Work of Council of Chancellors

The last post devoted to the executive power of the European federation will deal with realization of the executive power by the Council of Chancellors.

The first article of my proposal first deals with a question who will be in the chair of the Council of Chancellors. All Chancellors should have wholly equal position according to my suggestion but a function of a chairman is necessary for practical reason. A question of presidency is unnecessary at the moment of election, nobody of the respective group of candidates should act as a candidate for a president. Because no hierarchy among individual candidates there should be, it is necessary to choice a chairman after the election. It corresponds however not to equality of all chancellors that one of them is appointed a chairman for the whole term of service of the Council of Chancellors whereas the others would be in position of “ordinary” chancellors. The best solution is therefore alternation of presidency similarly as in the case of the Swiss Federal Council. It is elected by the Swiss federal parliament and it also elects a President of the Council from among its members  every year. But it is impossible at the Council of Chancellors for its origin is not derived from the parliament. The only acceptable manner that enters my mind is by drawing lots. The term of service of the Council of Chancellors is divided in three equal periods and each chancellor will be a chairman of the Council (so he (she) will be a First Chancellor in official terminology) in this way determined period of time by which equality of all three chancellors will be preserved. Taking its importance into account, drawing lots should be realized in a public and solemn manner, in the best case along with the obligatory oath. Such suitable public and solemn manner is a joint session of both chambers of the Assembly of the Union. There is only one question there, namely who will be in the chair in such joint session. In most bicameral parliaments is the lower chamber preferred and its president usually chairs the session. In my proposal, both chambers of the European federal parliament are equal but the same is in the case of the Swiss federal parliament whose chambers are constitutionally equal as well and in spite of it their joint session are chaired by the president of the “lower” chamber (the National Council). So I choose the same solution for the European constitution.

Next my suggested article deals already with work of the Council of Chancellors. First, however, it defines purpose of existence of the Council. The purposes are two: to perform decisions of the legislative and judiciary power and, independently on them, to execute measures for the good of citizens of the federation. In the case of the second, it is necessary to emphasize that it must go on in the frame of laws of the federation, otherwise power of the Council of Chancellors would be limitless.

Further, sessions of the Council of Chancellors themselves are described. As in the case of the Assembly of the Union, I determined the Federal Region of Brussels as a place where sessions of the Council should take place; and with a supplement that it can be also another place in the federation in the case of exceptional circumstances.

The next two letters of the text determine that sessions of the Council are non-public, unless the Council determines otherwise and that the First Chancellor calls and chairs sessions of the Council, in urgent cases other Chancellor of the Union.

I wrote about the next item already in the previous post – a decision of the Council of Chancellors is adopted by absolute majority, that is by two of three votes.

As well as in usual governments where a certain minister is charged with performing the decision of the government, also in the Council of Chancellors, a certain chancellor must be charged with the performing a Council's decision. I added a provision that such chancellor has the right to issue necessary decrees performing the decision though it may seem obvious.

Not only laws adopted by the parliament, also decisions of the Council of Chancellors have to meet certain formal requirements to come into force. The main condition is inscription in the Official Journal, although I added a possibility that it is not necessary to wait for inscription in the case of urgent necessity. Details however have to be regulated by a separate law in order that it is not abused.

A compensation for that sessions of the Council of Chancellors can be non-public has to be necessity to make out a written record (minutes) of every session which is after all usual in work of governments.

I devoted the following two suggested articles to two spheres of competencies of the executive power whose relation to Chancellors of the Union should be generally determined in the constitution. The first of them concerns foreign relations, in concrete terms who should represent the European federation externally. A head of state usually represents the state externally in most European states, it is mostly a president or a monarch but my proposal of the constitution of the European federation includes no such function of a president or similar representative person (the function of a president is a republican “remake” of a monarch and I consider it superfluous). In the case of absence of such function, it is possible to consider a collective head of state like (for example) in Switzerland; there is however a practice in Switzerland that the President of (Con)federation, a chairman of the federal government and of the collective head of state at the same time, acts as a head of state abroad. Therefore I included a provision to my constitutional proposal that the First Chancellor is the highest representative of the Union who represents it externally. I reserved however also a possibility that the Council of Chancellors put representation of the Union externally to the hands of other chancellor.

I detached, from acts of representation of the federation externally, matters of diplomatic mission in a separate provision. It is again mainly a task of the First Chancellor and he in my proposal independently can receive credentials of foreign diplomatic representatives. Also formal appointment and recall of ambassadors should be put in his hands but not on the basis of solely his decision, rather on the authority of the Council.

The following provision corresponds to present practice in most present states and should be present also in the constitution of the European federation. The matter is negotiation of international treaties and their ratification. Usually, it has to do with a head of state or with a government and because both of these functions are incorporated in the Council of Chancellors, negotiation and ratification of international treaties must therefore be its responsibility. But the Council cannot be allowed to secretly negotiate whatever, so it has to have an obligation to inform the parliament about progress of negotiation. The last step, by the way, must be according to me acknowledgment by people's vote but the turn of this matter comes later in the respective part of the constitution.

And the second article regulating performing executive power of the federation deals with relation of the Council of Chancellors to military affairs. First: who will be a commander in chief of armed forces of the European federation? The Council as a whole or the First Chancellor are the choices. In Switzerland that has a collective head of state identical with a government, a general (e. g. a soldier) is appointed by the parliament in the post of the commander in chief but under supreme authority of the government. I on the contrary believe that supreme authority over the armed forces of the European federation should hold one person and not (professional) soldier. So I put the authority of a commander in chief in the hands of the First chancellor along with competencies of appointing and recalling high officers of the armed forces and, before all, with the power to decide about use of the armed forces in both peace and war.

The next three provisions put limits on decision of the armed forces of the European federation by the chancellors. The first limit is that the armed forces of the federation can be dispatched outside the territory of the federation and the associated states only with approval of the Assembly of the Union.

But there has to be an exception for cases of urgent need. It however must have strict limitations as a protection against misuse. So the first limitation stipulated by me is an immediately imminent military attack or heavy natural disaster. The second limitation is a period of 50 hours – it is, I hope, a sufficiently long period so that the Assembly of the Union can manage to approve or reject further activities of federal armed forces outside the Union.

And other provision determines one more limitation, very important in my view – military activities against an enemy can be done only after a formal declaration of war (enacted by the parliament). It is my reaction to present abuse of military powers of European states (and before all of the USA). Their constitutions mostly make military actions dependent on a declaration of war, but present governments simply use such Orwellian terms like “preemptive strike”, “protection of civilians”, “searching for terrorists” that allow to pretend that no war is waged and so assent of the parliament is not asked though the same military actions are done as if a regular war was waged. Laws about waging war are evaded now, war is labeled in various other ways in order that own legal rules must not be followed. In the beginning of the 20th century, European states had ministries of war, today their cynical name is “ministry of defence” but wars are waged nothing less than at that time (the only difference is that today, European wars are waged predominantly outside of Europe). I do not want that any future European federation acts like European states today so I added to my proposal of this constitutional article a severe provision saying that any military actions against an enemy can be done only after formal declaration of war (and it by a special law). This provision should at least reduce if not remove excessive military campaigns (above that in good of only few chosen ones like great mining companies) which we can see today.

And that is all relating to the executive power of the European federation that has crossed my mind. The legal wording will follow and then I will come to the judiciary.

