754 representatives and is so the greatest democratically elected parliamentary body of the world but unlike many other much lesser parliamentary bodies in the world, it has only very restricted competencies (the less competencies the greater body – one of many absurd paradoxes of the present intergovernmental European Union). The present parliament of the EU is in my opinion too great body to be a unicameral parliament which in addition should be enlarged by the second chamber. I believe that the “lower” chamber of the parliament of the European federation should be lesser than size of the present European parliament; nobody surely is so foolish to believe the equation “greater parliament = more democracy”. I suggest 567 representatives as an upper limit of size of the “lower” chamber of the European federal parliament – it was size of the European parliament in the year 1995. I cannot somehow mathematically or politologically ground this number, it is only my subjective choice. But every other number will be a subjective choice as well, it is however better to choice lesser than greater numbers so that the chamber can meaningfully work (let us compare the suggested number 567 with the number 552 of representatives of the lower chamber of the parliament of India that represents a milliard citizens, much more that more numerous (754 today) representatives of the present EU parliament represent).
As for the “higher” chamber of the European federation's parliament I cannot determine any upper limit of the number of the representatives (it would be useless), the question is how many parliament members should represent every individual state. We do not know how many states will be part of the European federation but one representative for every state would be an insufficient number because in that case the upper chamber would be inadequately small with respect to the lower chamber although their position should be (in my opinion) completely equal (I will discuss it in another post). If the European federation should comprise all or almost all Europe in the end, I would consider as the best the number of three (in the case of very big federation two) representatives for one state.
The European federation will certainly comprise only a few states in its beginning and in the case would be insane to allot so many representatives to every state that the upper limit 567 or around 300 would be exhausted in either respective chamber. The numbers should then be determined otherwise and the specific numbers should be located in transitional provisions; so I will deal with them when I will write about the transitional provisions.
The last, least important question is what shall be the name of the parliament of the European federation and its two chambers. Of course, a simple descriptive name “The Parliament of the European Union” or something similar can be used. But I prefer some more “elegant” name, so I decided to suggest the name “The Assembly of the Union” (or “... of the European Union”, but I like more the first option). By the way, very alike is the name of the parliament of Comoros (“The Assembly of the Union of the Comoros”) but it is only a coincidence, in fact I was inspired not by this but by the name of the Swiss parliament („The Federal Assembly“). As for denomination of both chambers of the European federal parliament: I want stay away from words “upper” and “lower” because I have already mentioned that both chambers shall be equal in my concept, not one superior to the other. I was inspired again by the Swiss parliament and I suggest according to its function the name “The House of States” for the “upper” chamber, “The House of the People” then analogically for the “lower” chamber.

Two supplements

In the previous post, I have finished the chapter dealing with basic rights and now, I am to write about institutions of the federation. But I will begin with it only from the next post; now, I have to return again to what I have already written.
I decided (I hope last time) to modify the preamble and to complete the competencies of the federation. All that under the impression of observing present crisis of Europe and the European Union. Present European Union is not only in an economic crisis but also in a crisis of values which the EU is constructed on. Robert Schuman declared in 1950 that economic unification by small steps will bring Europe nearer to the main and final goal, to creation of a political federation. But nowadays, after more that half of the century, when we have a club of states with a noble name “Union” we are not the nearer to creation of a federation than in the year 1950. There are two main reasons of it: The first reason is that action of politicians of European states with regard to unification of Europe is separated from will and wishes of the people - “leaders of the European Union”, as the common phrase of mass media reads, come together somewhere in a summit and they adopt a decision … and the people of Europe can only observe it from afar. I only remark to them who read this from western Europe that exactly so communist rulers acted in eastern Europe before 1990 (the only difference was that there was not said “summit” but “congress” (of the Party) and it ran in the domestic framework of a state). The second reason of the present condition is lack of solidarity among Europeans. Inhabitants of individual European states consider each other as foreigners and they do not see any reason why to be sympathetic among each other. For example, attitude of Europeans towards Greeks is typical for present Europe – they are according to them lazy and they want not to give them anything from their own. But such action is not possible in a federation, it is impossible to hold a federation together without sense of mutual solidarity, passionately said without sense of brotherhood. A simple question is: do anything the present European political elites so that Europeans from different parts of Europe feel brothers to each other and members of the same community?
I know that no sense of brotherly solidarity will be established in practice by a mere declaration in a constitution's preamble but all the same, the preamble of the European federal constitution should at least constantly remind what is to be strived for. Therefore I changed my previous words “mutual solidarity” in my suggestion of the preamble for “brotherly solidarity”. The text reads now as follows (the change is underlined):

We, the people of Europe,

conscious of prior division and dissensions sequent on it;
conscious of prior tyrannies which brought about the worst suffering and destruction in history;
striving therefore for a permanent union
that will ensure peace, democracy, brotherly solidarity,
that will ensure liberty for its people,
that will promote the common welfare through social justice,
that will preserve its diversity,
that will preserve natural environment,

adopt this Constitution of the European Union.

The second completion – as I have written – concerns competencies of the federation. Observing the present European Union, I realized that a true federation must (unlike the present intergovernmental club of states) struggle that there is similar living standard in all parts of the federation. It requires necessarily that a support goes in the long run from more affluent parts of the federation in less fortunate parts of it. On the one hand, the brotherly solidarity mentioned in the preamble looks like this, on the other hand, it is an absolutely practical measure which prevents that the federations disintegrates on the grounds of economic tension (as we see in so called Eurozone now (thought it is not a federation)). This power has to be given to the federation and it is an additional reason why the federation must have its own resources. But because apportioning money to the member states can be a strong “weapon” for the federation with which it could too interfere with action of the member states, beyond its constitutional competencies (as it occur in the United States of America where the federation makes apportioning budget funds dependent on fulfilling demands towards the member states which it according to the federal constitution has not right  to), it is necessary as well to formulate limitation of this federal power. I put these pre-requisites in the following provision:

9. Strengthening of unity of the Union

The Union, for the sake of strengthening and preserving social and economic unity of the Union, issues laws striving for achieving equal living conditions in all territory of the Union and equalization economic differences among its particular parts and it takes measures for this purpose. It is doing it not allowed to interfere with competencies of the member states which are not expressly transferred by this constitution to the Union.

But not only an economic, also a social solidarity must exist if all citizens of the federation shall consider themselves as members of the same brotherly society. It is therefore necessary to give competencies to the federation also in the social field, I want however not remove the right to manage this field from the member states, so I formulated on the ground of it cooperation of both parties in the social field, namely as follows:

10. Social protection

(a) The Union cooperates with the member states in order that every citizen of the Union is provided with proper and in all territory of the Union equal healthcare.
(b)  The Union cooperates with the member states in order that  every citizen of the Union receives the worthy old age security.