In this post I will deal with a method of election of holders of the executive power of the European federation which I wrote in the previous post about. But before I get to a matter of the election itself I begin with an unrelated explanation about the term “chancellor” as I promised in the previous post.
When I had proposed a collective body comprising of three members as a holder of the executive power of the European federation I faced a question how to name members of this collective body. First I refused the usual title of members of European governments, “minister”, because – as I had written in the previous post – the collective body suggested by me is not a classical European government. Therefore I searched other terms used for holders of the executive power. If I leave out extra-European terms (as vizier), there are not many terms left. I mentioned the term “consul” in the previous post, on the one hand in connection with France of the end of the 18th century, on the other hand with ancient Rome. This title is not in use for holders of the executive power today. Other term used in connection with the executive power in the past and today is “chancellor”. Today, the prime minister of Germany and Austria is called with it. Members of an executive body subjected to the president are called “secretaries” in some states with the presidential system. It is also possible to take inspiration from Switzerland that has a collective government somewhat different from conventional European governments – its members are called “councillors”. There are also other titles connected with the executive power of various degrees (captain, chamberlain and others) having origin in history, sometimes however used also today. The most suitable term from all terms mentioned above is in my opinion the title of chancellor because it is most connected with an idea of a high holder of the executive power. But I admit that the choice is subjective.
Now, it is time to deal with election of chancellors of the European federation themselves. I wrote already in the previous post that they should – unlike members of the executive body in present European states – be elected directly by citizens of the federation. I add to the constitution's provision determining this what I wrote also in the section devoted to the federal parliament: that the election should be held in the whole territory of the federation at the same time.
If the constitution prescribes a general election, a provision about the active and the passive right to vote must follow. Because no other restrictions can be given it will be about the question of age. There is no reason to determine a different age limit for the election of the federal chancellors than to the federal parliament, namely 18 years. The age of candidates for the office of the chancellors is however another question. It is easy to understand that the office of a holder of the executive power of such great state that the European federation (probably – sooner or later) will be will demand great personal abilities and life experiences, therefore the lower age threshold must be set distinctly higher than the one for candidates to deputies of the federal parliament. I cannot present direct examples from elsewhere because constitutions of European states determine no age restrictions for holders of the executive power (for members of governments). An age threshold is on contrary determined for the function of the state president; the age of 35 or 40 years is the most common condition for running for the president. I am to follow one of these items – the age of 35 seems to me too low for an important and responsible function of chancellor of the European Union, therefore I chose the age 40 years.
I wrote already in the previous post that candidates for the function of chancellors of the Union will run for the function as an integrated group of three persons, not every of them separately. I wrote also the main reason in the previous post: capability of action is more important at the function of a holder of the executive power than variety of opinions. Therefore I believe that all three persons holding the executive power of the European federation should be bearers of the same or similar opinions which could not be kept if every member of the Council of Chancellors was elected separately and the citizens set the Council together from persons of maybe quite opposite opinions and attitudes to exercise of the state power (inner crises similar to present crises in classical coalition governments in European states could be expected in that case).
One another question is connected with the previous provision, namely representation of the member states in supreme bodies of the federation. It can be seen in the present European Union in example of the European Commission that every member state must have its representative. That cannot be kept in the case of a council consisting of three persons (unless the European federation accidentally had just three members). But it follows not that it is necessary to relinquish representation of citizens from various member states. While in the case of the parliament, a law can determine by how many deputies the respective state should be represented, this is logically not possible in the case of the council of three persons, but I at least added a provision that each of persons in the group of three candidates must be a citizen of a different member state of the federation than the other candidates in the same group which should prevent that holders of the executive power of the federation are connected with only one member state.
I come to an important question of election of candidates now. For if we ask a question to what extent the people has a possibility in democracy to really influence what persons will execute the highest public functions, it is maybe more important to influence who actually will run for the office than who of candidates will finally be elected. It threatens in every state that calls itself democratic (and it really happens in practice) that the caste of professional politicians in direct or indirect cooperation with powerful democratically irresponsible economic powers in background put only such candidates to vote to the people who ensure that privileges of these caste of politicians and friendly economic powers, so a choice without choice for the people as a result. I suggest therefore such solution that only those can run for a chancellor of the European federation who obtain support from citizens for their candidature; it is so by the way at presidential election in many a European state. I exclude a possibility that candidates obtain support from a certain number of deputies of the federal parliament because it would be unjust towards the candidates who will search support at citizens and in addition, one of objectives of direct election of chancellors of the Union by the citizens should also be restriction of the power of secretariats of political parties in the matter of elections.