Chancellors of the Union and their offices

This my other post dedicated to the executive power of the European federation is only short, it deals with the relation of the Chancellors of the Union to their function. It is an analogy of the respective regulations regarding the deputies of the Assembly of the Union. For that reason most regulations will repeat themselves because I believe that rights and duties of both categories of these supreme official persons should be in principal equal.

So the first article of my proposal regards rights and duties of the Chancellors of the Union. Its first letter determines a principle of incompatibility of functions and it is equal as in the case of deputies of the Assembly of the Union – a Chancellor of the Union must not hold another paid office of the Union or of any member state or any autonomous unit of a member state.

The second as well as the third letter of my proposal deals with criminal prosecution of the chancellor of the Union. My suggestion says first that freedom of movement of the Chancellor of the Union may not be restricted or he may not be taken in custody but only committing a criminal offence or immediately after. The next letter then is more specific about conditions of prosecution of the Chancellor of the Union, regardless whether he was apprehended committing a criminal act or not. It says that the Chancellor of the Union may be prosecuted on suspicion of committing a criminal act and determines who can initiate such prosecution. Because a natural consequence of separation of powers is that one power controls another it is understandable that one of the other sides having this right are in my suggestion members of the Assembly of the Union, that is representatives of both chambers. In order that lodging little justified complaints is prevented it is necessary to demand a certain number of deputies as a condition, not only one deputy but I choose their number rather low so that lodging a complaint against the Chancellor of the Union is on the other hand not too difficult. Therefore I chose the number of 40 deputies of the House of the People and 20 deputies of the House of States. But it ends not with this. In conformity with greater emphasis on occasion of the people to influence working of its constitutional representatives and unlike what is in common constitutions, I give a possibility to the people to initiate prosecution of the Chancellor of the Union. I chose their number also low, namely 25 000 persons, with addition that they must be from at least three member states. It is suitable to realize at these low numbers that it is only about initiation of prosecution, not about condemnation or removing from the office. I have also to point out what somebody maybe realized, namely that I did not mention about similar right of the people to initiate prosecution of deputies of the federal parliament. It may not be a bad idea also in this case but it seems to me not so necessary because every deputy is a part of a great entity and his responsibility as an individual is therefore much less.

The other provision concerns pay remuneration of the Chancellors of the Union and is completely identical with the respective provision about the deputies of the Assembly of the Union (the provision forbids them to accept other remunerations but their regular pay from the means of the federation).

The next letter suggested by me determines what belongs to rise of the mandate of the Chancellor of the Union. As in the case of the deputy of the Assembly of the Union I put its beginning to the moment just after his election. And an oath is alike required so that the mandate comes into effect. I entirely took over its reading from the oath of the deputies, I added however an obligation to protect unity of the federation. For if I wrote in the suggestion of the preamble that the European federation should be an indivisible entity, it should not be an empty declaration and somebody should have effort to preserve unity of the federation as a job description. And who else than a representative of the executive power should be obliged to it.

The last but one paragraph of this suggested article deals with ending of the mandate of the Chancellor of the Union and names again the same reasons as at the deputies of the federal parliament:  expiration of the term of mandate, refusing to take the oath or taking the oath with reservations, resignation, death, exercise of an incompatible function, recall, imprisonment.

Other details about rights and duties of the Chancellors of the Union, like of the deputies of the federal parliament earlier, will be left to a separate law.

The second article, that I will deal with, has no analogy in my earlier suggested provisions about the deputies of the federal parliament. It deals with a question how to proceed if one ore more Chancellors of the Union cease executing his office (for example he resigns, dies, is removed from the office and so on). It is necessary to emphasize first and foremost that so important body as the Council of Chancellors holding the executive power of the federation cannot remain incomplete (let alone entirely vacant) for longer time (unlike in the case of much greater bodies of the individual parliamentary chambers where one or few vacant seats are almost no complication for the parliament). Only that can result from it that it is necessary to complete the Council of Chancellors to full staff of three persons. But there is a question how to do it. I proceed from a basic assumption that a certain group of three chancellors was elected as a whole by the citizens. For that reason, I consider impossible that completion of vacant seats by a compensatory election or a compensatory appointment is chosen a permanent solution for the whole time to the next regular elections. If the citizens elected three specific chancellors as an indivisible group, someone else cannot hold their position as an regular chancellor. For that reason, I see as an only acceptable solution new (“premature”) elections of new three chancellors of the federation. These new elections have to be held in a certain period of time so that the federation is not without the regular executive power for a long time. Because it is necessary that the citizens become acquainted with possible candidates and that some people can at all think about their candidature. On the basis of it, I determined the farthest limit of new election a period of 80 days after any seat of the chancellor becomes vacant. A question however remains unanswered, who will exercise the executive power before new chancellors will be elected. Some provisional solution cannot be avoided here. If a kind of vice-chancellors were elected along with the chancellors, themselves could accede to their empty positions, but what is convenient in the case of one person and its one substitute, would be inconvenient in the case of three persons and three hypothetical substitutes of them. Therefore I select a classical method of taking over the function by other constitutional public figures. They are in particular the President of the House of the People of the Assembly of the Union, the President of the House of States and the President of the Supreme Court and in particular in this order of succession for vacant seats of the Chancellors of the Union. It is necessary to add that for the duration of their substitute exercise of the function of the Chancellor of the Union, these person cannot exercise the function to that they were elected in order that no (partial) fusion of the separated state powers occurs.

The next post will be the last dealing with the topic of the Chancellors of the Union, it will treat rules for working of the Council of Chancellors.

Chancellors of the Union - election

In this post I will deal with a method of election of holders of the executive power of the European federation which I wrote in the previous post about. But before I get to a matter of the election itself I begin with an unrelated explanation about the term “chancellor” as I promised in the previous post.

When I had proposed a collective body comprising of three members as a holder of the executive power of the European federation I faced a question how to name members of this collective body. First I refused the usual title of members of European governments, “minister”, because – as I had written in the previous post – the collective body suggested by me is not a classical European government. Therefore I searched other terms used for holders of the executive power. If I leave out extra-European terms (as vizier), there are not many terms left. I mentioned the term “consul” in the previous post, on the one hand in connection with France of the end of the 18th century, on the other hand with ancient Rome. This title is not in use for holders of the executive power today. Other term used in connection with the executive power in the past and today is “chancellor”. Today, the prime minister of Germany and Austria is called with it. Members of an executive body subjected to the president are called “secretaries” in some states with the presidential system. It is also possible to take inspiration from Switzerland that has a collective government somewhat different from conventional European governments – its members are called “councillors”. There are also other titles connected with the executive power of various degrees (captain, chamberlain and others) having origin in history, sometimes however used also today. The most suitable term from all terms mentioned above is in my opinion the title of chancellor because it is most connected with an idea of a high holder of the executive power. But I admit that the choice is subjective.

Now, it is time to deal with election of chancellors of the European federation themselves. I wrote already in the previous post that they should – unlike members of the executive body in present European states – be elected directly by citizens of the federation. I add to the constitution's provision determining this what I wrote also in the section devoted to the federal parliament: that the election should be held in the whole territory of the federation at the same time.

