This post will be short as, I presume, also this section in the European federal constitution will be short. It will deal with some internal matters of the federation. In the present intergovernmental European Union, everything concerning its internal structure is arranged by the international treaties concluded among its member states – the Union itself has no power to establish its own bodies independently on its member states and to determine the rules of their working. No wonder, it is an international organization and the states associated in it are who decides about it. But it cannot be applied to a European federation, it has to have freedom to establish its bodies freely in case of need and this also has to be written in the federal constitution.
As well as international treaties of the present intergovernmental EU determine bodies of the organization, the agreement among the mentioned states determines also the work conditions of the employees of the organization (at random, let us remember the agreement about wages of the European parliament members). Again, it will not be possible in the future, the federation itself has to determinate work condition of its employees, also the question of their social security (including even e. g. their pensions).
I will stay at the federation's employees yet. It is typical for the international EU at present that its bodies are not concentrated in one place, they are dispersed in various towns and states, including the supreme bodies – one of them, the Parliament, even changes its residence which has been criticized justly as a “travelling circus“ and is one of the best documents of impropriety of intergovernmental approach to European “unity“ (“intergovernmental unity” is nonsense in fact). It will be naturally necessary in the European federation that its supreme bodies (the parliament, the executive, the supreme court) are concentrated in its capital (i. e. likely Brussels) but other offices of the federation could be placed also in other parts of the federation; it will be valid automatically in case of branch offices of the central institutions situated in the member states. Employees of the branch offices of the central institutions situated in the member states should be chosen from inhabitants of respective states but it should be valid also in case of the central institutions themselves located in the capital. For that reason the European federal constitution should contain a provision saying that the member states ought to be represented in the federal bodies equally; the Swiss constitution can be an example for such provision.
The last matter that I insert in the chapter “internal affairs of the union” is the right of the federation to pursue statistics for its own purposes as it is so in other federations including corresponding articles of their constitutions (see for example the German constitution).
As well as international treaties of the present intergovernmental EU determine bodies of the organization, the agreement among the mentioned states determines also the work conditions of the employees of the organization (at random, let us remember the agreement about wages of the European parliament members). Again, it will not be possible in the future, the federation itself has to determinate work condition of its employees, also the question of their social security (including even e. g. their pensions).
I will stay at the federation's employees yet. It is typical for the international EU at present that its bodies are not concentrated in one place, they are dispersed in various towns and states, including the supreme bodies – one of them, the Parliament, even changes its residence which has been criticized justly as a “travelling circus“ and is one of the best documents of impropriety of intergovernmental approach to European “unity“ (“intergovernmental unity” is nonsense in fact). It will be naturally necessary in the European federation that its supreme bodies (the parliament, the executive, the supreme court) are concentrated in its capital (i. e. likely Brussels) but other offices of the federation could be placed also in other parts of the federation; it will be valid automatically in case of branch offices of the central institutions situated in the member states. Employees of the branch offices of the central institutions situated in the member states should be chosen from inhabitants of respective states but it should be valid also in case of the central institutions themselves located in the capital. For that reason the European federal constitution should contain a provision saying that the member states ought to be represented in the federal bodies equally; the Swiss constitution can be an example for such provision.
The last matter that I insert in the chapter “internal affairs of the union” is the right of the federation to pursue statistics for its own purposes as it is so in other federations including corresponding articles of their constitutions (see for example the German constitution).