The power of the modern state is
separated into the legislative, executive and judicial power in
theory. It is true on principle, the state of today however has also
other institutions available that cannot unambiguously be classified
within the mentioned three powers. This is also true about an
institution whose function is to inspect (to audit) economic
administration of the state and its parts; it is sometimes labeled as
the fourth audit power. It is beyond doubt that the future European
federation too cannot do without this component of the state power.
There are usually not many provisions about a audit body in
constitutions of the European states, neither the European
federation's constitution needs to be an exception; but I consider to
be necessary that at least two thing are included in the
constitution's text – a way of staffing and its powers.
A question how the people who inspect
state institutions get in their positions can be answered after the
answer to the question about essence of this office. Existence of a
supervisory institution itself is a logical expression of the
principle that nobody will control himself or at least not
objectively. There is an element of compulsion in necessity to let to
be audited and the superior audit office so stands against everyone
in a way. This its position demands that it is as independent on the
inspected institutions as possible. In the European states officials
of the supreme audit institutions are usually appointed in their
positions by the parliament, sometimes by the government or the
president. It in itself needs not to be an obstacle to independence
of audit office but this tie may arouse some doubts sometimes after
all whether it will proceed towards all state institutions equally
resolutely. It is also suitable to realize that relations among
individual state institutions despite theoretically good separation
of powers are in reality influenced by existence of a factor which
constitutions not much deal with, namely political parties. In my
opinion the audit office of the European federation should be more
than an information agency, it should be the real fourth state power,
independent on the three other ones. A conclusion follows from it for
me that its establishment should be independent on three other
powers, not derived from them, although the main essence of its
independence should ground in its powers. By the way, it is striking
that everyone regards as self-evident that democracy works in the way
that the people only elects deputies of the parliament and the other
constituents of the state are established already without
participation of the people. If the people should have at least some
control how those who are supposed to
manage its matters administer funds, direct election is more suitable
than if political groups themselves assure who will inspect them.
If there is a demand for direct
election of officials of the European federal audit office, its
internal structure must be discussed simultaneously because it will
be dependent on it who actually should be elected. All auditing stuff
naturally in view of its number (hundreds of them) cannot be elected,
the election therefore can only apply to a board with competencies to
decide. Here a question emerges whether the European federal audit
office should have a collective or one-person management. I believe
that it is the most advantageous for citizens if only a president of
the office endowed with powers corresponding to that fact is directly
elected and he (she) himself appoints other members of the
management. The president should be elected according to the same
rules as the members of the Council of Chancellors and the President
of the Supreme Court. As for the term of mandate of the president, I
adhere to the practice of the Court of Auditors of the present
European Union. It is useful (and in accord with real practice) to
establish audit departments branch-oriented according to objects of
the audit inside the office and heads of these departments are who I
mean as the superior management and who should be appointed by the
president of the office. Appointment of other stuff of the
departments can be in the hands of their heads but with final
approval of the president. As for decision-making, I believe that the
president of the office on the basis of his direct mandate from the
citizens should be entrusted with all significant competencies
(besides administration of the office itself and its representation
externally those are to establish the audit plan and to approve audit
reports) and the heads of the departments should be a consultative
body for his decision-making.
In order that the audit office of the
European federation deserves its label of fourth state power its
competencies have to correspond to it, especially if it is (in
decisive regard) directly elected. What is therefore necessary is
wide range of inspected institutions, independence at auditing
activity and first of all, enforceability of remedy of imperfections
if they were detected.
Among institutions whose
fund managing should be inspected must be above all the Assembly of
the Union, the Council of Chancellors and the Supreme Court which are
the supreme constitutional bodies, besides them also all offices
exercising a role of ministries or specialized administrative offices
(as for example a statistical office) as well as all public
institutions which are entirely or for the most part paid by the
Union (as for example science institutions). Also the member states
and their autonomous parts as well as private subjects must be
inspected if they obtained financial resources from the Union. The
army in all its units must not be absent from the list of inspected
institutions and not at all economic enterprises. Funds management of
the Central Bank of the Union and the Federal Investment Bank (about
these later) must also come under audit, at the Central Bank also
issue of money and securities. Conclusion of the list of inspected
items is then formed by implementation of the state budget of the
Union, the state final account and awarding public contracts (on the
part of the Union).
To deal with an outcome of the audit
is a very important part of the inspect process and I want to diverge
from the usual practice here. Supreme audit state bodies are usually
formed as a kind of detective agencies assignment of which is to
submit reports to other authorities of the state power. An audit
report is naturally submitted to a inspected body and to a superior
body too which should organize rectification in the case that
imperfections were detected; in addition to that the audit office
submits a report about its activity at times (once in the year). A
danger threatens however that the work of the audit office will be
devalued by that a state body within which power is to accomplish
rectification of detected imperfections or to punish guilty persons
does not accomplish rectification and does not punish the guilty
persons, especially when a “political interest” will be in it. It
is amazing that the politicians do not dare to disregard reports of
their audit office in some European states but this certainly is not
true in all Europe; and in general, organization of the state cannot
be built on unconditional trust in kindness of people. My opinion is
that people must be compelled to proper behaviour sometimes and it
proceeds from it that I want to give a possibility to the audit
office of the European federation to at least partially enforce
rectification of its negative findings. But not directly, I want to
observe separation of powers and tasks to some extent. It is for
example not autotelic that the court decides about guilt and
punishment but cannot bring a charge, it is not autotelic as well
that the parliament adopts laws but not executes them. It is not
appropriate as well that the audit office finds out wrong funds
management or even a peculation and itself secures a remedy. But what
I consider as necessary is that it has the right generally to order
rectification of detected defects to competence authorities (the
concrete form of rectification will be a thing of the competent
authority) and to control whether rectification was accomplished and
whether it meets the purpose. Besides that, it is my intention to
give a power to the audit office of the European federation to bring
accusations to the federal courts against persons responsible for
negligent funds management, for peculation and similar imperfections
and offences if they were detected at inspection and also competent
authorities for not accomplishing remedy measures. Only if the audit
office has coercive powers it is with certainty taken seriously by
everybody and it will so justifiably join the three main parts of the
state power.