If the constitution prescribes a general election, a provision about the active and the passive right to vote must follow. Because no other restrictions can be given it will be about the question of age. There is no reason to determine a different age limit for the election of the federal chancellors than to the federal parliament, namely 18 years. The age of candidates for the office of the chancellors is however another question. It is easy to understand that the office of a holder of the executive power of such great state that the European federation (probably – sooner or later) will be will demand great personal abilities and life experiences, therefore the lower age threshold must be set distinctly higher than the one for candidates to deputies of the federal parliament. I cannot present direct examples from elsewhere because constitutions of European states determine no age restrictions for holders of the executive power (for members of governments). An age threshold is on contrary determined for the function of the state president; the age of 35 or 40 years is the most common condition for running for the president. I am to follow one of these items – the age of 35 seems to me too low for an important and responsible function of chancellor of the European Union, therefore I chose the age 40 years.

I wrote already in the previous post that candidates for the function of chancellors of the Union will run for the function as an integrated group of three persons, not every of them separately. I wrote also the main reason in the previous post: capability of action is more important at the function of a holder of the executive power than variety of opinions. Therefore I believe that all three persons holding the executive power of the European federation should be bearers of the same or similar opinions which could not be kept if every member of the Council of Chancellors was elected separately and the citizens set the Council together from persons of maybe quite opposite opinions and attitudes to exercise of the state power (inner crises similar to present crises in classical coalition governments in European states could be expected in that case).

One another question is connected with the previous provision, namely representation of the member states in supreme bodies of the federation. It can be seen in the present European Union in example of the European Commission that every member state must have its representative. That cannot be kept in the case of a council consisting of three persons (unless the European federation accidentally had just three members). But it follows not that it is necessary to relinquish representation of citizens from various member states. While in the case of the parliament, a law can determine by how many deputies the respective state should be represented, this is logically not possible in the case of the council of three persons, but I at least added a provision that each of persons in the group of three candidates must be a citizen of a different member state of the federation than the other candidates in the same group which should prevent that holders of the executive power of the federation are connected with only one member state.

I come to an important question of election of candidates now. For if we ask a question to what extent the people has a possibility in democracy to really influence what persons will execute the highest public functions, it is maybe more important to influence who actually will run for the office than who of candidates will finally be elected. It threatens in every state that calls itself democratic (and it really happens in practice) that the caste of professional politicians in direct or indirect cooperation with powerful democratically irresponsible economic powers in background put only such candidates to vote to the people who ensure that privileges of these caste of politicians and friendly economic powers, so a choice without choice for the people as a result. I suggest therefore such solution that only those can run for a chancellor of the European federation who obtain support from citizens for their candidature; it is so by the way at presidential election in many a European state. I exclude a possibility that candidates obtain support from a certain number of deputies of the federal parliament because it would be unjust towards the candidates who will search support at citizens and in addition, one of objectives of direct election of chancellors of the Union by the citizens should also be restriction of the power of secretariats of political parties in the matter of elections.

A separate question is a number of signatures of citizens necessary that the candidatures are valid. I presume that it is impossible to say what number is the best, I inclined to the number 100 000. I proceed from the fact that in the presidential election that held in the Czech Republic, a state with 10 millions inhabitants, recently, a candidate who had not support of certain number of deputies of the parliament had to gather signatures of 50 000 citizens and six candidates made it without problems. So the number of 100 000 can be seen high at first appearance but it is not so high in this comparison. And in order that representation of citizens from more member states is strengthened in the respective person's candidature I added a condition that those 100 000 signatures must come from citizens from at least one sixth of the member states in order that happens not that candidates are candidates of only one member state. And I have to give notice that those 100 000 signatures of citizens concern the whole groups of three candidates, not every individual candidate because no candidate will run for the office separately according to my suggestion.

The next turn is of a question what majority should be necessary to elect the Council of Chancellors. I regard as obvious that the group of three candidates will be elected that will acquire an absolute majority of all votes and unless it happens, a second round is held in which two groups of candidates forward that have obtained the highest number of votes in the first round. The true question however is what should be considered an absolute majority of votes. An answer would be simple in a unitary state, in a federal state, however, a method of election should reflect federal arrangement. If the Council of Chancellors should be elected by mere absolute majority of all citizens of the federation, only citizens of few most populous states would in actual fact decide about composition of the Council of Chancellors. In order that it usually not happens it is necessary to establish two majorities known from people's referenda in Switzerland and to be used in modified form in voting in the present Council of the European Union from 2014. It results from it that the group of three candidates should be elected that acquires majority of votes of citizens and majority of votes of states (the result of people's voting in the respective member state is considered a vote of the state). A demand of two majorities however rather complicates the whole election. If no group of three candidates obtains a majority of people's votes and a majority of states' votes in the same time, which two groups of candidates will forward to the second round? The solution can be thought of that the group of candidates will be selected that obtained the highest number of people's votes and the group that obtained the highest number of states' votes. But how to proceed if one group of candidates obtains the highest number of people's votes and the highest number of states' votes in the first round and only obtains not an absolute majority? It would be ideal if the second group of candidates was that one that obtained the second highest number of people's votes and the second highest number of states' votes at the same time but it may not be fulfilled – the group that obtained the second highest number of people's votes may not obtain also the second highest number of states' votes. The same problem can occur also in the second round in which only two groups of candidates will compete for votes of citizens. It would be ideal if the group of candidates was a winner that obtains an absolute majority of people's votes and state's votes. But it can very really happen that one group obtains a majority of people's votes while the second group a majority of states' votes. How to proceed in such case? To prefer a majority according to voters' number or according to states' votes? I came on a method how to take into consideration both majorities. If no group of candidates obtained a majority of votes of citizens and of states at the same time, a total of share of people's vote and of share of states' votes would decide. To bring nearer what is my idea I introduce a clear example:

Let us presume that we have a federation of 27 members in that five groups of three candidates run for the office of the chancellors of the Union. After the first round, the hypothetical results will be as follows:
the group A – 11,22% votes of voters, 1 vote of a state,
the group B – 22,53% votes of voters, 8 votes of states,
the group C – 32,48% votes of voters, 9 votes of states,
the group D – 29,06% votes of voters, 6 votes of states,
the group E – 4,71% votes of voters, 3 votes of states.

Visual results are displayed by following two graphs.

It is apparent that no group of candidates obtained an absolute majority of votes of voters and of votes of states in the first round. Therefore two groups with the highest total of share of people's vote and of share of states' votes proceed to the second round. It is undoubted that the group C proceeds to the second round, there is a question however what group will be in the second place – whether the group B or D. The group B obtained 29,63% of states' votes (8 of 27) which added to 22,53% of votes of voters is the number 52,16; the group D obtained 22,22% of states' votes which added to 29,06% of votes of voters amounts to the number 51,28. The group B acquired higher score and proceeds therefore to the second round.

After the second round, hypothetical results will be as follows:
the group B – 46,14% votes of voters, 15 votes of states,
the group C – 53,86% votes of voters, 12 votes of states.

Again two graphs for clearness.

Neither of both groups obtained a majority of people's vote and of states' votes at the same time, it is therefore necessary to add up the shares. The group B obtained 55,56% states' votes which added to 46,14% votes of voters is 101,70; the group C obtained 44,44% votes of states which added to 53,86% votes of voters is the number 98,30. So the group B acquired higher score and just it is a winner of the second round of the election. It can be seen by the way in the examples that a number of states' votes has decisive importance unless numbers of votes of voters at individual groups of candidates are too different. It follows from it that the group can be elected that obtains not greater number of votes of voters but federalism must be reflected in process of the election in a federal state (especially in Europe, where the small number of great states considerably exceeds in population much greater number of lesser states).