A separate question is a number of signatures of citizens necessary that the candidatures are valid. I presume that it is impossible to say what number is the best, I inclined to the number 100 000. I proceed from the fact that in the presidential election that held in the Czech Republic, a state with 10 millions inhabitants, recently, a candidate who had not support of certain number of deputies of the parliament had to gather signatures of 50 000 citizens and six candidates made it without problems. So the number of 100 000 can be seen high at first appearance but it is not so high in this comparison. And in order that representation of citizens from more member states is strengthened in the respective person's candidature I added a condition that those 100 000 signatures must come from citizens from at least one sixth of the member states in order that happens not that candidates are candidates of only one member state. And I have to give notice that those 100 000 signatures of citizens concern the whole groups of three candidates, not every individual candidate because no candidate will run for the office separately according to my suggestion.
The next turn is of a question what majority should be necessary to elect the Council of Chancellors. I regard as obvious that the group of three candidates will be elected that will acquire an absolute majority of all votes and unless it happens, a second round is held in which two groups of candidates forward that have obtained the highest number of votes in the first round. The true question however is what should be considered an absolute majority of votes. An answer would be simple in a unitary state, in a federal state, however, a method of election should reflect federal arrangement. If the Council of Chancellors should be elected by mere absolute majority of all citizens of the federation, only citizens of few most populous states would in actual fact decide about composition of the Council of Chancellors. In order that it usually not happens it is necessary to establish two majorities known from people's referenda in Switzerland and to be used in modified form in voting in the present Council of the European Union from 2014. It results from it that the group of three candidates should be elected that acquires majority of votes of citizens and majority of votes of states (the result of people's voting in the respective member state is considered a vote of the state). A demand of two majorities however rather complicates the whole election. If no group of three candidates obtains a majority of people's votes and a majority of states' votes in the same time, which two groups of candidates will forward to the second round? The solution can be thought of that the group of candidates will be selected that obtained the highest number of people's votes and the group that obtained the highest number of states' votes. But how to proceed if one group of candidates obtains the highest number of people's votes and the highest number of states' votes in the first round and only obtains not an absolute majority? It would be ideal if the second group of candidates was that one that obtained the second highest number of people's votes and the second highest number of states' votes at the same time but it may not be fulfilled – the group that obtained the second highest number of people's votes may not obtain also the second highest number of states' votes. The same problem can occur also in the second round in which only two groups of candidates will compete for votes of citizens. It would be ideal if the group of candidates was a winner that obtains an absolute majority of people's votes and state's votes. But it can very really happen that one group obtains a majority of people's votes while the second group a majority of states' votes. How to proceed in such case? To prefer a majority according to voters' number or according to states' votes? I came on a method how to take into consideration both majorities. If no group of candidates obtained a majority of votes of citizens and of states at the same time, a total of share of people's vote and of share of states' votes would decide. To bring nearer what is my idea I introduce a clear example:
Let us presume that we have a federation of 27 members in that five groups of three candidates run for the office of the chancellors of the Union. After the first round, the hypothetical results will be as follows:
the group A – 11,22% votes of voters, 1 vote of a state,
the group B – 22,53% votes of voters, 8 votes of states,
the group C – 32,48% votes of voters, 9 votes of states,
the group D – 29,06% votes of voters, 6 votes of states,
the group E – 4,71% votes of voters, 3 votes of states.
Visual results are displayed by following two graphs.
When I had proposed a collective body comprising of three members as a holder of the executive power of the European federation I faced a question how to name members of this collective body. First I refused the usual title of members of European governments, “minister”, because – as I had written in the previous post – the collective body suggested by me is not a classical European government. Therefore I searched other terms used for holders of the executive power. If I leave out extra-European terms (as vizier), there are not many terms left. I mentioned the term “consul” in the previous post, on the one hand in connection with France of the end of the 18th century, on the other hand with ancient Rome. This title is not in use for holders of the executive power today. Other term used in connection with the executive power in the past and today is “chancellor”. Today, the prime minister of Germany and Austria is called with it. Members of an executive body subjected to the president are called “secretaries” in some states with the presidential system. It is also possible to take inspiration from Switzerland that has a collective government somewhat different from conventional European governments – its members are called “councillors”. There are also other titles connected with the executive power of various degrees (captain, chamberlain and others) having origin in history, sometimes however used also today. The most suitable term from all terms mentioned above is in my opinion the title of chancellor because it is most connected with an idea of a high holder of the executive power. But I admit that the choice is subjective.