There is a question in the end
whether the audit body itself should be uninspected. That is
naturally not possible, the audit office therefore must be subjected
to the inspection too and the Assembly of the Union is the best
choice for it.
Supreme Audit Office of the Union
Article 54 – Audit power of the
Union
1. The power to exercise audit of
public funds management belongs to the Supreme Audit Office of the
Union.
2. The Supreme Audit Office of the
Union has its seat in the Federal Region of Brussels.
3. The Office is subjected to
supervision by the Assembly of the Union.
Article 55 - Composition
1. The Supreme Audit Office of the
Union is composed of the President and the High Auditors of the
Union. Each High Auditor is the head of an Audit Department; the law
stipulates their number and subject jurisdiction.
2. Every citizen of the Union who
completed the age of 40 years can be the President of the Supreme
Audit Office of the Union or the High Auditor of the Union.
3. The term of mandate of the
President and the High Auditor is six years. Nobody can be the
President or the High Auditor more than twice.
4. Details are stipulated by the law.
Article 56 – Election and
appointment of members of the Supreme Audit Office
1. The President of the Supreme Audit
Office of the Union is elected by the citizens of the Union according
to provisions of the article 47 of this constitution.
2. The High Auditors of the Union are
appointed by the President of the Office. At most two High Auditors
can be the citizens of the same member state as the President of the
Office.
3. Other staff of the Office are
appointed by the President or by High Auditors with approval of the
President.
4. The law stipulates details.
Article 57 – Rights and duties of
the members of the Supreme Audit Office of the Union
1. The President, the High Auditor or
other member of the Office carrying out the direct control activity
is not allowed to hold any constitutional or other salaried office of
the European Union, of any member state or its autonomous entity, to
engage in other paid occupation, to receive any remunerations and to
give unpaid consultancy.
2. The member of the Office carrying
out the direct control activity may not be prosecuted, restricted in
his free movement or arrested unless caught while committing a
criminal act.
3. The members of the Office receive
a salary paid from means of the Union.
4. The mandate of the High Auditor
becomes effective by his appointment. The mandate of the President of
the Office becomes effective by his election.
5. The mandate of the President of
the Office and the High Auditor expires by
(a)
expiration of the term of mandate,
(b)
resignation,
(c) death,
(d)
exercise of an incompatible function,
(e)
sentence for a deliberate offence.
6. The law stipulates details.
Article 58 – The President of the
Office
1. The President of the Supreme Audit
Office of the Union
(a) administers the Office and
represents it externally,
(b) develops the plan of auditing
activities and its changes,
(c) authorizes audit reports,
(d) develops the report on the work
of the Office,
(e) brings actions following from the
audit reports.
2. The President of the Office making
his decisions consults the board of the High Auditors.
Article 59 – Control activity of
the Office
1. The Supreme Audit Office of the
Union shall audit
(a) the implementation of the State
Budget of the Union,
(b) the state final account of the
Union,
(c) administration of public funds by
every institution stated in this constitution as well as all units of
the armed forces of the Union,
(d) funds management of public
institutions which are entirely or for the most part paid by the
Union,
(e) funds management of the Central
Bank of the Union and the Federal Investment Bank and issue of money
and securities by the Central Bank,
(f) financial administration of
enterprises in exclusive or majority ownership of the Union,
(g) administration of funds by
private subjects if they obtained financial resources from the Union,
(h) awarding public contracts by the
Union.
2. The audit applies to
conformity of fund management with laws and other regulations of the
Union and further to thrift, efficiency and expediency.
3. The
institutions subjected to the audit have to provide all necessary
data irrespective of the type
and degree of their
secrecy.
4. The Supreme Audit Office of the
Union carries out auditing activities in compliance with its own
plan. It does not accept commands from any public institution of the
Union or private subjects.
5. Details of course of the audit are
stipulated by the law.
Article 60 – Conclusions of the
audit
1. The audit report is submitted to
the institution subjected to the audit and to a superior institution
if possible.
2. To protest to a court against the
audit report is admissible.
3. If violation of the law or
imperfections are detected the audit report indicates responsible
persons. The institution subjected to the audit and the superior
institution are invited to take measures which will result in
rectification. The institutions accomplishing rectification are
obliged to inform the Supreme Audit Office of the Union which
measures to rectification were accomplished.
4. The Supreme Audit Office of the
Union brings actions for peculation, neglect in administration of
public property and other detected imperfections as well as for not
accomplishing or unsatisfactory accomplishing rectifications.
5. The law stipulates details.