Also a provision determining a period for that the chancellors of the Union are elected must be a part of the article of the constitution that determines basic rules of their election. It is again a question to be disputed. It cannot be said that a certain period is right whereas another wrong, so a concrete period of the mandate of the chancellors of the federation will be a result of a subjective decision. I believe that the term of office of the chancellors of the Union should not be completely equal as the term of office of deputies of the federal parliament in order that separation and difference of the executive power from the legislative power is highlighted. Because I determined the term of office of both chambers of the federal parliament to be four years, a period shorter or longer than four years comes into consideration. But less than four years is few for the highest executive state authority, so a longer period than four years is better. Too long periods are however not suitable too (temptation of power can seduce everyone), the period of five years appears the best for me (let us remind for example that the term of service of the France's president was seven years initially, but was reduced to five years in 2000). I add a provision to it that I wrote already in the text about the federal parliament, namely that nobody is allowed to hold the office of the chancellor of the Union more than twice.

Because all details about the election of the chancellors of the Union cannot be in the constitution, I refer to a separate law and with it I end the passage devoted to the election of holder of the executive power of the European federation. The next post will deal with persons of the chancellors (their rights and duties and similar).

Form of the executive power of the European federation

In this post, I will describe my idea about who should be a holder of the executive power of the European federation. Readers know already that my idea is a committee or a body that I call the Council of Chancellors. I wrote however nothing more about it, maybe most readers will expect that it is actually only my different name for a standard state government which commonly is formed in European states. But my view is different not only in the question of the name – it fundamentally differs from a typical European manner of establishing governments and is very close to some extra-European ways of establishing the executive power. The fundamental point of view for me is democracy and possibility of the people to influence public events and the European manner is not enough democratic in my opinion.

European federalists have a habit of taking the United States of America as a model and of taking over every single feature from them. But while they take over such details as that the European federation should be called “The United States of Europe” they disregard more fundamental things. There is one great difference between the way how the executive power is staffed in the federation of the USA and the way usual in Europe which is planned also for the future European federation by many – one person elected directly (or in fact directly) is a holder of the executive power in the USA, a body consisting of more persons (a prime minister and other ministers) that are not elected is a holder of the executive power in European states. Which system is more democratic? Various people can raise an objection that European governments are made up on the basis of (parliamentary) elections (which is absurd: parliamentary elections → a government). It is true but in spite of it the prime minister and other ministers are unelected persons; the people decides who will be a (prime) minister in no European state. The reality is that parliamentary elections are held, after the elections, envoys of political parties that obtained a certain greater number of parliamentary seats meet together and come to an agreement behind the scenes which person from the respective parties will be the first minister and which persons fill posts of other ministers. The people can only watch this negotiation but has zero possibility to influence it. The people can only partially determine by its election of parliament's deputies which parties will negotiate about composition of the government but it is the only possibility that it has. It cannot even exactly decide which concrete parties will form the government, the political parties themselves decide it after the parliamentary elections. The people can influence in absolutely no way what person will hold what ministerial seat although governments and their individual ministers play a significant power role in systems of present states. How such system can be considered as democratic? If a system of direct election of a holder of the executive power in the state is closer to the will of the people, a question can be asked why it is not used in Europe and why governments are made up by a negotiation of political parties behind the scenes (or quasi publicly) after parliamentary elections. There can be an answer that it is simply a European tradition but another tradition then can be asked – why there is a different tradition somewhere outside of Europe? A true explanation of a European manner of establishing the executive power has to be searched in historical development of Europe. So I will now proceed to a historical digression which is necessary in my opinion to show why I hold not for suitable to copy the form of the executive power common in present Europe for state arrangement of the European federation.

Before the half of the 18th century, absolutistic monarchies ruled almost in all Europe. A monarch was an exclusive holder of the state power in them, other classes of inhabitants were excluded from decision making, they could at most participate in execution of monarch's will. There were exceptions (Venice, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Poland, German City-States, Dubrovnik) that were mostly aristocratic oligarchies but they played not a decisive role in Europe's development and what is more, existence of almost all of them entirely or temporarily ended on the threshold of the modern times. Enlightenment philosophers, in particular the French ones, were coming up with theories about wholly different state arrangement – based on the will of all people – that that really existed in that time. These theories met with a great response in their century but could not be put into practice in Europe because the absolutistic monarchs were yet too strong. What was however impossible in Europe was possible in the north America. In the year 1776, its North American colonies separated from Great Britain and faced a task to choose a state form. There were no tradition of absolutistic rule in these colonies and ideas of European (French) philosophers were known there and they were really used in administration of the colonies. Therefore state theories of Enlightenment were naturally used also in creation of state form of the new federation. The power of the king of Britain over the North American colonies was overthrown in the year 1776 (or through the following war) but it was not strong even before, so there was no obstacle for using a state form of the Enlightenment. It is important to emphasize that Americans had not to make a compromise with an absolutistic power.

There was utterly different situation in Europe. Shortly after the North American colonies had achieved independence absolutism fell in France, the French however were not radical at first and made a compromise with the existing royal power because the executive power was left to the king. Shortly after the king was executed but after a short temporary period monarchy returned to France and it strove after restoration of absolutism. In 1815, when Napoleon Bonaparte was defeated, almost all Europe was absolutistic and absolutism seemed even reinforced. All the same, rise of a more democratic regime could not be halted but evolution went in most Europe unlike in France by a way of gradual concession of the absolutistic power. An elected body of representatives was conceded at first, usually however representing interests of the most rich or otherwise privileged ones initially and only with a consultative function; the absolutistic power of the monarch thus was restricted only very partially. The monarch, above all, chose in his arbitrariness his ministers (the word minister is of the Latin origin meaning originally “a servant”), as however grew the power of the elected body it happened in a certain moment that ministers of the monarch became responsible to the representative elected body instead of to be solely private servants of the monarch. The next step then was that the monarch chose a prime minister according to outcome of the election to the representative body and appointed other ministers on his recommendation or reserved their appointment utterly to him. Although this evolution passed not with the same speed in all European states it became a basis for the present form of the executive power everywhere in Europe – the president replaced the monarch in almost all states but nevertheless, he appoints a prime minister in compliance with a result of the parliamentary elections and other ministers on his recommendation who are together the collective government responsible to the parliament. The present manner of establishing the executive power is therefore caused by historical evolution, by the way how absolutism was retreating during the 19th century. There was no possibility to choose another way in the 19th century and the manner of establishing the executive power had therefore to look like it looked.

But the question is why still to continue today in action that was necessary in the past but is not necessary today. I do not see any reason. The present way of establishing governments corresponds to historical circumstances which went down already and apart from that the citizens can directly not influence what concrete persons become members of the government it has also one disadvantage more: The present governments are formally responsible to the parliaments and they can work only when they have confidence of that parliaments. Superiority of the parliament (as the only directly elected state body) results from it at first sight, reality is however exactly opposite. Because political parties that have majority of deputies in the parliament form the government the respective “governmental” deputies must act so that they put not stability of the government at risk. It follows, apart from other things, that to agree with draft bills submitted by the government is almost their duty. And if some serious contradictions among the parties being in the government happen, a common solution is dissolution of the parliament and calling premature parliamentary elections. But the parliament is dissolved because the problem happened on the side of the executive power which is simply absurd. The government is responsible to the parliament theoretically but in practice, the parliament is rather responsible to the government because its action must adapt to that the government falls not. This way the parliament and the government grow together in one and separation of the legislative and executive power is rather theoretical than real (all the more so that the author of most of draft bills is the executive power).