Now, it is time to deal with election of chancellors of the European federation themselves. I wrote already in the previous post that they should – unlike members of the executive body in present European states – be elected directly by citizens of the federation. I add to the constitution's provision determining this what I wrote also in the section devoted to the federal parliament: that the election should be held in the whole territory of the federation at the same time.
If the constitution prescribes a general election, a provision about the active and the passive right to vote must follow. Because no other restrictions can be given it will be about the question of age. There is no reason to determine a different age limit for the election of the federal chancellors than to the federal parliament, namely 18 years. The age of candidates for the office of the chancellors is however another question. It is easy to understand that the office of a holder of the executive power of such great state that the European federation (probably – sooner or later) will be will demand great personal abilities and life experiences, therefore the lower age threshold must be set distinctly higher than the one for candidates to deputies of the federal parliament. I cannot present direct examples from elsewhere because constitutions of European states determine no age restrictions for holders of the executive power (for members of governments). An age threshold is on contrary determined for the function of the state president; the age of 35 or 40 years is the most common condition for running for the president. I am to follow one of these items – the age of 35 seems to me too low for an important and responsible function of chancellor of the European Union, therefore I chose the age 40 years.
I wrote already in the previous post that candidates for the function of chancellors of the Union will run for the function as an integrated group of three persons, not every of them separately. I wrote also the main reason in the previous post: capability of action is more important at the function of a holder of the executive power than variety of opinions. Therefore I believe that all three persons holding the executive power of the European federation should be bearers of the same or similar opinions which could not be kept if every member of the Council of Chancellors was elected separately and the citizens set the Council together from persons of maybe quite opposite opinions and attitudes to exercise of the state power (inner crises similar to present crises in classical coalition governments in European states could be expected in that case).
One another question is connected with the previous provision, namely representation of the member states in supreme bodies of the federation. It can be seen in the present European Union in example of the European Commission that every member state must have its representative. That cannot be kept in the case of a council consisting of three persons (unless the European federation accidentally had just three members). But it follows not that it is necessary to relinquish representation of citizens from various member states. While in the case of the parliament, a law can determine by how many deputies the respective state should be represented, this is logically not possible in the case of the council of three persons, but I at least added a provision that each of persons in the group of three candidates must be a citizen of a different member state of the federation than the other candidates in the same group which should prevent that holders of the executive power of the federation are connected with only one member state.
I come to an important question of election of candidates now. For if we ask a question to what extent the people has a possibility in democracy to really influence what persons will execute the highest public functions, it is maybe more important to influence who actually will run for the office than who of candidates will finally be elected. It threatens in every state that calls itself democratic (and it really happens in practice) that the caste of professional politicians in direct or indirect cooperation with powerful democratically irresponsible economic powers in background put only such candidates to vote to the people who ensure that privileges of these caste of politicians and friendly economic powers, so a choice without choice for the people as a result. I suggest therefore such solution that only those can run for a chancellor of the European federation who obtain support from citizens for their candidature; it is so by the way at presidential election in many a European state. I exclude a possibility that candidates obtain support from a certain number of deputies of the federal parliament because it would be unjust towards the candidates who will search support at citizens and in addition, one of objectives of direct election of chancellors of the Union by the citizens should also be restriction of the power of secretariats of political parties in the matter of elections.
A separate question is a number of signatures of citizens necessary that the candidatures are valid. I presume that it is impossible to say what number is the best, I inclined to the number 100 000. I proceed from the fact that in the presidential election that held in the Czech Republic, a state with 10 millions inhabitants, recently, a candidate who had not support of certain number of deputies of the parliament had to gather signatures of 50 000 citizens and six candidates made it without problems. So the number of 100 000 can be seen high at first appearance but it is not so high in this comparison. And in order that representation of citizens from more member states is strengthened in the respective person's candidature I added a condition that those 100 000 signatures must come from citizens from at least one sixth of the member states in order that happens not that candidates are candidates of only one member state. And I have to give notice that those 100 000 signatures of citizens concern the whole groups of three candidates, not every individual candidate because no candidate will run for the office separately according to my suggestion.