My opinion is for the given reasons that the only way of establishing the executive power of the European federation corresponding to the 21st century is a direct election by the citizens. This however provokes some questions. In the first place, it is a number of holders of the executive power of the federation. (A method of election is in the second place but I will reserve it for the following post). If we speak about a direct election, it is almost impossible to ponder over a classic government consisting of approximately 15 ministers. An election campaign would be rather confused (and so a possibility to choose the right persons to be complicated) but above all, the resulting government would consist of persons of heterogeneous opinions and would therefore suffer from inner ambivalence similarly as classic coalition governments. In my opinion, capability of action takes precedence over diversity of opinions (which on the contrary is very appropriate at the legislative body) at the supreme executive body. An election of one holder of the executive power stands as a best possibility, similarly as in the USA (if we ignore a superfluous connecting link in the form of the electoral college). But this is not the best possibility in my opinion. The European federation, whatever size it will have, will be probably a great state and therefore a number of activities that its executive power will have to deal with will be also great. I believe that to charge one person with such great burden and responsibility is not appropriate and that the executive power of the federation should be held by more persons. The question of the number so remains. The number should not be great for the reasons that I mentioned above, a possibility to form a list of candidates consisting of more persons with the same or similar opinions and to leave a possibility to judge suitability of every single candidate to the people at the same time is limiting. In my opinion, the best is to decide between the number of two or three. The number of two resembles two candidates in the presidential election in the United States of America, for the president and its vice-president, but only one of them really executes the executive power after the election and attention of voting citizens is focused just on him. Also ancient Rome can be remembered, high public offices were always held by two persons. But a motive of this measure was not distribution of burden of the office, the true reason was to prevent emergence a tyranny of an individual. In spite of my idea of establishing a collective executive power of the European federation too, either of two Roman colleagues was elected separately and so two people met in an office who had utterly different views at execution of their public service, sometimes with consequences in practice. As for three common holders of the executive power, I can refer to France in the period 1799-1802 when three consuls led the state. As in the case of the executive power in the United States, the fact is also here that these three consuls had not equal position (the first consul who was Napoleon Bonaparte played the leading role among them). I wanted only to show by these historical or present-time examples that the executive power in the state can be distributed among two or three persons, to take over any formerly or now existing system without a change is however not necessary. In every case, the choice between the number of two or three holders of the executive power of the European federation will be decided on the basis of the way of decision making of their collective body. If the same responsibility is put in hands of more people, they can reach a decision either unanimously or by voting. Either two or three persons will hold the executive power of the European federation, a requirement for unanimity would cause that every of the colleagues would have the right of veto on decisions of the body which could paralyse the executive power. In the number of two would however be no alternative than either unanimity or veto and unanimity cannot be achieved also among close persons always. Therefore the number of three holders of the executive power is better because consent of two from the number of three is necessary to come to a decision and it is a compromise between unanimity and a possibility of veto by one vote.

So my conclusion is that holders of the executive body of the European federation should be three, elected directly by the people of the federation (which is more democratic than the present way) and running for the office in groups of three, details about organization of the election will however follow later. I will explain also why I chose the designation "chancellor" for a holder of the executive power of the European federation.

Federal territories and related

I was going to start writing about the executive power of the federation but writing previous two posts about representation of individual parts of the European federation in the federal parliament I realized that I have not satisfactorily solved a question of territories that are dependent on some European states but are not a direct part of them. Those are mostly territories which are situated outside of Europe and mostly they are not supposed to be a part of future united Europe in contrast to their metropolises. Their inhabitants themselves want not in many cases to be a part of united Europe although they want not to break links to their European metropolitan states. In the present international organization of the European Union, the thing is solved the way that the metropolis is a part of the EU but its dependent territory is not. However such solution would be impossible in the case of creation of the European federation. I have written in the post Associated states that administration of territories not being a part of the federation would have to be considered as independent foreign policy from the part of the respective member state, and it is naturally inaccessible. Inhabitants of the respective dependent territories would have to decide after creation of the European federation whether they want to be outside the federation or inside it. In the first case the territories could be associated states of the federation, but the respective territories would be independent states from the point of view of international law. But if the would not want to be independent states – and they probably would not want to, if they have not wanted it up to this day – they would have to be a part of the European federation. I suppose however that these territories would want to retain links to thier metropolitan states if they become member states of the European federation; therefore I added a category of federal territories in the proposal of the European federal constitution. Citizens of these territories would have to be citizens of the federation (and therefore to have their representatives in the federal parliament as I have written in previous two posts) but a status of a federal territory should make to have special relationship to the federation, distinct from relationship of the member states to the federation, possible for them.

However, before I get to details I return in the very beginning, to the article 2 where I enumerated the member states of the federation. So that the list is complete I have to add all dependent territories of already enumerated member states (namely of France, the United Kingdom, the Nederlands and Denmark), just in the form of federal territories. I added also the Federal Region of Brussels to the list as a separate unit, I will return to it later. I must make a remark in advance: when I started writing about a proposal of a European federal constitution I had the states associated now in the international organization called the European Union in mind but in the course of writing, to propose such constitution with that a union comprising whole Europe could work became my intention. I adjusted therefore reading of the article two to it and involved all European states (including the microstates) except of Russia, Turkey and Caucasian states in it. The people in all enumerated states and territories should get a possibility to make a decision whether it wants to participate in creation of the European federation or not. I do not believe in contrast to my aearlier idea that respective plebiscites should be held only in the states of the present EU. There may be an objection that the states of the present European community are more prepared to political unification than those which stay outside but it can be hardly believed because there is almost no popular and especially political discussion about its tending towards a federation inside the European “Union”, if national politicians governing it have still such goal at all. The modified articte two is presented lower. I point out that I am aware that the European federation may never exist in that form, however I suppose that the suggested article two will be revised after creation of the federation or admission of a new member in a form corresponding with reality.

As I have written, status of a federal territory should make possible that territories dependent on any European state now could retain their close relationship with the respective metropolitan states but not at the same time to have to participate in the European federation in equal extent as the metropolitan states themselves. Therefore I drew up the first paragraph of the article about federal territories this way: the European federal constitution (I have primarily its third chapter dealing with competencies of the federation in mind) should be valid also for relations between the federation and the federal territories unless the respective law about status of the federal territory determines otherwise. That is to say, every federal territory should have the right to determine by a special law what parts of the third chapter of the federal constitution should be valid for it. The right of a federal territory to such law is guaranteed by the suggested article two.

The right to special status inside the European federation can however not give a right to arbitrarily reject obligation of whatever provision of the constitution to the territory. Some competencies of the federation must be retained in relation to the federal territories if the federation should work as a whole and if malfunctions should not occur in its operation. Therefore I enumerate the articles of the chapter three or parts of them in a suggested text bellow which cannot be a subject of special regulation of relations between the federation and the respective federal territory. Overview of them with commentary follows. (Numbering of articles corresponds not with what I published earlier because I added two other articles concerning just the federal territories and the Federal Region of Brussels.)

- The entire article 18 (foreign relations): As the member states cannot have their own foreign policy, the federal territories cannot have it too; it is obvious.
- The entire article 20 (military affairs): The same is valid as in the case of the article 18.
- The entire article 21 (free movement, internal security): I do not see any argument why federal territories should restrict free movement of other citizens of the federation in their territory. And if movement of persons is free, also freedom of activities of federal investigative bodies in federal territories must be, otherwise they could become bases of organized crime which would be secure from institutions of the Union there.
- The entire article 22 (citizenship of the Union): No federal territory like the member states can be allowed to give its citizenship to somebody who did not became the one of the federation first.
- From the article 23 (economy, curency) the paragraphs (d) (business law is a matter of the federation), (f) (social conditions of labour), (g) (uniform currency in all federation), (h) (federal supervision over banks and other financial organizations): Objective of these restrictions for the federal territories is that these territories become not, in the framework of the European Union, areas where companies could misuse eventual milder local conditions. Federal territories cannot – in my proposal – permit for example lower protection of working people or less severe conditions for financial institutions because citizens in the rest of the Union would be threatened by that. (Who critically observes present capitalism sees what unfair advantages supranational firms utilize in states with low legal regulation and protection of working people understands what I have in mind.)
- From the article 24 paragraphs (e) (the Union levies import and export duties), (f) (the Union  imposes capital gains taxes), (g) (size of taxes imposed by the Union has to be equal in all federation): The first condition is natural, because it is related to foreign policy, the other two ones then have the same justification as restrictive provisions of the article 23 – their purpose is to prevent that federal territories become not tax havens, offshore finacial centres or something similar inside the federation.
- The paragraph (e) (genetic engineering): Genetic manipulation of living creatures is so weighty matter that the federal territories cannot be allowed to permit less strict rules in this field than rules valid in the rest of the federation.
- From the article 30 (environment, agriculture) the paragraphs (e) (treating farm animals), (f) (treating free living animals), (g) (animal tests): All these provisions should prevent that the federal territories become not an asylum of supranational or other firms that would want to get around severe regulations of the federation about protection of animals against maltreatement.

The last paragraph of my proposal distinguishes the federal territories from the member states in one more thing. A reason of political unification of Europe and of creation of European federal state is to prevent damages which arose from division of Europe. The damages could be various and can vary or complement each other in the course of time. Unification of Europe therefore makes sense only when it will last forever. If the European federation was threatened by disintegration at any time, unification would lack purpose; unification “on trial” would be virtually no unification. Therefore unity of the European federation must be everlasting and the member states cannot have the right to secede from the federation (therefore a plebiscite has to confirm accession of any new state to the federation in both sides as well as creation of the federation itself in its beginning). It is actually common that federal constitutions do not regulate and not mention the right of the member states to secede from the federation (the only exceptions known to me are the constitution of the former Soviet Union (the article 72 of the constitution from 1977) and the present constitution of Ethiopia (the article 39)). Some federal constitution mention, on the other hand, impossibility of partition of the federation (the constitution of Brazil in its preamble), most of them however are silent about this matter, perhaps because they consider indissolubility of the (respective) federatin an obvious thing. I was aware the judgement of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the case Texas versus Write (1869) in that the court rejected the right of a member state to secede from the United States although the constitution said nothing about it referring to the Articles of Confederation which repeatedly mention creation of perpetual union; therefore I inserted earlier the same words in preamble of my suggestion of the European federal constitution. But writing about it now I hold for appropriate to emphasize it more so that there is no misgiving in the matter – therefore I changed the earlier published article 1 in the General Provisions by adding a word “indivisible”. The amended article is below.

But I return back to the federal territories. What I have writen above about the member states should not be valid for them. As the list of them obove shows they are predominantly territories distant frome Europe and so from its affairs. They are remnants of former colonial empires of some European states and their existing bond to their metropolitan states is not utterly a result of their free choice. There is an independence movement in some of them and if there is not now, it can there be sometimes in the future. From the mentioned reasons I believe that the federal territories – unlike the member states – should have the right to decide to leave the European federation. Their right to etirely merge with their metropolitan state (as French overseas territory Mayotte did in the year 2011) is naturally not disputed.

To mention status of the Federal Region of Brussels is what remains to be discussed. The matter of fact is that this territory should serve as a federal district in the European federation similar to federal districts in other federations, for example in the United States of America, Australia, Brazil or Mexico. The main reason of creating such federal districts is to ensure that main constitutional bodies of the federation are not located in the territory of any mameber state and cannot thus be influenced by the respective state in which territory the bodies are located. Another assumption arises then from this main assumption, namely that administration over the federal district is exercised by federal institutions. I hardly can make another remark that the one that James Madison wrote in 1788 (the Federalist No. 42) about the future federal district of the USA: “The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of Government, carries its own evidence with it.” (And: “It is a power exercised by every Legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity; but a dependence of the members of the General Government on the State comprehending the seat of the Government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the National Councils animputation of awe or influence...”)

But it would not be just if the Federal Region of Brusells had no autonomy and the entire state power was exercised by federal authorities. Federal districts in various federations have (or acquired in evolution) their own administration similar to a state one and federal authorities serve only as a supervisor who confirms or can change decisions of autonomous bodies of the federal district in the case of necessity. I chose the same for the Federal Region of Brussels and following two paragraphs describe this solution: the state power exercise local autonomous authorities in the Federal Region of Brussels, their decisions can be changed or revoked by the federal authorities. It is actually a manifestation of something like concurrent legislation (and concurrent administration too) known for example from Germany.

Reading of the respective suggested articles of the constitution including the amended article 1 and the amended article 2 follows (changes in these two are underlined in comparison with the previously published text):

Article 1
The European Union is an indivisible democratic federal state based on the will of the people. The people is the only source of the state power.

Article 2
The European Union is composed of the states Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, the Nederlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, of the Federal Region of Brussels and of the federal territories Andorra, Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, Bonaire, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Curaçao, the Falkland Islands, the Faroe Islands, French Polynesia, Gibraltar, Greenland, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, qqMonaco, Montserrat, New Caledonia, the Pitcairn Islands, Saba, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, Saint Martin, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, San Marino, Sint Eustatius, Sint Maarten, the Turks and Caicos Islands, Wallis and Futuna as well as all territories belonging to them.

Article 16 - Federal Region of Brussels
(a) The Federal Region of Brussels is endowed with all competencies that belong to the member states.
(b) The state power in the Federal Region of Brussels is exercised by the people of the Federal Region of Brussels and by authorities elected by it.
(c) The Assembly of the Union and the Council of Chancellors can revoke or change whatever legislative or executive decision of the authorities of the state power of the Federal Region of Brussels if protection of federal authorities located in the Federal Region of Brussels requires it.

Article 17 – Federal territories
(a) All provisions of the chapter three of the constitution apply to the relations between the Union and the federal territories unless the respective law of status of the federal territory stipulates otherwise.
(b) Each federal territory may regulate its relation to the Union by the law about status of the federal territory.
(c) The law about status of the federal territory may not change the provisions of the articles 18, 20, 21, 22, of the paragraphs (d), (f), (g), (h) of the article 23, of the paragraphs (e), (f), (g) of the article 24, of the paragraph (e) of the article 27 and of the paragraphs (e), (f), (g), (l) of the article 30 of this constitution.
(d) The federal territories have the right to leave the community of the European Union.

Assembly of the Union - constitutional text

In this post, I bring a summary of my previous posts dedicated to the parliament of the European federation in the form of a suggestion of a constitutional text. There are some things that I not discussed aerlier because I realized them only writing this text. First, I added imprisonment to conditions under which a deputy loses his mandate. A reason is obvious, I suppose. Second, I realized that I had given the right to have its representative in the European federal parliament to associated states (see this post), so I had to regulate their position in this constitutional text. And third, I completed in the article about lawmaking that all laws anticipated by the constitution (by words "details are stipulated by the law" or similar) must be subjected to a plebiscite as the constitution itself (because they are in fact a part of the constitution, although a separated one by their form).