The next turn is of a question what majority should be necessary to elect the Council of Chancellors. I regard as obvious that the group of three candidates will be elected that will acquire an absolute majority of all votes and unless it happens, a second round is held in which two groups of candidates forward that have obtained the highest number of votes in the first round. The true question however is what should be considered an absolute majority of votes. An answer would be simple in a unitary state, in a federal state, however, a method of election should reflect federal arrangement. If the Council of Chancellors should be elected by mere absolute majority of all citizens of the federation, only citizens of few most populous states would in actual fact decide about composition of the Council of Chancellors. In order that it usually not happens it is necessary to establish two majorities known from people's referenda in Switzerland and to be used in modified form in voting in the present Council of the European Union from 2014. It results from it that the group of three candidates should be elected that acquires majority of votes of citizens and majority of votes of states (the result of people's voting in the respective member state is considered a vote of the state). A demand of two majorities however rather complicates the whole election. If no group of three candidates obtains a majority of people's votes and a majority of states' votes in the same time, which two groups of candidates will forward to the second round? The solution can be thought of that the group of candidates will be selected that obtained the highest number of people's votes and the group that obtained the highest number of states' votes. But how to proceed if one group of candidates obtains the highest number of people's votes and the highest number of states' votes in the first round and only obtains not an absolute majority? It would be ideal if the second group of candidates was that one that obtained the second highest number of people's votes and the second highest number of states' votes at the same time but it may not be fulfilled – the group that obtained the second highest number of people's votes may not obtain also the second highest number of states' votes. The same problem can occur also in the second round in which only two groups of candidates will compete for votes of citizens. It would be ideal if the group of candidates was a winner that obtains an absolute majority of people's votes and state's votes. But it can very really happen that one group obtains a majority of people's votes while the second group a majority of states' votes. How to proceed in such case? To prefer a majority according to voters' number or according to states' votes? I came on a method how to take into consideration both majorities. If no group of candidates obtained a majority of votes of citizens and of states at the same time, a total of share of people's vote and of share of states' votes would decide. To bring nearer what is my idea I introduce a clear example:
Let us presume that we have a federation of 27 members in that five groups of three candidates run for the office of the chancellors of the Union. After the first round, the hypothetical results will be as follows:
the group A – 11,22% votes of voters, 1 vote of a state,
the group B – 22,53% votes of voters, 8 votes of states,
the group C – 32,48% votes of voters, 9 votes of states,
the group D – 29,06% votes of voters, 6 votes of states,
the group E – 4,71% votes of voters, 3 votes of states.
Visual results are displayed by following two graphs.
It is apparent that no group of candidates obtained an absolute majority of votes of voters and of votes of states in the first round. Therefore two groups with the highest total of share of people's vote and of share of states' votes proceed to the second round. It is undoubted that the group C proceeds to the second round, there is a question however what group will be in the second place – whether the group B or D. The group B obtained 29,63% of states' votes (8 of 27) which added to 22,53% of votes of voters is the number 52,16; the group D obtained 22,22% of states' votes which added to 29,06% of votes of voters amounts to the number 51,28. The group B acquired higher score and proceeds therefore to the second round.
After the second round, hypothetical results will be as follows:
the group B – 46,14% votes of voters, 15 votes of states,
the group C – 53,86% votes of voters, 12 votes of states.
Again two graphs for clearness.
Neither of both groups obtained a majority of people's vote and of states' votes at the same time, it is therefore necessary to add up the shares. The group B obtained 55,56% states' votes which added to 46,14% votes of voters is 101,70; the group C obtained 44,44% votes of states which added to 53,86% votes of voters is the number 98,30. So the group B acquired higher score and just it is a winner of the second round of the election. It can be seen by the way in the examples that a number of states' votes has decisive importance unless numbers of votes of voters at individual groups of candidates are too different. It follows from it that the group can be elected that obtains not greater number of votes of voters but federalism must be reflected in process of the election in a federal state (especially in Europe, where the small number of great states considerably exceeds in population much greater number of lesser states).
Also a provision determining a period for that the chancellors of the Union are elected must be a part of the article of the constitution that determines basic rules of their election. It is again a question to be disputed. It cannot be said that a certain period is right whereas another wrong, so a concrete period of the mandate of the chancellors of the federation will be a result of a subjective decision. I believe that the term of office of the chancellors of the Union should not be completely equal as the term of office of deputies of the federal parliament in order that separation and difference of the executive power from the legislative power is highlighted. Because I determined the term of office of both chambers of the federal parliament to be four years, a period shorter or longer than four years comes into consideration. But less than four years is few for the highest executive state authority, so a longer period than four years is better. Too long periods are however not suitable too (temptation of power can seduce everyone), the period of five years appears the best for me (let us remind for example that the term of service of the France's president was seven years initially, but was reduced to five years in 2000). I add a provision to it that I wrote already in the text about the federal parliament, namely that nobody is allowed to hold the office of the chancellor of the Union more than twice.
Because all details about the election of the chancellors of the Union cannot be in the constitution, I refer to a separate law and with it I end the passage devoted to the election of holder of the executive power of the European federation. The next post will deal with persons of the chancellors (their rights and duties and similar).