Title 4 – Institutions of the Union
Chapter 1 – Assembly of the Union

Article 31 – Assembly and its chambers

1. Legislative power if not exercised directly by the people as well as other competencies stipulated by this constitution belong to the Assembly of the Union.
2. The Assembly of the Union consists of two chambers, the House of the People and the House of States. Both chambers are equal to each other.
2. The Assembly of the Union has its seat in the Federal Region of Brussels. In the case of exceptional circumstances, each chamber can sit in other place of the Union.
3. The House of the People and the House of States have separate sessions.
4. A resolution of the Assembly of the Union requires assent of both chambers.
5. Each chamber can take a resolution if at least two thirds of their respective members are present.
6. Each chamber can take its own resolution or decision. Assent of majority of its members is required.
7. Both chambers are in permanent sessions. The total period for which a session of one chamber may be adjourned shall not exceed 150 days in one year.
8. The Assembly of the Union may not be dissolved.
9. The first session of each chamber of the Assembly of the Union is called by a Chancellor of the Union no later than the thirtieth day after the election or appointment of deputies of the respective chamber. If not done so, the respective chamber meets on the thirtieth first day after the election or appointment of deputies of the respective chamber.
10. Sessions of the chambers and their committees are public. The public can be excluded solely for serious reasons stipulated by the law.
11. Each chamber elects within itself its President and two Vice-Presidents and dismisses them.
12. Each chamber establishes committees and assigns deputies to them.
13. The law of rules of procedure regulates work of each chamber.
14. Each chamber has the right to start investigation in the public interest and to summon all persons discharging public functions.

Article 32 – Rights and duties of members of the Assembly of the Union

1. Nobody is allowed to be a member of the Assembly of the Union and to hold any constitutional or other salaried office of the European Union, of any member state or its autonomous entity or of any other territory of the Union. Nobody is allowed to be member of both chambers.
2. A member of the Assembly of the Union votes only according to his conscience and to interests of the people that he represents and according to the constitution of the Union. He may not vote following instructions of any other person or by proxy. Every member of the Assembly of the Union has one vote in voting.
3. A member of either of two chambers may not be prosecuted or subjected to inquiry with regard to statements or voting made in the exercise of his mandate.
4. A member of the Assembly of the Union may be prosecuted, restricted in his free movement or arrested only with consent of the chamber of which he is a member unless caught while committing a criminal act. The detention of a member of the Assembly of the Union or the prosecution against him is suspended during a session or for its entire duration if the respective chamber requires it.
5. Members of the Assembly of the Union receive a salary and a compensation for the costs of their travel to the seat of the Assembly of the Union paid from means of the Union. To receive any other remunerations is inadmissible.
6. The mandate of a member of the Assembly of the Union becomes effective by his election.
7. Every member of the Assembly of the Union takes the oath at the first session of his chamber which he attends. The oath of the member of the Assembly of the Union reads: “I, … (name of a person), solemnly pledge now to work for welfare of the people of the European Union, to represent it in compliance with my conscience and to fulfill the spirit of the constitution of the Union.”
8. The mandate of a member of the Assembly of the Union expires by

(a) expiration of the term of mandate,
(b) refusing to take the oath or taking the oath with reservations,
(c) resignation,
(d) death,
(e) exercise of an incompatible function,
(f) recall,
(g) imprisonment.
9. Every member of the Assembly of the Union has the right to put questions to members of the Council of Chancellors regarding their authority; they have the duty to respond verbally or by writing no later than in thirty days.
10. Representatives of the associated states have all rights and duties as other members of the Assembly of the Union with exception of the right to vote and to access to confidential information.
11. The law stipulates details of rights and duties of members of the Assembly of the Union.

Article 33 – Lawmaking

1. Every member or a group of members of the Assembly of the Union has the right to submit a draft bill.
2. Every bill is discussed first in the chamber to which it was submitted.
3. Every bill is discussed in three readings in each of the chambers. In the first reading, all members of the respective chamber become acquainted with a bill and they decide whether they will consider it further; in the second reading, draft amendments that may refer only to the discussed matter can be added to the bill; in the third reading, the chamber finally decides whether the bill is passed or rejected. Every reading is accompanied by a general debate that can be left out on request of majority of present members of the respective chamber. No less than twenty days may elapse between individual readings. Details are stipulated in the laws of procedure of each respective chamber.
4. The law about declaration of war and the law terminating state of war are discussed in each chamber only in one reading.
5. Assent of majority of members of the respective chamber is required in each of the chambers to adopt a law or a resolution of the Assembly of the Union.
6. If one chamber expresses its assent to a bill, it is without unnecessary delay advanced to the other chamber. Assent of both chambers is required to pass a bill.
7. A draft law adopted by the Assembly of the Union with exception of the law about declaration of war and the law terminating state of war is without unnecessary delay advanced to the Council of Chancellors. It either expresses its assent to the draft law or sends it with explanations back to the Assembly of the Union. Each chamber votes again about the returned draft law in one reading, amendments are not allowed. A majority of four seventh of members of each chamber is required to adopt the law.
8. An adopted law is inscribed in the Official Journal of the European Union. It takes effect when it is inscribed in the Official Journal unless the law itself stipulates otherwise.
9. Laws completing the constitution of the Union anticipated by the constitution itself require adoption in a federal plebiscite to become effective.
10. An adopted law must not be contrary to the constitution of the Union and must not have retroactive effect.
11. Regulation of more unrelated affairs may not be involved in one law.
12. The law about declaration of war must contain a reason of a declaration of war, definite determination of an enemy and an objective of military actions.

Article 34 – House of the People

1. The House of the People consists of deputies who represent the people of the European Union. The number of deputies must not exceed 567.
2. The people of every member state, of every federal territory as well as of the Federal Region of Brussels is represented according to a number of their inhabitants with respect to the principle of degressive proportionality. The people of any member state and of the Federal Region of Brussels may not be represented by less than three deputies, the people of every federal territory is represented by one deputy. Details are stipulated by the law.
3. Deputies of the House of the People are elected in general, direct and secret elections. Every member state or federal territory as well as the Federal Region of Brussels is a separate electoral district. Elections take place in all territory of the Union at the same time and according to the same rules. The law stipulates details.
4. The term of mandate of a deputy of the House of the People is four years.
5. Every citizen of the European Union who reached the age of eighteen years has the right to elect deputies of the House of the People.
6. Every citizen of the European Union who completed the age of twenty one can be elected a deputy of the House of the People.
7. Nobody can be elected a deputy of the House of the People more than twice.

Article 35 – House of States

1. The House of States consists of deputies who represent the member states of the Union. Each state is represented by three deputies.
2. The Federal Region of Brussels is represented by three deputies, each federal territory is represented by one deputy.
3. Deputies of the House of States are delegated by the member states and federal territories as well as by the Federal Region of Brussels according to their rules observing principles of public administration responsive to the people. All deputies are delegated at the same time. The law stipulates details.
4. The term of mandate of a deputy of the House of States is four years.
5. No deputy of the House of States may be less than twenty one years of age and must be a citizen of the state or other territory of the Union that delegates him.
6. Nobody can be elected a deputy of the House of States more than twice.

Characteristics of both parliamentary chambers

In the last post devoted to the federal parliament, I will deal with special characteristics of its individual chambers (houses). I will discuss both chambers altogether in one post because provisions about both of them will be similar.

I begin with a (constitutional) article devoted to the House of the People. Its first paragraph suggested by me characterizes its role first: it says that the House of the People consists of deputies who represent the people of the European Union. Other statement will be in the first paragraph of the first article about the House of  States (that it consists of deputies who represent the member states). The second part of the same article is then a sentence determining the maximum size of the House of the People. I determined the number at 567 deputies which I had written about in the first article devoted to the federal parliament.

The “lower” house should represent the people of the federation as a whole but in practice, this people is divided among the member states (or other territories) of the federation – therefore also the deputies representing the people of the federation have to be divided according to the member states (eventually other territories) of the federation. A rule must logically be valid at the same time – that the greater part of the people of the federation resides in the respective member state the greater number of deputies represents this part of the people. This principle is determined in the second paragraph. Apportion of adequate number of representatives among each state is another question. There will be great differences in their size among the member states in practice which will undoubtedly necessitate that very great or very small states will be disadvantaged. To prevent that very small states are too undervalued in their representation, it is necessary to grant them a certain minimal number of deputies as it is common in the present European parliament and other current parliaments. My suggestion is that in the House of the People, every state is represented at least by three deputies which is intended also for the Federal Region of Brussels. I expect moreover that the European federation will have something like federal territories outside the member states and I grant them the right to at least one deputy. (I will return to the topic of federal territories in a separate post because I realized that I forgot some important things concerning them in previous articles of the proposed constitution.) What mathematical method should be used to apportion the deputies among the member states (and other parts) of the European federation I am not able to say now, so I leave details to a separate law (but I believe that the now used principle of so called degressive proportionality should be preserved also in the future and that a general mathematical principle should be used, not a trade-like “ad hoc” political deal as in the EU today).

The third paragraph of my suggestion speaks about the way of election of deputies of the House of the People. I have again to leave details to a separate law, the constitution should determine only the most important principles. I take for obvious what all constitutions write, namely that the election should be based on universal, direct, secret suffrage. If the constitution allocates a certain number of deputies to each state (or other territory of the federation), a necessity results from it that every member state is also a separate electoral district. It is advantageous for the reason too that in such districts, citizens will have a possibility to know candidates which would not be possible in the case of a list of candidates made for one electoral district comprising the whole territory of the federation (present proposals to put something similar through for the election in the European parliament are unreasonable and cannot bring what federalists expect of). Actually, it is an almost obvious thing, there are (more than one) electoral districts for legislative body's election in almost all states of the world. One more rule must be present in the third paragraph of this constitutional article in my opinion; it is not common in constitutions of federations but concrete experiences with the present intergovernmental European Union require it. There are no unified common rules of suffrage in the European Parliament election at the present time. Every state determines its own rules, it has to respect only three basic general rules. It reflects that the present European alliance of states, though it is called a union, is in fact no union (to promote this word in the title of the European community by the federalists was not a reasonable idea, because thus a genuine meaning of this word loses in value). The present European Union is in short a community (or a club) of independent states and realization of election to its  parliament-like representative body mirrors the fact. But if a European federation should be one state and if I have written that the House of the People represents the people of the Union, it is not possible that different rules in relation to the common federal state are in force. Somebody can take it for obvious but I prefer – having experience with the present manner of election to the European parliament – to add a sentence to the third paragraph saying that election to the House of the People is held in all member states (and other territories of the federation) in the same time and by the same rules.

The fourth paragraph of my suggestion determines a period during which a deputy of the House of the People executes his mandate. A standard period in parliaments of most European states is four years and I do not see any reason to determine another term of a deputy's service for the House of the People.

The following two suggested paragraphs determine a minimal age of candidates and their voters. The first of them, the fifth paragraph, says that every citizen of the Union who has reached his eighteenth year of age has the right to vote to the House of the People. The following sixth paragraph then determines the minimal age for a possibility to be elected (= passive suffrage). I determined this age to 21 years because it is a frequent age limit for this type of election in many European states; I believe furthermore that the age for public offices should be higher then the age of active suffrage.

The last, seventh paragraph  comprises a provision which is normally not present in constitutions of states. It says that nobody is allowed to be elected a deputy of the House of the People more than twice. Because it occurs in practice that political parties place some persons in their lists of candidates again and again and it happens considering known behaviour of voters that some persons serve as deputies of a legislative body for a long continuous period but thus they become professional politicians who lose contact with reality and those which they should represent. This provision therefore should prevent it.

Now is the turn of the House of States. The structure of the suggested article devoted to it will be very similar to the previous one. Its first paragraph has again two parts, it determines the role of this chamber and its size. The role of the House of States should be to represent the member states as I have written above. I wrote also about the size of the House of States (in the post http://federal-constitution-of-europe.blogspot.cz/2012/06/form-of-parliamentary-body.html). I suggested three deputies for each state there and also gave reasons that I had chose this number in order that the “upper” chamber has not disproportionate size in comparison with the “lower” one. For if to adopt every law requires agreement of both chambers, disproportionately less votes would be sufficient in one chamber than in the other one, if the House of States is too small in comparison to the House of the People (but I admit that in reality, there are great differences between two chambers of some bicameral parliaments).

A provision about the number of deputies representing other territorial units than the member states is located in the second paragraph. The Federal Region of Brussels should in my opinion have equal position as the states, namely three deputies, federal territories then one deputy because – if they exist – they will be territories of small number of inhabitants. Again: I will write about these in a future, already mentioned article.

The third paragraph speaks about a method of election of deputies of the House of States. But now, it is not necessary to determine unified rules. The House of States should represent the member states (and other territories) of the federation and every state (etc.) is a separate unit that determines its own rules in internal matters. Therefore is my opinion that also a method how every individual state elects its deputies to the House of States should be reserved to its free deliberation. So elections of deputies of the House of States in fact will in some extent be similar to election of deputies to the present European parliament that also has not universally unified rules. I believe that even more freedom to decide about the method of election of their deputies to the House of States should be given to the member states of the future European federation in comparison to the present “euro-elections” and only two general rules should be in force: the deputies shall be elected by a method respecting the principle of public administration responsible to the people and all deputies of all states should be delegated at the same time. I leave details to a separate law again.

Then length of service of deputies of the House of States is a question. It should be equal or longer (or shorter) than the mandate of deputies of the “lower” chamber? In some bicameral parliaments, deputies of the upper chamber are elected for longer period of time than deputies of the lower chamber, in other parliaments however, their length of service is equal. I decided for the second possibility for the House of States because I had chosen a principle earlier that both chambers should have equal position – and in that case, there is no reason for longer term of service of deputies of the House of States.

The fifth paragraph of my proposal determines again the age limitation for deputies. I will not determine a lower limit for active suffrage because I wrote that to decide about election of its deputies will be a business of each member state (etc.). What remains is to determine the lowest possible age of a deputy of the House of States. I determine it again in 21 years as in the case of the House of the People. But it is necessary to add one more limitation: a deputy delegated by the respective state (or other territory) must be its citizen, otherwise the House of States as a body of representatives of the member states would have no sense.

The same provision as in the case of the article about the House of the People is in the suggested last paragraph: nobody is allowed to be elected to the House of States more than twice.

It is all what I wanted to write about the federal legislative body of the European federation. My next post will bring a proposal of the constitutional text related to this matter.